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ABSTRACT
The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first, I 
present the general theoretical framework within which the arguments 
of the thesis are considered. This framework contains an interpretive 
semantic component (in the sense of Katz 1966a, 1972, Bierwisch 1969,
1971) and the formalism assumed is that of Bierwisch, I argue however 
that this formalism in effect constitutes a statement of the necessary 
and sufficient truth conditions on the sentences of a language and that 
this is the correct basis for natural-language semantics.
This hypothesis appears to be threatened by the concept of 
presupposition. In the second section, I therefore discuss two separate 
concepts of presupposition and consider the issues both raise for natural- 
language semantics. In brief, I argue (chapter if) that to incorporate 
a concept of presupposition defined in terms of speakers' belief has 
consequences which necessitate its exclusion by fiat from a formal 
linguistic theory. Furthermore I argue (chapters if-5) that a logically 
defined concept of presupposition refers to an empty set of sentences, 
since every postulated presupposition is in fact an example of an 
entailment relation. So I conclude that neither definition of 
presupposition should be part of natural-language semantics. Accordingly 
the semantic framework set up in the first part remains at present 
unfalsified. However in addition to such a semantics, in the final 
section I set up a theory of pragmatics (along lines suggested by Grice-, 
1957, 1961, 1968, 1969) to explain those aspects of sentences which are 
not captured by a truth-conditional (but non-presuppositional) semantics.
In over-all terms, my aim is two-fold: (i) to justify in some detail 
the formal properties of an interpretive semantic component (based on a 
non-presuppositional logic); and (ii) to suggest a tentative specification 
of a pragmatic theory as part of some more general theory of performance.
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CHAPTER 1 s Preliminariess The Linguistic Framework
1,1 Introduction
Throughout this thesis I shall assume that there is one aim which 
underpins all research within a theoretical linguistic framework - to 
explain the phenomenon of human language, to characterise how and why 
human language is distinct from other ordered hierarchical systems. 
Furthermore I take it for granted that this can in principle be achieved 
by the formulation of a theoretical framework which places constraints 
of a specific and clearly defined nature on the form a language might 
take, thus excluding all the forms it does not take. For example, one 
might claim that every language is a system expressing a relation 
between meaning and sound in the form of three levels, semantics, 
syntax, and phonology/phonetics, and that these are characterisable 
with particular types of rule-formulations• More specifically, within 
the framework of transformational grammar, one might claim (as I shall 
in fact be assuming) that every language can only be described with the 
appropriate generality if two separate levels of syntactic structure are 
set up - deep and surface structure; that the syntactic structure of 
a sentence in any language can invariably be characterised by a system 
of phrase structure rules which describe the hierarchical structure 
of the underlying level; that a system of ordered ’transformational* 
rules relate this level by a systematic series of phrase markers to 
the phrase marker which describes the superficial surface structure 
of the sentence; etc, etc. All statements of this kind constitute 
so-called formal linguistic universals (cf. Chomsky 1965, p.28 f.), and 
by their very nature it follows that if any one such claim can be
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Shown to be false for even a single language, this constitutes a 
falsification of the given framework as it stands* Thus even though 
only one language (say, English) may be under consideration, the 
transformational linguist is (or should be) concerned with the 
wider perspective of testing potential universal claims about 
language* I therefore offer no apology for using English as my 
sole source of data, despite the fact that my arguments concern 
the universal issue of the nature of meaning in natural language*
Apart from widespread agreement on the aim of linguistic 
inquiry, there is disappointingly little which can be taken for 
granted* As Postal pessimistically described the situation in 
1971, 'Serious grammatical investigation at the moment is rather 
like travelling in quicksand. There are no firm supports. Every 
step is uncertain. Every move is questionable.® This assessment 
of current research in syntax (Postal 1971 P#3), made fourteen 
years after the publication of Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957), 
is even more strikingly true of semantics, where there is no 
established theoretical framework, and even no agreement as to 
the premises on which to construct a framework. Nevertheless 
Leech apparently felt justified in suggesting in 19&9 with 
tentative optimism that linguists working in semantics were 
beginning to show agreement at least on the aims of a semantic theory 
(cf. Leech 19&9 p.*0*
To what extent was this optimism justified? The extent of the 
agreement can be quickly listed on one hand* There are four conditions 
which linguists working within the framework of a formal model of 
language would agree must be satisfied by a semantic theory (or
semantic component of a general theory);
(1) It must be able to predict the meaning of any sentence, and it
must do so on the basis of the meaning of the lexical items in that
sentence and the syntactic relations between those items - i.e. the 
model must state a systematic relation between the meaning of lexical 
items and the syntactic structure of the sentence. Moreover, where
a sentence has more than one interpretation, the model must predict 
the appropriate number of interpretations. (How these predictions 
are carried out will of course vary from theory to theory.)
(2) Since the set of sentences for any language constitute an 
infinite set, the semantic model must be made up of a finite set of 
predictive rules like its syntactic counterpart; the model cannot 
merely analyse an arbitrarily selected finite subset of this 
infinite set.
(3) The model must separate the infinite set of semantically non­
deviant sentences from another infinite set « that made up of 
contradictory or anomalous sentences, such as examples (X)—(8);
(1) John ran but he didn't move
(2) The man who was running was walking
(3) The girl is a boy
(if) Bachelors are married men
(5) Green ideas sleep furiously
(6) Ideas ran to catch the train
(7) Safety likes to be treated gently
(8) The boulders got married
1, Whether or not the model should treat contradictory and anomalous sentences 
as ungrammatical (i.e. not well-formed) is not generally agreed upon.
For conflicting views, cf. Katz 1972, Jackendoff 1972, McCawley 1971*
Lakoff 1971b. For further discussion of contradictory and anomalous 
sentences in this thesis, cf. p.16 fn.ll ch.2 p.6*ff.
2. The existence of non-anomalous metaphorical interpretations for these 
sentences is not predicted, since in order to explain a metaphorical 
interpretation on a sentence, one needs to refer to its literal 
interpretation (cf. ch.7 P*2@5X The statement of the literal inter­
pretations of sentences is therefore logically prior to the analysis 
of metaphor.
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(4) The model must be able to predict meaning relations between
sentences, e.g. entailment (cf. ch.3 p. 82), contradiction and
synonymy (cf. ch.2 p. 64), since these relations hold by virtue of
the meanings of sentences. These four demands are agreed in principle
by all linguists.
But there the agreement ends. The old problem of what constitutes
3the meaning of sentences raises its ugly head again. There seem to me
to be two principal alternatives; either meaning can be defined in terms
of conditions for the truth of sentences - i.e. be defined in terms of
the relation between sentences (and lexical items) and the external
L
world they describe; or it can be defined in terms of conditions on 
the use of sentences in communication - i.e. be defined in terms of the 
relation of sentences to the speech act, the speaker of the sentence, 
etc. But it was on just this question of the delimitation of meaning 
that Leech suggested that there had been 'a movement towards agreement'
(p.4). How is it that Leech's optimistic view is not borne out? The 
difficulty arises when the notion of presupposition is incorporated 
into linguistics; because presupposition, like meaning, can be defined 
in one of two ways - either as a relation between statements (parallel 
to entailment, synonymy etc), or as a property of the speaker's belief 
in uttering a sentence. And only one of these definitions is compatible 
with a definition of meaning in terms of truth conditions. Yet if the 
presuppositions of a sentence are part of its semantic interpretation 
then by definition they are part of its meaning. Thus if presuppositions
3. Cf. Ogden and Richards 1923 for the classic collection of definitions 
of meaning,
4. I shall argue in ch,2 that Katz' and Bierwisch's and Leech's positions 
are not genuine alternatives to this.
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in terms of speaker-belief are considered to be part of the semantic 
interpretation of sentences, then it seems that the meaning of sentences 
must be in terms of speaker-hearer relations and not, or not solely, in 
terms of the relation between a symbol and the state or object it 
describes. My main concern in this thesis will therefore be to 
determine the exact nature of presupposition and to consider its 
relevance to an analysis of natural language. The main arguments of 
this thesis are thus exclusively semantic.
However the basis outlines of a formal model of language are 
currently so confused and provoke so much disagreement, that before 
broaching the main thesis, I shall briefly justify certain hypotheses 
about the nature of syntax and semantics which I shall assume to be 
correct for the remainder of the thesis.
1.2 The justification of Deep Structure and The Relation of Syntax
and Semantics
One of the major problems of current work in both syntax and
semantics is that there is no real agreement as to what constitutes
evidence about syntactic structure. This is a potentially dangerous
disagreement, since it is a fundamental issue for all arguments
pertaining to syntax, and yet it is one which at least until recently
5many linguists have appeared to assume is not in question. The 
position they adopt over the nature of syntax may thus be an unspecified 
premise for the argument and not part of the argument itself. Since 
the delimitation of syntax goes hand in hand with the delimitation of
3* For a particularly striking example, cf. Lakoff 1970b*
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semantics, the answer to the question ’What constitutes syntax?* is of 
equal importance for those arguing about the formal nature of semantics 
as it is to those worrying about syntax. I shall therefore review 
briefly (section 1.2.1) the types of evidence which have been used to 
justify deep structure and I shall argue that the only arguments which 
are relevant to the determination of some such syntactically defined 
level are those which depend on evidence of formal distributions.
On the basis of this, I shall then discuss (section 1.2.2) evidence 
which suggests that the constraints on syntactic structure are different 
in kind from those of semantics and that the widely held view that there 
is no distinction between syntax and semantics (cf. McCawley 1968,
Postal 1970* Lakoff 1971a) is a mistaken one. Since these latter 
arguments in particular are not original, I shall present them with 
a minimum of detail* I refer the reader to the original for the 
discussion in full.
1.2.1 Criteria for Deep-Structure Analyses: Selectional Resti'ictions 
While the original claim of two syntactic levels - deep and 
surface structure - has remained inviolate since its formulation by 
Chomsky in 1957, the detailed justification for and definition of 
deep structure have altered in several important ways, and this has 
a direct bearing on the status of semantics in the grammar. There 
are three alternative sets of criteria for deep structure which have 
been considered. Pre-Aspects, the justification for underlying structure 
was of two main types, arguments depending on formal distribution of 
elements, and arguments depending on selectional restrictions between 
lexical items. Thus for example it is necessary to set up a more 
abstract level of syntax in which you is the subject of imperative
-12-
sentences if one is to capture tlie obvious generalisation for tag- 
question formation and reflexivisation that only you and yourself 
respectively can occur in imperatives containing tags or reflexive 
pronouns, and no other pronoun. I give this argument in brief as a 
demonstration of a 'formal* argument and I shall not give further 
details of this by now standard argument (cf. Postal 1964), Examples 
of arguments depending on co-occurrence constraints, the other main 
evidence for underlying structure, are legion.
The first unified specification of the form a linguistic theory 
should take and the relations betv/een its components was in 1964-5 
with Katz and Postal 1964 and Chomsky 1965, and it is the 
definition of deep structure given in the latter that has been the 
source of controversy since. In this second formulation, there were 
three types of argument justifying the level of deep structure: 
formal arguments, arguments involving selectional restrictions, and 
(secondarily) synonymy between sentences,^ Each of these criteria 
reflect (directly or indirectly) a different defining condition on 
deep structure: that it is the level at which syntactic relations
are stated explicitly, that it is the level at which lexical items 
are inserted and selectional constraints operate, and that it is 
the level which determines the semantic interpretation of a sentence* 
Furthermore it is the level immediately prior to any transformations. 
Notice that if synonymy is included as a justification for underlying 
structure then this justification is no longer solely syntactic - it 
is partly semantic.
6* In fact Katz and Postal were careful to mention this as a consequence 
of their definition and not a defining criterion. But it was widely 
accepted as a defining function of deep structure*
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The third method of defining and justifying deep structure is to
allow one type of argument only - the formal arguments* This is the
most rigidly syntactic of the three possibilities and it is this
that I wish to put in a plea for. Neither synonymy nor selectional
restrictions are allowed as evidence. Using synonymy as a criterion
is to assume that a semantic generalisation should be expressed in
terms of a syntactic generalisation. Such an assumption predetermines
the nature of the relation between syntax and semantics and leads
directly to a generative semantics position. But as any first-year
logic student knows, the proof that fp' from the premise that 'p*
is trivial, I shall therefore not assume that synonymy has any
necessary bearing on syntactic structure. However, this third formulation
also excludes the use of evidence from selectional restrictions. Why
is such evidence suspect?
In Aspects, selectional restrictions are defined as a syntactic
blocking mechanism on the insertion of verbs into the output of the
phrase-structure rules; and they are stated in terms of the lexical
properties of the preceding and following nouns. But McCawley
7cogently argues (1968 and elsewhere) that selectional restrictions
8are not a syntactic constraint but a semantic one. This being so, 
they are not evidence for a syntactically defined deep structure.
There are five pieces of evidence that a blocking mechanism of the 
kind outlined above cannot be corrects
1) Such a constraint must be stated in terms of the semantic properties 
of the entire noun phrase, and not in terms merely of the surrounding
7# In fact he takes a stronger position, but this is not relevant to 
the argument at this point. Cf. McCawley 1971' •
8, For a good summary of the arguments against considering selectional 
restrictions syntactic, cf. Jackendoff 1972 pp.l8 ff.
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nouns, because Our male cousin became pregnant is just as deviant as 
Our brother became pregnant, and for the same reasons (cf. McCawley
1968 p.133 f.).
2) In every case where a selectional restriction looks like involving
a syntactic feature it is in fact semantic. Consider the contrast 
between singular and plural, and the necessary non-singular 
specification of the object noun phrase of the verb count (cf. ibid 
P.134 f.):
(9) *1 counted John
(10) I counted the boys
But I counted the crowd is also grammatical and this suggests that it 
is not the syntactic specification plural which is demanded but the 
semantic implication of plurality, Cf. also the distinction between 
who and which, generally thought to be syntactic and the following 
sentences, where the head noun preceding who and which is identical in 
each case:
(11) The one who is most interesting is John
(12) *The one which is most interesting is John
(13) *The one who is most interesting is Aspects
(14) The one which is most interesting is Aspects
3) When embedded as a complement to verbs such as say, selectional 
restrictions can be broken without deviance:
(15) John said that rocks get diabetes
(16) John claimed that men get pregnant
(17) Our five-year old son told Mary that stones have babies
4) In certain negative environments, selectional restrictions can 
also be broken without causing deviance:
(18) A rock doesn't get diabetes
(19) Worms don't worry about money
(20) Men don't get pregnant
(21) It's not true that a rock gets tired
-15-
In both of these two last cases, a Chomskian blocking mechanism on 
lexical insertion has to be prevented from applying; because if it 
applies, the syntax will not generate for example rock as the subject 
of jjpt diabetes at all irrespective of the larger syntactic environment.
Any constraint which applies obligatorily except when it has an ad 
hoc caveat that it doesn't is suspicious,
5) Where a verb or adjective has a particular selectional restriction 
and the noun it modifies is unmarked for that specification, the 
resulting phrase is interpreted as having that specification as part 
of its meaning:
(22) John hit it
(23) That person is pregnant^
(24) Those that get pregnant sometimes regret it
Thus the Hast example is interpreted as having a subject which is 
female, human and adult, and this interpretation is due to the 
selectional specification of pregnant that its subject be female 
and adult (but not necessarily human) and the selectional specification 
of regret that its subject be human. Chomsky's formulation of 
selectional restrictions offers no account of this last set since 
selectional constraints are syntactic and do not operate in the 
semantic interpretation of a sentence - they are merely a condition 
on lexical insertion. Katz's formulation of selectional restrictions 
as a constraint on the operation of the semantic interpretation rules 
(cf. Katz and Fodor 1963) meets similar problems. Ad-hoc caveats have 
to be added for these cases.
9, With pregnant we enter the problematic realm of what constitutes knowledge 
of the language (viz. the meaning of pregnant) and what merely knowledge 
of the world (viz. our knowledge of which sex gives birth to children).
For present purposes however I am simply assuming that it is part of 
the lexical specification of pregnant that it apply to females.
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But if selectional specifications are analysed as a semantic
property of the verb in question no different in kind from its
inherent properties, then there is a natural solution to all the sentences
given above* Our male cousin became pregnant will be ruled out as a
contradiction by virtue of the joint specification of the subject as
male and female (cf. p*26 for an explicit formulation of contextual
specification in terms of semantic components); John said that rocks
get diabetes will not be ruled as deviant by virtue of the semantic
10property of the verb say; Worms don’t worry about money will not be
ruled as deviant since the specification of ’human* on the subject of
worry is interpreted as falling within the scope of negation (cf, John
isn’t a woman) (Cf. section 1.3*3 for a discussion of negation); and
the interpretation of sentences such as Those taatget sometimes
regret it follows as an automatic consequence since the specification
of the subject as human, female, and adult, simply is part of the
11meaning of the lexical items and hence of the sentence itself*
Furthermore, this analysis of selectional specification of lexical 
items as a part of their meaning makes an important and correct 
prediction (a sixth piece of evidence that selectional restrictions 
are semantic in nature): all synonymous lexical items will have
identical selectional restrictions (even when they are syntactically 
distinct - viz. singular versus plural), and hence all synonymous 
sentences will have the same commutation potential:
(25) John used a knife to cut the cake
(26) *John used milk to cut the cake
10. Verbs such as dream, believe,with the same property are discussed on 
pp. 104 ff, 138T7T36“ff7—
11. It follows from this that there is no longer any distinction in kind 
between anomaly and contradiction. Of. Bierwisch 1969 fu.13 for a 
critical assessment of this distinction.
(27
(28
(29
(30
(31
(32
(33
(34
(33
(36
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John cut the cake with a knife 
♦John cut the cake with milk
The mother of John „. • •.
♦The mother of dust ...
The woman who gave to John
♦The woman who gave "birth to dust . ...
John killed Mary 
♦John killed milk 
John caused Mary to die 
♦John caused milk to die
If this is argument is correct and selectional restrictions constitute 
part of the meaning of lexical items, then selectional restrictions 
are no more relevant to a justification of underlying structure than 
shared synonymy. If either is used as evidence of deep structure, 
then the relation between syntax and semantics can no longer be 
argued about; it has been assumed.
1.2.2 The Independence of Syntax and Semantics
Nothing I have said so far provides any evidence as to the nature
of the relation between syntax and semantics; my argument has merely
been that only formal distributional arguments are relevant in
considering the problem. This coi^ braint excludes many arguments which
have been put forward. The issue of the interdependence or otherwise
of syntax and semantics thus rests on whether synonymous structures have
the same syntactic potential* The evidence so far available suggests
that they do not. Fodor (1969) points out that John killed Mary and
John caused Mary to die differ in their constraints on adverbial
12modification and on pronominalisation. His evidence is of three kinds;
12* I am assuming here that kill and cause to die do not differ in 
meaning. This has been questioned. Cf, Jackendoff 19?24p.27f.
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(a) a two-verbsStructure can have an interpretation such, that the 
two activities referred to occur at different times, a possibility 
which is not open to a simple clause structure; viz.
(36) John caused Mary to die on Saturday by poisoning her on Friday
(37) *John killed Mary on Saturday by poisoning her on Friday
(b) a two^ verb structure allows either verb phrase to be pronominalised 
by do so, v/here a one-verb structure allows only one possibility;
(38) Eva caused James Bond to die and everybody was surprised that
she did so
(39) Eva caused James Bond to die and everybody was surprised that
he did so
(40) Eva killed James Bond and everybody was surprised that she did so
(41) ♦Eva killed James Bond and everybody was surprised that he did so
(c) there are instrumental adverbial constructions which modify only the 
underlying subject of a sentence (as in John got in touch with Mary by 
using the telephone, which cannot mean that Mary used the telephone), 
and these are a source of ambiguity in a cause to die construction but 
not in a sentence containing kill. Thus John caused Bill to die by 
swallowing his tongue is ambiguous; John killed Bill by swallowing his 
tongue is not. In order to explain the first constraint in a framework 
in which cause to die and kill have the same underlying structure, there 
has to be a special caveat on the transformational rule of lexical 
insertion that it only takes place if a modifying sentential adverbial 
does not contain contradictory time specification. To explain the 
distribution of do so, lexical insertion has to be before pronominalisation 
though there is conflicting evidence with melt that lexical insertion
must be after pronominalisation; and to explain (c) one would have to 
give up the apparently well-attested generalisation that such instrumental
-19-
adverbials are restricted to deep structure subject modification.
However each of the paradigms is explained naturally if the under­
lying structure of kill is a simple NP KP ]] structures all
the constraints then follow as an automatic consequence «* a simple 
sentence cannot take conflicting adverbials, do so is a verb phrase 
pro-form and there is no verb phrase corresponding to the do so in (41),
John killed Bill by swallowing his tongue is unambiguous because there 
is only one subject in the sentence.
Furthermore, Chomsky (1969) has provided evidence that a syntactically 
defined concept of deep structure along the lines of Aspects (1965) provides 
a natural account of the distinction between derived nominals such as 
destruction, belief, death, etc., and the corresponding gerundive con­
structions. These two types of constructions have many of the properties 
that have commonly been said to indicate shared underlying structure - viz. 
selectional restrictions, identical subject-verb-object relations. How­
ever, as Chomsky points out, they do not have the same freedom of 
occurrence. Derived nominals only enter constructions which parallel 
deep structure configurations and not derived structure configurations.
Thus we get
(42) John's proof of the theorem
(43) John's destruction of the enemy
(44) John's death
(45) John's desire to go
(46) *John*s likelihood to go
(47) *John's appearance to be sick
(48) *John's easiness to ignore
(49) John's eagerness to be helpful
This paradigm is significantly different from gerundives, which are 
formed freely from both deep structures and derived structures:
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(50
(51
(52
(55
(54
(55
(56
(57
John’s proving the theorem 
John's destroying the enemy 
tfchn's dying 
John's desiring to go 
John's being likely to go 
John's appearing to be sick 
John's being easy to ignore 
John's being eager to be helpful
Gerundives and nominals differ further in that the former are sentential
in nature: they can contain aspect, the gerundive itself allows adverbial
modification but not adjectival modification, and John in the above
examples is not replaceable by determiners. Derived nominals differ
in each of these respects: John can be replaced by a wide range of
determiners, the nominal can be modified by the full range of
adjectives but not by adverbs, and no aspectual modification is possible.
Thus we have the following sets of sentences:
(58:
(59 
(60 
(61 
(62
(65
(64
(65
John's having deceived Mary upset Bob 
John's deliberately deceiving Mary upset Bob 
♦John's deliberate deceiving Mary upset Bob 
♦The deliberate deceiving Mary upset Bob 
♦John's having deception of Mary upset Bob
♦John's deliberately deception of Mary upset Bob 
John's deliberate deception of Mary upset Bob 
The deliberate deception of Mary upset Bob
For some premodified nominals the derivation from an underlying verbal 
structure is even difficult to conceive e.g. John's three linguistics 
qualifications are rather inferior. Thus while gerundives have 
sentential properties derived nominals have the internal structure of 
noun phrases. In order to capture this distinction, and yet retain the 
generalisation that they contain identical subject-object relations, 
Chomsky suggested describing gerundives transformationally in the
-21-
normal way, but describing derived nominals by extending the base to
generate them directly. The following phrase-markers demonstrate the
different underlying structures for John's destroying the enemy.
John's destruction of the enemy and for the intransitive expressions
13John's dying. John's death:
John destroy 
Fig. I
Det N
the enemy
NP
Det 
Poss
John
NP
N
Fig.II
NP
Complement
destroy the enemy
NP VP
John
V
I
die
Fig.Ill
13# Cf. Ch.6 for an argument in favour of a different deep structure to 
that given here for £prundives. The difference is not however relevant 
to Chomsky's argument and I am ignoring it here.
John die
Fig,IV
The most striking difference is perhaps that die and destroy are entered
direetly under a noun node in Figures II and IV respectively. The details
IZl
of this formulation are not important at this point. The interest lies 
in the consequent dictionary entries. All verbs which have derived nom­
inals will have disjunct lexical entries along the lines of destroy and die
DESTROY‘D  j + [ NP]
[CAUSE]J^ (NOT X2)
-j- Cv] + Cn ]
p ie  i  _____]
[BECOME] Xx (not [alive] x^
[ANIMATE] XL 
h-[V]'^^T[N]
Both destroy and die are given lexical entries in which the semantic 
properties are neutral as to their syntactic function (noun or verb).
This will be true for the great majority of verbs. Their lexical 
entries will contain a disjunction between noun and verb, together 
with a common core of properties which are common to these two syntactic 
realisations. But analysing lexical entries as having a common core of
14. For purposes of exegesis I shall retain the standard notation through­
out this thesis.
15• Binary features (preceded by *+* are syntactic features. Others are 
semantic. The specification of the semantic features is only 
approximate. For a detailed justification of the form of semantic 
features, cf. p.24 ff, I ignore the phonological specification.
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semantic properties with more than one syntactic realisation of this 
semantic core is equivalent to presenting the claim that syntax and 
semantics constitute two distinct levels of structure, since it 
allows identity on either level without this pre-determining identity 
at the other level, even within a single lexical item*
It is on the strength of evidence of the kind presented in this 
section that I assume that the constraints imposed by syntactic 
structure are not co-extensive with those of semantics. This stand 
leads to two consequent assumptions which provide the theoretical 
background to all the arguments in this thesis: (a) syntactic constructs 
in general must be defined and justified without reference to semantics,
(b) the semantic analysis of a sentence does not automatically lead to 
a reflex in the syntactic structure of that sentence.
1,3 On The Nature of Semantic Features and The Semantic Component 
While the nature of the rules of the semantic component remains 
quite unclear, this problem is not one with which I shall deal in any 
detail in this thesis. I shall merely assume for the sake of exegesis 
that semantic specification operates largely along the lines suggested 
by Bierwisch (1969, 1971)* In this formulation, the rules of the 
semantic component are interpretive in so far as they are dependent 
on a semantic specification of lexical items in the lexicon and the 
syntactic information provided by the underlying structure of a 
sentence (in this respect like Katz).
16. I shall therefore be largely ignoring the work done by logicians such 
Montague, Lewis etc whose semantics are interpretive in the stricter 
sense of defining a function which maps sentences into a model.
Cf. Montague 1968, 1972, Lewis 1972*
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1.3.1 On the Form of Semantic Features
One important respect in which Bierwisch differs from Chomsky 
(1963) and Katz (1964, 1966) is in the form of the minimal semantic 
unit. Bierwisch formulates semantic components along the lines 
defined by predicate calculus, and not in a different x^ ay as do 
Katz and Leech. One of the chief reasons for not using predicate 
calculus as the basis for description seems to have been the common 
assumption that the semantic properties of lexical items, like their 
phonological and syntactic properties, could be formulated in terms 
of binary features (whether implicitly, like Katz, or explicitly, like 
Leech), However it is apparent that binary features must be 
inadequate for analysing terms such as transitive verbs which 
express a relation between two objects, e.g. kill, chase, etc., 
since such features are equivalent to a one-place predicate and 
hence are not a suitable means of formalising two-place relations.
Thus [MALE] X, [HUMAN] X, [ADULT] X,*^ can be rewritten as the binary 
feature complex +MALE ^ +HUMAN^  '+ADULT'j but [CAUSE] X^ ( [DTE]X^  ) 
cannot be reformulated in binary features in any transparent way*
The nearest equivalent is perhaps .tj-CAUSATIVE, +RELATIONAL, * DEATH, 
which is obviously unsatisfactory. Moreover both Katz' (cf. Katz 
1966, 1967} and Leech's attempts to overcome this deficiency 
necessitate dubious additions to the semantic metalanguage, which to 
the extent that they are adequately justified are terminological 
variants of predicate calculus formulations (cf, Bierwisch 1969
17* I adopt here the format of Bierwisch. A predicate is thus listed 
first in sequence, followed by its argument(s). Propositional 
arguments are enclosed in round brackets*
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l8for detailed criticisms of Katz* extended component system)*
I shall therefore - like Bierwisch (cf, also Weinreich 1962, Bendix 
1966) » assume that semantic properties of lexical items can most 
appropriately be described by the formulae of predicate calculus, 
construing features as predicates with unbound variables indexed for 
subject and object (and indirect object in the case of three-place 
predicates such as give)* There are however several respects in 
which the semantic apparatus differs from that of predicate calculus, 
One of these is the need to have propositions functioning as 
arguments. Thus for example the lexical entry for kill would be;
KILL ; + [____ NP]
[CAUSE] ( [BECOME] ( NOT [ALIVE] ^ p¥p))
[ANIMATE] ^jpyp
+ [N] -f[V]
In each case the variable X is given a syntactic index. In the first 
component above, X and the proposition ( [BECOME] ( NOT [ALIVE] X )) 
function as arguments of the predicate [CAUSE], the proposition 
(NOT [ALIVE] X) is the argument of the one-place predicate [BECOME], 
and [ALIVE] has X as argument. Implicit in this formulation is the 
assumption that the semantic properties of lexical items are expressed 
in terms of the contribution the items make to the meaning of a sentence*
A further complication of predicate calculus is the need to have 
predicates as arguments for predicates. This is necessary in order to make 
explicit the meaning cf for example run, as
l8. The revision of Katz's system in Katz 1972 is not substantially 
different from earlier versions and is therefore open to the same 
criticisms.
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RUN % I [FAST] MOTION ]}^ g . [LEGS] 3^ g
* [ [PHYSICAL] ACTIVITY ]^ips . [ANIMATE]^p Q 1 9
There is one principal difference between the formulation used 
here and that of Bierwisch, Unlike Bierwisch (1969), I recognise 
no difference in status between so-called selectional restrictions 
and inherent properties (cf 1,2,1), Kill thus contains as part of 
its meaning the specification that its object is animate. This 
specification is not a condition on the operation of projection 
rules in the manner of Katz and Bierwisch; it is no different in 
status from the specification of the action itself. This is 
essentially equivalent to the transfer-feature mechanism of 
V/einreich 1966 (cf, also Leech 1969), This latter is a means of 
allowing properties of the verb to be ’transferred* to neighbouring 
noun phrases, to account for the contextual specification of the kind 
demonstrated in Those that get pregnant sometimes regret it. The 
necessity for such a mechanism is however solely due to the lack of 
specification in binary features of what it is that the components 
describe. Since there is no explicit indication of what the components 
are predicated of, there is no means of distinguishing cases where 
components are specifications of different arguments • Thus the 
complication involved by this process is a direct consequence of 
using a binary feature specification for semantic components. The 
problem simply does not arise in a lexical entry in which semantic 
components are construed as predicates with variables which indicate 
which noun phrase functions as its argument.
19. I am assuming the standard definition of '.1 as and.
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Each of the lexical entries given here depends on some form of 
redundancy rule completing the specification of its meaning. For 
example:
[HUMAN] X  --■* [ANIMATE] X
[ANIMATE] X  -- 4 [CONCRETE] X
In fact the lexical entry for run given aboyse could he simplified if
the following redundancy rule v/as taken into account:
PO
[ACTIVITY v MOTION] X — --» [ [PHYSICAL] ACTIVITY ] X
The need for these rules is very generally recognised. However their 
complexity has been discussed in detail only by Bierwisch (1969)» who 
points out that many redundancy rules must be of a form 
[M] — 9 [ [M] N ]
rather than a mere addition of features. Thus for example a full 
specification of woman would not be in the form:
[FEMALE] X . [HUMAN] X . [ANIMATE] X . [CONCRETE] X . [ADULT] X
Wt rather in the more complex hierarchical form:
[ [ [FEMALE . HUMAN . ADULT] ANIMATE ] CONCRETE ] X
since the minimal entry [FEMALE] X • [HUMAN] X . [ADULT] X would be 
subject to redundancy rules:
[FEMALE] X *--- £  [ [FEMALE] ANIMATE ] X
[HUMAN] X ---[ [HUMAN] ANIMATE ] X
[ADULT] X  £ [ [ADULT] ANIMATE ] X
PI
[ANIMATE] X ■> [[ANIMATE] CONCRETE] X
This hierarchy Is not only needed to account for relations of inclusion 
between properties but also to account for the behaviour of semantic 
complexes under negation (cf. section 1.3*3)•
20. Cf. Bierwisch ibid p.170 f#
21. Bierwisch's formulation is:
[[RED*] v [[BLUE]*] v [[GREEN]*] v ...  -- £ [COLOR]
but the difference is not substantive ('*' is interpreted as a place* 
holder for the more inclusive term). I have preferred the simpler 
formulation for purposes of clarity.
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There is one further potential criticism here which must be 
rebutted. It might be argued that the semantic structure postulated 
for kill is terminologically equivalent to the following phrase-markers
Fig.V
neg NP
alive become
Anyone holding this position would presumably further argue that since
all semantic representations can be represented in the form of a phrase*
marker, the syntax-semantics dichotomy is untenable and is reduced to 
22mere terminology. It is indeed a consequence of my position that the 
semantic representation of the sentence John caused Mary to die is 
similar in many respects to its syntactic representation , and the 
semantic representation can be presented in a form which accentuates 
the similarity:
Proposition
Proposition" Proposition
Argument Predicate Argument Predicate
animate
Argument
Proposition
Argument""”"" ^  Predicate 
Pro^Qsit^n^^^^
Operator Argument Predicate
X. cause NOT X, alive become
Fig.VI
22. This is implicit in some of the work by linguists such as McCawley,
Postal, Lakoff etc. Cf. McCawley 19685 and Chomsky 1972 for an argument 
against any such assumption on the grounds of its vacuity.
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S
NP Aux VP
NP VP
N V| I
John past cause Mary die
Fig. VII
However, there is one crucial difference - the labelling of the 
relations. Figure VI uses the terms Proposition, Argument, Predicate
and Operator, whereas Figure VII uses S, NP, Aux, Tense, VP, V, N.
And this distinction is not merely terminological. All that is 
conveyed by the terms in Figure VI is:
Argument : nonrelational term
Predicate s relational term
Proposition: combination of argument and predicate 
Operator : terra which alters argument-predicate relation
There is no more specification of the properties and relations than this. 
And apart from the addition of quantifiers, this list constitutes the 
entire metavocabulary of semantics. Now while this is a form of syntax 
in so far as it relates items syntagmatically, it is not a syntax of any 
specific language. Moreover it is so general that it can describe any 
system of relations such as mathematics, biological systems, and systems 
such as those describing growing cells. What is common between linguistic 
syntax and predicate calculus is that both use linking and hierarchical 
relations: there are concatenation relations between Argument-Predicate
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and between subject and verb, and there are hierarchical relations 
between propositions and also between sentences* The difference 
between them lies in the very much greater abstractness of the 
relations in the semantic structure and, conversely, in the specification 
of the relations in syntax - the labelling. Since the information 
given in the semantic structure is so general, the fact that it can 
be represented in the form of a phrase-marker merely states, trivially, 
that semantics, like syntax, involves hierarchical relations. Such 
a conclusion is hardly justification for renouncing the distinction 
between syntax and semantics. Hexorder to justify rejecting the 
distinction, one needs to argue that the labels NP, N, V, Aux etc 
are relevant to semantics, a claim that Chomsky's disjunct lexical 
entry specifications (cf. p. 22 ) implicitly deny.
1.3*2 On the Nature of the 'Projection' Rules
The rules providing the semantic interpretation of a sentence are
dependent on the semantic specification of the lexical items as fully
interpreted by the redundancy rules, and their syntactic relations
as defined by the deep structure phrase-marker. In addition, Bierwisch1s
system of interpretive rules depends on all noun phrases having a
23reference index as part of their deep-structure specification. These 
reference indices are substituted for the grammatical index specified 
in the lexical entry and all the components are combined to form an 
unordered conjoint set (i.e. joined by These 'projection'
rules are constrained by the syntactic indices on the lexical items*
Tfoese must match the noun phrase whose referential index is to be
23. Cf. Ch.2 for an independent justification of this position.
Exceptions to this general statement are considered in ch.5, P»l62£.
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substituted (in the case of a noun, the grammatical index must match 
the noun phrase immediately dominating it)• Thus for example the 
phrase marker in Figure VIII f
NP. VP
NP,
Det N Det
kill 
+ [V]
+ [ NP]
the woman 
+ [N]
[[[MALE*HUMAN.ADILT] [CAUSE] ^ g( [BECOME] [[[FEMALE.HUMAN.ADULT]
ANIMATE] CONCRETE] (NOT [ALIVE] -yp) ) ANIMATE] CONCRETE] X
. [[ANIMATE]CONCRETE]
Fig. VIII
is interpreted as:
[[[MALE . HUMAN . ADULT] ANIMATE] CONCRETE] X ±  .
[[[FEMALE . HUMAN . ADULT] ANIMATE] CONCRETE] X* .
2
[CAUSE] ( [BECOME] (NOT [ALIVE] X2> ) . [[ANIMATE] CONCRETE] X ^ 3
Any specification which is given twice is then deleted, thus avoiding
redundancy (in this case [[ANIMATE] CONCRETE] X_
d
When all the semantic rules have taken place, there are well- 
formedness conditions blocking any interpretation containing conflicting 
components. Thus for example both The man is a woman and The man is
2 k . a x  [NP,S] v [NP,VP] v ENP,PP], where *v' here and in all subsequent 
formulations corresponds to logically inclusive or.
23. I ignore here the problem of the definite article. For a more detailed 
analysis, cf. ch.3-6.
26. For further details, cf. Bierwisch 1969*
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pregnant will be said not to be well-formed sentences of the language
ii m n w g^&Miwwi— —
by virtue of their contradictory semantic components (cf, fn 131
of this chapter on the putative distinction between anomaly and 
27
contradiction)• For details of this procedure cf. Katz 1964 
p.526 f, Bierwisch 1969 p.164.
1.5.3 Negation
The semantic rules of interpretation are not exhausted by the 
projection rules of substitution. Additional rules are needed to 
interpret negative sentences, and there are special problems over these 
which constitute the core of the disagreement over presupposition. The 
problems I shall consider later (cf. ch.4-6). Here I merely wish to 
set up a formal means of describing the interpretation of negative 
sentences. A detailed formulation was set up for negative sentences 
first by Katz (1964) , and this was improved and generalised by 
Bierwisch to cover all types of sentences and all types of semantic 
marker, simple and complex. I shall assume here that the latter is 
the more sophisticated and I shall not deal with Katz* (1964) 
formulation (it has three caveats which both reduce its over-all 
generality and detract from its initial plausibility). In both Katz* 
and Bierwisch*s formulation the rule is, in essence, a strict translation 
into componential terms of the logical equivalence defined by de Morgan 
(a borrowing which is not admitted by Katz though explicitly stated 
by Bierwisch), This states that for any conjoint set of items
27. I shall assume the correctness of this type of constraint merely for 
the sake of exegesis. A plausible alternative would be to demand that 
the semantics merely has to characterise them as a natural set, rather 
than exclude them as not well-formed. Evidence in support of this view 
is provided by the necessity of a pragmatic maxim (cf. ch.7) that 
speakers tell the truth. The deviance of contradictions is thus captured 
by rules of communication. The problem is on this view parallel to self- 
embedded constructions whose deviance is explained by some theory of 
memory rather than by the specifically linguistic competence model.
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(whether they be properties, objects or statements), the negation of 
that conjoint set is equivalent to the disjunct set of the negation 
of each member of that set, vizi 
- (p . q) s' -p v -q 
Thus to take a simple example in componential terms, It was a girl
has the interpretation that the object described was female AND
young AND human AND animate etc, but It wasn't a girl then has the 
interpretation that the object described was either not female OR 
not young OR not human OR not animate*
There are several complications to this statement. Both Katz
and Bierwisch analyse negation in terms of an "antonymy operator".
This is defined as follows!
For any antonymous set of components .... M^ the
antonymy operator (A/M^ ) of some arbitrary component fh 
is V v ... v M± x .... Mn).
For those cases such as A^NIMATE] which are sole members of their set;
A/M s -M (i)
It follows from these definitions that A/A/M^ - M^ , Bierwisch 
extends this to complex markers such that for any markers M and N 
(either simple or complex)j
A/[M . N] - [A/M v A/N] (ii)
(equivalent exactly to de Morgan's law)
A/[ [M] N] s [ [A/M]N v A/N ] (iii)
(deducible from de Morgan's equivalences - cf. Bierwisch 1969 P* ) 
The interpretation of a negative sentence is then derived as follows 
(ignoring for the moment problems of scope)?
-y*-
Given Neg S where S is interpreted as a conjoint set of semantic
components (p^  * p^  • P-^ *.... pn) either simple or complex, Neg S
is replaced by A/S.
A / S  B A / p 1  v A/p2 v A/p^ v .***. v A/pn
By this rule the interpretation of It wasn't a woman is predictable
2 8in the following way* The semantic specification of woman was given 
earlier as:
[c[FEMALE * HUMAN , ADULT] ANIMATE] CONCRETE X 
Thus NEG [[[FEMALE . HUMAN . ADULT] ANIMATE] CONCRETE] X is replaced by 
A/[[[FEMALE . HUMAN . ADULT] ANIMATE] CONCRETE] X 
E(by ffiL)CV[CFFMALE * HUMAN . ADULT] ANIMATE] CONCRETE v A/CONCRETE] X29 
S(by ^  [[A/[FEMALE . HUMAN * ADULT] ANIMATE]CONCRETE v [A/ANIMATE]CONCRETE
v A/CONCRETE ] X3° 
s(by CCA/FEMALE v A/HUMAN v A/ADULT] ANIMATE]CONCRETE
v [A/ANIMATE]CONCRETE V A/CONCRETE ] X 
=(by i) ^  MALE v -HUMAN v -ADULT] ANIMATE]CONCRETE] X 
a b _c
v [[-ANIMATE] CONCRETE] X v [-CONCRETE] X 
d e
The or in each case is the logically inclusive or, with the additional 
constraint that readings containing contradictory components will be 
rejected as an impossible interpretation by the output condition 
mentioned earlier (p*31f)• So if [ANIMATE] is negated, as in (d), it 
cannot be combined with a semantic complex containing [ANIMATE], as in 
Q*} » (k) * or (■£) • Informally what the rule states in this example is
28* I here assume the incorrect simplification that negating a sentence 
is equivalent to negating its predicate* Cf. Ch*5 for further 
instances which demonstrate this to be false*
29* In this application of (iii) M - [[FEMALE . HUMAN . ADULT]ANIMATE]
N - [CONCRETE]
30. In this application of (iii) M - [FEMALE , HUMAN « ADULT]
N s [ANIMATE]
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that the set of components specified by the statement lb was a woman
31does not correspond to the state of affairs being described*
This failure of correspondence may have one of several causes? either 
the object described is not female (though human) as in (a), or it 
is not human (b), or it is not adult (£), or it is not animate at 
all (d) , or it is not even a concrete object (e). Which of these 
is the cause of the lack of correspondence is not specified by the 
sentence, but is left vague. All the sentence states is that there 
is not a correspondence between the statement It was a woman and the 
situation in question. The context (linguistic or non-linguistic) 
may however clar'ify which of these four possible specifications is 
the basis of a speaker's asserting It wasn't a woman - viz?
(A) P 'Was that a woman knocking on the door?"
Q 'No. It wasn't a woman, (it was a man)."
(B) P 'Was that a woman knocking on the door?"
Q 'No, It wasn't a woman. (It was my dog.)"
(c) P 'Was that a woman knocking on the door?"
Q 'No. It wasn't a woman (It was my daughter.)"
(D) P 'Was that a woman knocking on the door?"
Q 'No. It wasn't a woman. (It was mty. dustbin leaning up against,it.)
(E) P 'Was it a woman that annoyed you?"
Q 'No. It wasn't a woman. (It was my own incompetence*)"
In fact, as (A) demonstrates, the possibilities are yet more varied, as
the complex (a)-(c) allows for any combination of [MALE] or [-MALE] 
with [HUMAN] or [-HUMAN] and with [ADULT] or [-ADULT] - except 
[-MALE » HUMAN , ADULT]• The sentence is in fact applied in (A) to
31* Cf, Ch,2 for a detailed discussion of the relation between semantic 
components and the non-linguistic entities they describe.
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describe a situation in which a combination of [MALE . HUMAN # ADULT]
are involved. Notice that if the redundancy rules had been, as
traditionally formula ted:
[HUMAN] X — --  ^ [ANIMATE] X
[ANIMATE] X — --* [CONCRETE] X
the wrong predictions would nave been made: the possible interpretations
of It wasn't a woman would have been given as
»( [FEMALE]X . [HUMAN]X . [ADULT]X . [ANIMATE]X . [CONCRETE]X )
= A/( [FEMALE]X . [HUMAN]X . [ADULT]X . [ANIMATE]X . [CONCRETE]X )
= [A/FEMALE]X V [A/HUMAN]X V [A/ADULT]X v [A/ANIMATE]X V [A/CONCRETE]X
- [MALE]X v [-HUMAN]X v [-ADULT]X v [-ANIMATE]X v [-CONCRETE]X
Here the five contextualisations (A)-(E) are predicted, but there is
no means of blocking the combination of [-CONCRETE] and[MALE],
[-ANIMATE] and [MALE] etc: i.e. there is no way of capturing the
intuition that if animacy or concreteness are negated, then m e x
human-ness or adult-ness must also be negated.
The fact that there are at least the five different contextualisations
(A)-(E) of It wasn't a woman does not demonstrate that the sentence is
five-ways ambiguous. What the disjunct reading states is that there is
one interpretation of this sentence but that there are (at least) five
ways of meeting the conditions set by this interpretation. This
constitutes vagueness, not ambiguity. This can be shown by considering
32well-attested cases of vagueness. There is but one interpretation 
of neighbour but more than one way of meeting this interpretation. It 
is met both by female humans and by male humans. If negative sentences 
were said to be ambiguous by virtue of their disjunct reading, then 
every example of vagueness could be shown to be ambiguous. Neighbour
32. I am using vagueness here and throughout as interchangeable with
unspecified. It is arguable that there is a second kind of vagueness 
which is in principle unspecifiable. An example is You are the winner, 
which may be vague as to whether or not it is being used performatively*
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i'or example would be shown (falsely) to be an ambiguous lexical item,
since it can be used to describe quite different types of object, male
humans and female humans* This is clearly incorrect. There is a
syntactic test for distinguishing vagueness from ambiguity, which
33confirms this analysis of negation. If a sentence is ambiguous, then 
in order for verb-phrase pronominalisation to take place in a conjoined 
structure containing that sentence, the two conjuncts must agree in 
their interpretation of the ambiguous sentence. Thus (66) is 
ambiguous two ways and not four:
(66) John likes visiting relatives and Harry does too.
This cannot be followed by the contextualisation John likes going to 
see relatives, and Harry for them to come and see him. If a sentence 
is vague in some part of its semantic interpretation, the interpretation 
of the pronominalised conjunct need not agree with the first conjunct:
(67) John likes music and Harry does too: John likes pop and Harry
classical.
(68) John paid a lot for his car, and Harry did too: John paid 3,000
pounds and Harry 6,000 pounds.
(69) John has one neighbour and Mary has one too: John's neighbour is
a spinster, and Mary's is a widower.
In all these cases - unlike (66) - the further specification of the 
conjuncts can ^ vary independently. Now just as the specification of 
sex in some contextualised use of neighbour can vary independently 
across a verb-phrase pronominalisation of this type, so can the 
interpretation of negative sentences:
(70) John didn't run away and Harry didn't either: John walked slowly
off and Harry stayed stock still.
33 • Cf. Lakoff 19700.
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(71) John doesn't seduce women and Harry doesn't either; John seduces
young girls and Harry seduces boys*
(72) On the first day, it wasn't a woman and it wasn't on the second day
either; first it was a man and then it was a 
young girl.
In each of these, the verb phrase of the second conjunct can be 
pronominalised (deleted in the case of the copula) by virtue of the 
two conjuncts sharing an identical negated verb phrase. This does 
not however constrain the specification of which conditions are 
interpreted as not being met, i.e. to what components of the sentence 
the negation applies. Thus the interpretation of the scope of the 
negation is vague, not ambiguous*
Furthermore, the two semantic concepts of vagueness and ambiguity 
are theoretically distinguished. An ambiguous sentence is formulated 
as having two quite separate structures, whereas a vague sentence is 
one which is characterised semantically by a disjunction. Thus neighbour 
will have a lexical entry which is unspecified for sex and which will 
therefore be specified redundantly as [MALE v FEMALE]. Similarly a 
negative sentence has one underlying structure (given that it is not 
ambiguous for independent reasons) and is interpreted as vague in its 
interpretation by a semantic rule which predicts a disjunct set of 
possible readings.
1.3*^ The Scope of Negation
So far I have referred only in passing to the so-called 'scope1 
of negation with an implicit assumption of its being understood. It 
must however be more rigorously defined. In the case of negation, the 
scope of negation constitutes those semantic components which are
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altered by the rule of negation. Thus for some conjoint set of semantic 
components [e^  • . e^ J the negation of that set is equivalent to;
[A/e1 v A/e^ v A/e^ ]
and this formulation by definition allows any of the following
3 kcombinations;
[A/e1 , A/e  ^• A/e^ l (i)
CA/e^  • A / • e^ j (ii)
[A/e1 , e2 , A/e^ ] (iii)
<Ee^ , A/©2 • A / e - p (iv)
W • ®2 * e3^ (v)
*^el * e2 * (vi)
[e^  . A/e2 . e^ ] (vii)
Now in each of these specified cases, the scope of negation differs
it includes all three components in (i) , e^  and e2 in (ii) » 
and in (iii), e^  and e^  in (iv) etc. This may seem to stand in 
contradiction to my statement that the rule applied to a whole 
sentence reading, with the single disjunct output. But it is not.
The specification of Neg(e^ • • e^ ) allows for each of these seven
possibilities and the scope of negation is indeterminate. Thus 
It wasn't a woman in my example on p*3^f does not specify that the 
object described was a boy, or that it was a girl, or even that it 
was the dustbin leaning against the door, etc, but merely states that 
the object described was not male, human and adult, a specification which
3 k ,  The only option excluded is [e., • e? * * since this would correspond
to the assertion of such a statement, not its denial.
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covers and is neutral between each of these possibilities. So the 
scope of negation is indeterminate in this case.
Notice that this accords with our definition of the distinction 
between ambiguity and vagueness, since It wasn’t a woman is given a 
single (disjunct) reading. If negative sentences were ambiguous 
according as their scope differed, then this sentence (and all other 
negative sentences) would be described as having the requisite number 
of different underlying structures with the scope stated specifically 
for each interpretation,
1,3*4,1 Rules of Semantic Interpretation Operating on Surface Structures
The inherent vagueness of negative sentences has not been widely
recognised among linguists. In fact attempts have been made to predict
a fully specified scope of negation, and these attempts have led to a
proposed revision of the standard (1965) theory's claim that the input
to the semantic component is the set of deep-structure phrase markers.
There are three chief protagonists in this issue - Lakoff (1970b),
Jackendoff (1969), and Chomsky (1971), of whom two (Lakoff and
Jackendoff) base their arguments on the mistaken assumption that negative
sentences are fully determinate in their meaning and scope-specification,
35and that they are therefore frequently ambiguous. The point at issue 
is this: are deep-structure phrase markers a sufficient input for the
35* They are not alone in this mistake. In a comparable analysis of even, 
Fraser (1971) mistakenly assumes that sentences containing even are 
ambiguous as to itsr scope and on the basis of this, he claims to provide 
a deciding case for the deep-structure semantics v. surface-structure 
semantics issue. However each of his crucial examples - e.g. The 
statue was even photographed by the King, That man is even easy to please 
- which if they allow a VP-scope reading can only be naturally described 
in terms of derived constituent structure - are necessarily vague in 
scope. Thus any possibility for VP-scope interpretation is-- indistin­
guishable from and only one of a disjunct set of readings of a S-scope 
reading. The putative test cases thus fall to the ground, since a deep- 
structure specification of scope naturally predicts a S-scope reading.
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semantic component to be able to predict the interpretations of sentences, 
or should this claim be dropped in favour of a weaker claim that 
information from both deep structure and surface structure is necessary 
in order to predict the meanings of sentences?
Lakoff argued that scope of negation could be predicted at underlying 
structure. His argument stemmed from the claim that John didn*t hit Mary 
in the garden is synonymous to its cleft congener It is not in the 
garden that John hit Mary, and that a natural explanation of this would 
be provided if both were derived from the underlying structure corresponding 
to the cleft construction: -p. TV
Neg VPNP
Prep Pbeit
MB'prepVP
DetNP
John Mary in the garden
This was generalised to all adverbials so that for every case, the 
adverbial was analysed as the scope of negation^  and the scope of 
negation was invariably expressed in terms of a cleft-type structure. 
That which was interpreted as falling within the scope of negation 
was analysed as the superordinate predicate and that which was not 
understood as negated was analysed as the subordinate. Even in 
its own terms this analysis can be shown to be insufficient for 
a general account of negation. First of all, as both Heidolph (1970)
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and Chomsky (1971) have pointed out, the scope of negation may he 
restricted to an item which is not a deep structure constituent,
(73) John didn't run in front of the house, hut behind it
(74) John isn't easy to please or eager to pleases he's just a fussy,
idle old man
In (73)» "the focus of negation is not a constituent at all, and in (74)> 
it is a derived constituent hut not a deep structure constituent. 
Secondly, an analysis which makes the focus of negation the superordinate 
tern leads to a syntactic contradiction in examples such ass
(75) John isn't a bright boy
In (75), as the sole item in the scope of negation, bright should by 
definition be superordinate to boy, but its syntactic relation to boy 
demands that it he subordinate to boy. There is in any case no cleft 
for (75) to he parallel to. There is no *It isn't bright that John is 
a boy. Moreover the argument stems from an incorrect analysis of John 
didn't hit Mary in the garden. It is not obvious that this sentence is 
synonymous with It is not in the garden that John hit Mary, since it 
stands in a comparable relation to a whole set of cleft sentences:
(76) It is not John that hit Mary in the garden
(77) It is not Mary that John hit in the garden
(78) It is not in the garden that John hit Mary
(79) What John did not do to Mary was hit her in the garden
(80) What John did not do was hit Mary in the garden
(81) What John did not do to Mary in the garden was hit her
There is thus no reason to isolate any single cleft structure as the 
underlying structure for the corresponding simple negative*
A very similar mistake is made in Jackendoff*s attempt to provide 
an alternative interpretive position. Jackendoff purports to show that
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some negative sentences are unambiguous as to scope and of these 
there is a set of sentences in which an active—passive pair are not 
synonymous since they differ in their scope specification. If the 
grammar is to maintain the active-passive relation and yet predict 
this difference, the rule determining scope specification must be 
carried out after the passive rule has taken place - i.e. at the surface 
structure. The following sets of data are central to his arguments 
(8^ )(i) It is not so that many of the arrows hit the target 
(ii) Many of the arrows didn't hit the target 
(mi) Not many of the arrows hit the target 
(iv) The target wasn't hit by many of the arrows
(iia) Many of the arrows didn't hit the target, but many of them did hit it
(iiia)*Not many of the arrows hit the target, but many of them did hit it
(iva)*The target wasn't hit by many of the arrows, but it was
hit by many of them
(83Xi) It is not so that many of the demonstrators were arrested by
the police
(ii) Many of the demonstrators weren't arrested by the police
(ffi.) Not many of the demonstrators were arrested by the police
(iv) The police didn't arrest many of the demonstrators
(iia) Many of the demonstrators weren't arrested by the police but
many were
(ilia)*Not many of the demonstrators were arrested by the police but
many were
(iva)*The police didn't arrest many of the demonstrators, but they
did arrest many of them
The argument proceeds identically for both sets of data:
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(a) (i) is the characteristic paraphrase of sentence negation
(b) (i) is unambiguous and synonymous with (iii) but not with (ii).
Therefore (ii) is not an example of sentence negation, but verb 
phrase negation
(c) (ii) can be denied without forming a contradiction, as in (iia),
but (ii^ cannot, giving confirmation that (ii) must be an instance 
of verb phrase negation, not sentence negation.
(d) (iv) is unambiguous and synonymous with (iii) and not with (ii)
its syntactic congener. This is said to be demonstrated by the 
contradiction in (iiia) and (iva) which is not present in (iia),
(e) Therefore, since (iv) and (ii) are not synonymous, the passive 
transformation must take place before the specification of scope 
is predicted - i.e. at surface structure.
Steps (b), (c) and (d) are incorrect and unjustified. Moreover they 
lead to a contradiction, (b) is wrong in the same way that Lfikoff. 
was wrong. It is not so that many arrows hit the target covers both 
Many arrows didn't hit the target and Not many arrows hit the target 
since it is neutral as to scope specification. There is thus no 
evidence so far that either of these is not an instance of sentence 
negation. Step (c) is incorrect because (iia) is not an example of 
a negative sentence plus its positive counterpart, despite appearances , 
The fact which Jackendoff overlooked is that (iia) is only non­
contradictory if the many in the first conjunct is nob coreferential 
with the many in the second conjunct. But on this reading the two 
conjuncts are thus not identical and do not provide evidence of the 
scope of negation in the first conjunct. It is this part of the analysis 
which leads directly to a contradiction. Sentence (iia) on the 
relevant reading is parallel to John^ didn't hit the target but John  ^
did. Therefore, if Jackendoff*s argument concerning (iia) is correct,
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it also follows that John^ didn't hit the target is an instance 
of verb .phrase.negation. But John, didn't hit the target is
A  II,' I a I I'l  nn I Ill     IIIHIII WII mi n  —
synonymous with It is not so that Johiu hit the target. Therefore 
John^ didn't hit the target is an instance of sentence negation.
Thus John^ didn't hit the target is necessarily both an instance of 
sentence negation and not an instance of sentence negation. Further­
more step (d) is wrong: (iv) is not synonymous with (iii) but is 
vague in its specification as between (ii) and (iii). This can be 
shown by contextualisations of sentences of type (iv):
(84) The doctors didn't treat many of the patients at all. They just
sent them away with worthless prescriptions
(83) The police were persuaded not to arrest many of the demonstrators9
who then hung around being a nuisance
(86) John wasn't treated by many of the specialists, who just said he
was imagining things.
In each of these cases many is interpreted as not falling within,, the
scope of negation, and corresponds therefore to the natural interpretation
of many when it is to the left of the negative particle - i.e. to
sentence type (ii) in the paradigm. It thus follows that sentences
of the type The target wasn't hit by many of the arrows must allow at
least the two possible scope interpretations claimed of (ii) and (iii)
in order to predict the interpretations as in (84)-(86) above. It is
thus not obvious that the passive transformation does change meaning,
and it does not follow that semantic rules must take surface structure
into account.^
36. What remains a puzzle for any analysis is the difference between (iiia) 
and (iva) on the one hand, and (iia). Though (iia) is the odd one out 
here, it constitutes less of a problem than (iiia) and (iva). It is 
predictable that two lexically identical sentences containing many 
should not be coreferential. This follows from the conditions for 
pronominalisation. Any NP which is lexically identical to an antecedent 
NP and which is not pronominalised is predictably interpreted as not 
coreferential with its antecedent. What is odd is that many in (iiia) 
and (iva) cannot be interpreted in this way, I have no explanation 
for this.
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Chomsky's argument for semantic rules at surface structure is 
the only argument of the three which predicts an indeterminacy in 
the interpretation of scope in negative sentences. His argument concerns 
the interdependence of stress assignment and the interpretation of the 
scope of negation (and question), It is very generally known that 
contrastive stress alters the interpretation of negative sentences, as in 
(87a) JOHN didn't hit Mary in the garden^
(8?b) John didn't HIT Mary in the garden
(8?c) John didn't hit MARY in the garden
(87d) John didn't hit Mary in the GARDEN
I shall return to this problem of the predictability of contrastive 
stress and the consequent interpretations in chapter 8, However Chomsky 
seeks to extend this interdependence of stress and scope specification 
to normal stress assignment and the scope of negation. He suggests 
that scope (focus in his terms) of negation can be datermined as 
restricted to any phrase containing the intonation centre. Thus in 
John didn't give away a house in Barnes with normal final stress 
assignment, in Barnes, a house in Barnes, give away a house in BarnesB 
or the whole sentence can constitute the scope of negation, since each 
contains Barnes, the intonation centre. This definition of scope 
explicitly excludes the possibility of the scope being restricted to 
the $<&rb only, the subject only, ox* a house, since none of these 
constitutes a phrase containing the intonation centre. Furthermore it 
predicts that the smallest domain of scope is the lexical item.
Both of these constraints are unjustified. Each of the following is 
a possible scope of negation, given unmarked stress assignment;
37. Here and elsewhere in this thesis, words in capital letters indicate 
contrastive stress.
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(8'8a) John didn't give away a house in Barnes - it was in V/imbledon
(scope - adverbial noun phrase)
(88b) John didn't give away a house in Barnes - it was only a garage
(scope - object noun phrase)
(88c) John didn't give away a hoxise in Barnes but he sold it at a fairly
low price (scope « verb)
(88d) John didn't give away a house in Barnes - it was Bill who did
(scope a subject noun phrase)
(88'e) John didn't give away a house in Barnes - he was arranging for an
auction (scope » verb phrase)
(88f) John didn't give away a house in Barnes - there hasn't been any
property changing hands recently (scope s sentence)
(89a) John wasn't running - he was quite still
(89b) John wasn't running - he was walking
In (88) the scope can include only the verb, only the object noun 
phrase, and only the subject, as well as the possibilities predicted 
by Chomsky's formulation. In (89) the scope can not only include the 
lexical item run but it can be restricted to just one of its components, 
the specification of the type of motion - namely running. The component 
of motion is unaffected. So it appears that the scope of negation is 
not definable either in terms of syntactic units (lexical items) 
or in terms of syntactic constituents, or in terms of stress placement. 
Consideration of arguments such as these therefore suggest that scope 
of negation is not dependent on either syntax or'" phonology (with the 
exception of contrastive stress). There is thus so far no evidence of 
the necessity for rules of semantic interpretation operating on 
surface structures.
There is however one further argument concerning quantifier scope
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38given by Barbara Ilall-Partee (1970), There is a transformation called 
conjunction reduction which relates
($Qa) Edward is touchy and Edward is difficult to please
(90b) Edward is touchy and difficult to please
(9.1a) Bill is popular and Bill is likely to succeed 
(91b) Bill is popular and likely to succeed
As these pairs demonstrate, the rule is generally meaning»preserving.
39However, it no longer preserves meaning when the subject includes
a quantifier such as numerals, many, .some, few, or is modified by only.
Thus the following pairs are not synonymous;
(92a) Few rules are explicit and few rules are easy to read 
(92b) Few rules are explicit and easy to read
(93a) Some women are married and some women are happy
(93b) Some women are married and happy
(9^ a) Three rules on this page are explicit and three rules on this page
are easy to read 
(9^) Three rules on this page are explicit and easy to read
(93a) Only the three rules on this page are explicit, and only the three
rules on this page are easy to read 
(93b) Only the three rules on this page are explicit and easy to read
Since the verb phrases may be derived constituents, as in all the
examples except (93)« b^e scope cfii© quantifier cannot be stated at
the level of underlying structure, because the constituents involved
are not necessarily constituents at that level. Thus Hall-Partee
suggests the interpretation of scope must be stated at surface structure,
38* Some further arguments are provided by Hasegawa (1972) but I shall 
not take them into account here since Hasegawa*s account, involving 
complements of think, crucially confuses ambiguity and vagueness,
Cf, section 1,3*3# of this chapter,
39# The problem is more complicated than this but the additional complexity 
does not affect the argument.
-49-
after the transformation has taken place. in his reply (1970®), 
Lakoff suggested that this conclusion was not inevitable since 
there was a naturally stateable constraint preventing the derivation 
of the (b) sentence of each pair from its (a) counterpart, namely 
the constraint that conjunction reduction can only take place if 
the subject noun phrases are coreferential. Since the (a) members 
of each pair are understood to be non-coreferential, it would follow 
that the (b) member would never be derived from the structure 
underlying the (a) member. This explanation is not however adequate* 
Compare (9*0 with (96).
(96) Three rules on this page are explicit and they are easy to read 
By Lakofffs constraint, (96), which clearly involves coreferential 
subjects, should be synonymous with (9*fb), but it is not. Moreover, 
the noun phrases in (95a) are (pace Lakoff) also coreferential, and 
yet (95®) is not synonymous with (95b)* His constraint on conjunction 
reduction does not therefore handle these cases, and a separate ad 
hoc condition would have to be added to exclude them. Moreover it 
provides no explanation at all as to why (96) and (9^ b) do not mean 
the same. If on the other hand we conclude with Ha11-Partee that 
conjunction reduction applies blind with the interpretation of the 
conjoined verb phrase as falling within the scope of the subject 
quantifier being predicted from surface structure, then these examples 
provide no problem. On this evidence it seems that the only natural 
solution is to allow rules of semantic interpretation operating on 
surface structures*
What is more relevant for our immediate concern is that the Hall- 
Partee argument appears at first glance to carry over directly to
-50-
scope of negations the pairs (97) and (98) are clearly not synonymous*
(97a) John isn’t ambitious and John isn't eager to become President
(97b) John isn’t ambitious and eager to become President
(98a) John isn't ambitious or John isn't eager to become President
(98b) John isn't ambitious or eager to become President
(97a) denies both propositions, whereas (97b) denies only the combination 
of ambition and eagerness to become r^esidents (98a) allows for one of 
the propositions to be true whereas (98b) denies both* (97a) is thus 
logically equivalent not to (97b) but to (98b), (97b) being equivalent 
to (98a)* If the Hall-Partee argument concerning quantifiers is correct, 
it would seem natural to allow conjunction reduction also to apply blind 
in these cases, deriving the (b) sentence from its (a) counterpart with 
an interpretation of the sentence being read off from the surface- 
structure configuration* In this case, the rule interpreting negative 
sentences would operate on the interpretation of surface struncture 
phrase markers*
Notice first of all, that whatever the input to the projection
rules (i.e* the main core of the interpretation rules), the formulation
of the rule of negation will not be affected* We have already seen how
it operates when the input to the projection rules is the set of deep
structure phrase markers. Suppose however the set of projection rules
operated on surface structure phrase markers. In this case, as Lakoff
has pointed out (197®a), there would have to be rules of interpretation
creating structure as it were, interpreting for example gapped structures
such as John tried to date many rich girls and Bill many poor girls in a *
IfO
way essentially corresponding to the reverse of gapping* Semantic 
A-0. Called by Lakoff 'anti-gapping' 197Qa p. 2^1*
-51»
rules of interpretation of this type would be required wherever the 
derived structure differs from the underlying structure (whether by 
virtue of deletion or permutation).^ The rule of negation would only 
operate on the output of these structure-creating rules and it would 
thus not differ in formulation from that given earlier (p*33f).
Furthermore, it is not obvious that (97b) and (98b) should be 
derived from (97a) and ($8ci.) respectively, despite their parallel to 
the quantifier examples. Equally plausible deep structures would be 
the following:
S
andneg
John is ambitious John is eager for John 
to become President
Fig* X
orneg
John is eager for JohnJohn is ambitious
to become President
Fig. XI
and these phrase markers are reflexes of the semantic interpretation 
required for their respective surface sentences. If these phrase markers 
are syntactically justified, the rules of interpretation can operate 
on the (fully specified) deep structure phrase markers. Arguments for 
having the scope of negation be interpreted from surface structure 
configurations are thus logically independent of the Hall-Partee 
arguments concerning quantifiers.
1^, Cf. Jackendoff*s rule of negation which interprets the negative element 
generated in the auxiliary position as raised to the S node, essentially 
the inverse of Neg-Placement (cf. Klima 19(&.),
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In any case, her argument is not as water-tight as the data she 
considered suggest. Both she and Lakoff assumed that when a quantifier 
was in surface subject position and modified by a co-ordinate verb 
phrase, it must be non-synonymous with its expanded counterpart.
But this is not so. Consider (99) and (100).
(99) Many questions were answered by Bichard and Allice
(100) Five questions must be attempted by each candidate
Under Hall-Partee1s analysis (99)* derived by conjunction reduction 
(and passive) from Richard answered many questions and Alice answered 
many questions, must imply that Richard and Alice ansv/ered the same 
questions. But this isn't so, just as in (100) the implication is 
clearly not that all candidates should attempt the same questions as 
each other. However under the interpretation that Richard and Alice 
did not necessarily answer the same questions, (99) is synonymous 
both with its active counterpart and with the sentence corresponding 
to its deep structures there is thus no need to set up a rule of 
semantic interpretation from surface structure. This creates an 
anomaly. How can we allow sentences containing quantified subjects 
to change meaning over conjunction reduction only some of the time? 
Compare (99) with (101)0
(101) Many buildings are guarded by dogs and night watchmen
There is nothing structurally to distinguish these two sentences, and 
yet only the latter is not synonymous with its expanded counterpart, 
Many buildings are guarded by dogs and many buildings are guarded by 
night watchmen. The only distinction seems to be the likelihood of 
a joint reading on the subject - more so in (101), less so in (99)#
This would imply that in both cases, both readings were possible, the
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prevalence of one or the other being a non-linguistic matter.
The question then arises as to whether this semantic vagueness,
though pragmatically resolved, should be extended to the entire range
of conjunction reduction examples. This being so, synonymy would be
preserved between deep structure and surface structure. Decision
on these questions would require another thesis, and for the moment
I shall merely assume that the question of surface structure rules of
42semantic interpretation remains an open one. In any case my main 
concern in chapters 4-6 will be not with the general principle of 
surface structure rules of interpretation but with the specific 
problem of negation* And since the arguments concerning the prediction 
of negation scope from surface structure are on the one hand not strong 
and on the other hand do not affect the formulation I have adopted here,
1 shall assume that negative sentences are given a semantic interpretation 
from a fully specified deep structure phrase marker.
1.4 Summary
The linguistic framework which I shall be assuming in the central 
arguments of this thesis is now more or less complete. I have argued 
that syntax and semantics are two separate though related components, 
and that any constructs in either of these components must be justified 
solely in terms of that component. So arguments for deep structure 
must be based on syntactic evidence, and not semantic evidence.
Conversely, arguments concerning the semantic structure of sentences
42* For similar reasons, I shall not take into account here the considerable 
body of arguments presented in Jackendoff 1972*
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- for example negative sentences - will not be taken as evidence for 
the deep structure of those sentences. In particular, I argued 
that so-called selectional restrictions are not in fact a constraint 
mechanism but rather part of the meaning of lexical items, no different 
in kind from the inherent meaning of lexical items. They thus play 
no part in demonstrating the necessity of a syntactically-defined 
level of deep structure.
With respect to semantic structure, I argued that all components 
of meaning forming the meaning of lexical items should be expressed 
in terms of a predicate and its arguments, closely analogous to the 
formulation of predicate calculus. Kirthermore the rules of the 
semantic component constitute (i) a set of interpretive projection, 
rules which operate on a deep structure input and which replace the 
syntactic indices of the lexical items by referring indices on the 
noun phrases to give a sentence reading; and (ii) rules such as that 
for negation which operate on the output of the projection rules.
I considered the possible necessity of surface structure input to 
the semantic component, but on the evidence presently available, 
this weakening of the constraint on the semantic component seems 
unjustified.
With respect to negation itself, I argued that ingpneral negative 
sentences are not ambiguous as to scope, but rather vague (or 
unspecified), and hence they allow a range of possible interpretations. 
This range appears to be constrained by the semantic components of 
the sentence in question and is not stateable in terms of syntactic 
or phonological constraints. Further evidence of the independent
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non-syntactic nature of the negation rule is provided by examples 
such as the following:
(102) The prisoner had not escaped from Dartmoor and Brixton - he
had only escaped from Brixton
Here the domain of the scope allows for a specification in which one
part of a conjoint noun phrase, Dartmoor, is isolated as the scope
of negation. This isolation of one noun phrase from a conjoint
noun phrase structure constitutes a flouting of the Co-ordinate
Structure Constraint which operates as a general constraint on
syntactic processes preventing processes applying to ■.’one part of
a conjoint noun phrase (cf. Ross 196?)• If the domain of the
scope of negation is to be explained in syntactic terms, the example
above must be stated as an exception to this widely attested constraint.
If however the delimitation of scope is explained in terms independent
of syntax, then the anomaly disappears. The rule of negation thus
provides a further piece of evidence that constraints on semantic
43structure are different in kind from those of syntax, a difference
which can only be naturally captured in a framework containing two
separate components of syntax and semantics.
43# The evidence is not in fact entirely clear-cut: there is opposing 
evidence (cf. Lasnik 1972) that the rule of negation shares at 
least some constraints with syntactic processes.
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CHAPTER Z : The Basis of Semantics; A Definition of Meaning
2.1 On Katz and Bierwisch's Definition of Semantic Marker
In chapter 1, I put forward a linguistic framework which 
purported to provide an explanatory and predictive account of all the 
well-formed sentences of any given language together with their 
semantic (and phonological) interpretation. As a seriously intended 
hypothesis about the structure of language, this framework should 
make a number of testable predictions. Some of these predictions 
(e.g. the relation between syntax and semantics) I have already 
discussed. But the status of the semantic constructs remains largely 
untested. In general, the semantic component can be said to make at 
least the following predictions:
(1) The semantic structure of sentences in any one language can be 
described in terms of the semantic structure of the lexical items of 
that language if its syntactic structure is taken into account in a 
systematic way.
(2) The semantic structure of a lexical item can be explained in terms
of components of meaning, where these components predict the contribution 
that that lexical item makes to the meanings of sentences in which it 
occurs (cf. p.30f )*
(3) There are two infinite sets of sentences, one constituting well- 
formed sentences, another non-well-formed sentences, where ’non-well- 
formedness' is characterised by the presence of contradictory semantic 
components.
(4) Semantic relations such as entailment, ambiguity, synonymy and
1, I am using the term semantic component with systematic ambiguity 
to refer to a component or section of the grammar on the one hand, 
and to the minimal semantic construct (semantic feature) on the 
other. Which interpretation is intended will always be clear 
from the context*
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contradiction can be defined in terras of semantic features. For 
example, entailraent is definable as the relation between two sentences 
and $2 which holds if contains as a subset those features which 
constitute the semantic representation of (e.g. A boy ran across the 
road entails A child ran across the road).
As an empirical claim about the semantic structure of language,
this set of predictions is little more than vacuous. It is not
entirely so, in that it fulfils the conditions I put forward initially
(p. 8f ) as being demanded of any semantic theory - viz. the ability to
relate lexical and sentence meaning, the ability to separate two
infinite sets of sentences, and the ability to predict relations of
entailment etc. But the circularity involved removes any inherent
interest the claims might have. The circularity is transparent in
(1) and (2) and only one step less so in the predictions (3) and (4).
For example, all the definition of entailment claims - even assuming it 
2to be correct - is that the meaning of one sentence is part of the meaning 
of another sentence. It does not give any explanatory account of this 
relationship. In particular, this definition is not obviously 
relatable to the logical definition of entailment. And the circularity 
in the prediction of entailment from sentence meaning is made plain 
if we recall that sentence meaning is explained in terms of word 
meaning and word meaning is established on the basis of entailment 
relations. Such a definition scarcely offers an explanatory account 
of entailment itself.
The charge of circularity is not new (cf. Vermazen 1966). However, 
one might say in rejoinder, that the charge is mistaken - it conflates 
the discovery procedure of semantics with the theoretical statement.
2. It is not. It predicts that All boys like sweets entails All
children like sweets. Cf. Leech 1969 pp.35 ff for a more detailed 
account in terms of semantic features. Cf. also chapters 3-5 of this 
thesis for further discussion of entailment.
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It may be part of the discovery procedure of semantics to establish 
lexical meaning on the basis of semantic properties of sentences and 
semantic relations between sentences, but it is not part of the 
theoretical statement* Moreover, this procedure is standard in 
linguistic analysis. If this charge were justified for semantics, both 
syntax and phonology would also be Condemned as vacuous, since for 
example the label NP and its re-write rule
are set up on the basis of a set of distributional facts and the 
grammar then predicts these facts by virtue of this rule. For 
semantics, the way out of the circle is to define the term semantic 
component not as I suggest in my prediction (2) (p.'56) but by some 
other way. But this way - the option taken and defended by Katz 
and Bierwisch - also leads to vacuity. The definition given by 
Bierwisch is that semantic components are ’not symbols for physical 
properties and relations outside the human organism, but rather for 
the internal mechanisms by means of which such phenomena are perceived 
and conceptualised' (1970 p.l8l). As an attempt to consider the 
consequences of universal linguistic constructs for psychology, 
this statement is irreproachable, but as a theoretical definition 
it is untenable. It has the immediate consequence that the status 
of any semantic component(s) is in principle untestable since there 
is no means of testing a so-called perceptual construct. By general 
principles of the philosophy of science, any such definition is vacuous.
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2,2 Meaning and Reference
The core of the problem is the definition of meaning. In the
framework given above, the semantic components are mere artefacts
which churn out appropriate artefacts as meanings of sentences. There
is no direct attempt to explain the relation between the abstract
symbols of language and the external world those symbols describe.
Yet this is surely the goal of semantic theory,'1 and any semantic
mechanism which does not attempt to explain this relation is merely
playing academic parlour games.
The standard defence of this separation in linguistics of the
semantics of a language and the world the language describes is given
by Lyons (1968). He assumes there (p.*lr24f0 the correctness of Frege's
sense-reference distinction, points out that words like unicorn have
meaning no different in kind from horse despite their lack of referent,
suggests that there are many words which do not refer to anything
outside the language (such as intelligence. goodness), and concludes
that the explanation of problems of reference need not therefore be a
job for linguists. Though the book in question is introductory, the
3
argument is a widespread one. Almost without exception, linguistic 
descriptions assume that semantics involves only intra-theoretical 
statements and therefore does not include any predictions about the 
relation between words and their referents.
3>. For arguments making this assumption, either implicitly or explicitly, 
cf. Postal 1971b, Bierwisch 1969, Katz 1966b, 1972.
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The assumption behind this argument is that reference is a
relation which holds between a symbol of the language and the objects
of the world as we know it* Now clearly what the language describes
(given that the language - and hence the meaning of the words - is
constant) is not merely this "real" world, but also 2,000 BC, 2,000
AD, the world of one's expectations, the world of one's dreams etc.
It is quite irrelevant to semantics that the first man to land on the
moon has a specific object to refer to in 1973, but the first woman to
land on the moon does not. This must be so, since if in 197^ a woman
should land on the moon it would not follow that the phrase the first
woman to land on the moon would have a different meaning. Thus if
reference has to be restricted to the world as we know it, then the
general assumption that linguistic semantics is not concerned with
problems of reference seems to be correct.
However there is an alternative. The concept of reference could
be generalised to encompass different worlds, or rather different states
of affairs, in the following way. If we conceive of the world and the
changing events in the world as a series of states of affairs such that
at time^  one state of affairs holds, at bime  ^another state of affairs
holds, etc then the real world of "now” in which unicorns do not exist
A
but- horses do is just one possible state of affairs. In each 
of these states of affairs, there will be a set of objects to which the 
symbols of the language stand in a relation of reference. In the 
light of this, the relation between meaning and reference could be 
reformulated* the meaning of a symbol could be defined as a statement 
of the conditions necessary for a relation of reference to hold in 
some state of affairs. Thus in talking about meaning, one is not 
talking about reference itself, but about the (necessary and sufficient)
This philosophical concept of 'possible worlds' is most clearly 
explained by Hintikka (1969): * It would be more natural to speak of 
different possibilities concerning our 'actual' world than to speak 
of several possible worlds ,,,. In our sense, whoever has made 
preparations for more than one course of events has dealt with 
several 'possible courses of events' or 'possible worlds'. Of 
course, the possible courses of events he considered were from his 
point of view so many alternative courses he considered events 
might take. However, only one such course of events (at most) 
become actual. Hence there is a sense in which the others were 
merely 'possible courses of events' (p.90f). The concept is defined 
more formally by A.N.Prior 1962.
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conditions for reference.
Under this interpretation of meaning, it is not so obvious that 
we need to have recourse to the distinction between sense and 
reference. It is certainly no longer the dichotomous one that many 
would have us believe. Let us consider briefly the original argument 
for the twin concepts of sense and reference. What Frege argued (1892) 
was that the existence of a relation of symbol to referent was in 
principle not a sufficient statement of meaning because of the 
existence of such non-synonymous pairs of sentences as (1) and (2)j
(1) Noam Chomsky;’ is Noam Chomsky
(2) Noam Chomsky is the man who wrote Aspects
In order to explain the non-tautologous nature of the second sentence, 
Frege set up the distinction between sense and reference, where the 
sense of a word constituted its meaning and reference the relation it 
held to some referent. But the sense of a word or phrase under the 
interpretation given here is the specification of the conditions which 
a referent must meet in order for the relation of reference to hold.
And in the case of Frege*s type of sentence-pair, the conditions of 
reference are clearly not the same. It is merely a contingent fact that 
the proper name Noam Chomsky and the phrase the man who wrote Aspects 
have the same referent. Thus while it is a semantic fact that the 
(1) is vaonousiy' truej
it is a contingent fact that (2) happens to be true. There is clearly 
a possible state of affairs in which the man who wrote Aspects was 
not Chomsky but Enoch Powell. Similarly it is matter of contingent 
fact that there are no unicorns at the moment, and the semantic
5. This is suggested by Hintikka (Hintikka 1969 pp.87-111) in connection 
with the semantics of propositional attitudes.
statement would merely predict that the meaning of unicorn constitutes 
a set of conditions which specify that the object which unicorn be 
used to refer to must be like a horse except that it have one 
horn.
2*3 Sentence Meaning and Truth
If meaning were defined in terms of reference conditions, sentence 
meaning could then be described interpretively by a set of projection 
rules. There are however several problems over equating meaning and 
conditions for reference. First there is the problem that the relation 
of reference must incorporate abstract concepts such as properties, 
actions, etc, since the problems of coreference in pronominalisation, 
relativisation etc hold equally for objects, properties and actions, 
as for example in The happiness that I felt yesterday was overwhelming. 
The second and more important problem is tfeat the connectives and, or 
and if-then will not be characterised as having meaning, since they 
clearly do not refer.
Yet as we shall see immediately, there is a natural connection 
between reference conditions and sentence meaning, which can lead 
us to a definition of meaning that encompasses reference conditions 
and the truth-table definitions of the connectives. Notice that if 
for any sentence, the items refer appropriately to objects, and the 
properties or actions described correspond to the description given, 
then the sentence will be true. Thus if the sentence The boy ran to 
his mother is used to describe a male, non-adult human and a female 
adult human who is his mother, and the relation between them is such
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that he went to her with a particular fast motion that we call runninge 
then ©edt-cf fhs conditions specified in the sense of the lexical items 
contained in the sentence corresponds to its non-linguistic referent, 
and as a result the sentence is true. It follows from this that we 
have an alternative characterisation of the meaning of a sentence - 
viz. the meaning of a sentence constitutes a statement of the (necessary 
and sufficient) conditions under which that sentence would be true/*
In other words, a statement of meaning in a natural language is a 
statement of the truth conditions of the sentences of that language.
Just as with referential conditions, it is important to note again 
that it is no more relevant to a statement of sentence meaning whether 
or not a sentence is actually true in any arbitrary state of affairs 
than it was to a statement of word meaning that the item actually bear 
a referent. One is not concerned with contingent truth- 
value assignments - only with the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the truth of sentences. Thus the meaning of I saw a unicorn is no 
different in kind from I saw a horse. In both cases, the statement 
of meaning merely gilfes the conditions under which that sentence 
would be true. Furthermore this definition of meaning naturally 
includes the definitions of the connectives, since truth-tables are 
a statement of truth-conditions.
How does this definition of meaning match up to the conditions on 
a semantic theory given earlier (p.8f) - viz. the ability to isolate 
the infinite set of contradictory sentences and the ability to 
predict entailment, synonymy, contradiction etc? The prediction of
6. Cf, section 2.4.1 for a discussion of the validity of assigning 
truth-values to sentence®.
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inter-sentence relations follows as an automatic consequence of the 
definition of meaning. That is, if all the conditions hold that make 
true John killed an actress last night then it must be the case that 
both An actress died last night and A woman died last night are of 
ncessity true, since each of these constitutes a subset of the 
conditions specified by John killed an actress last night. But this 
is the logical definition of entailment - that one sentence entails 
the second if the truth of the second necessarily follows from the
7
truth of the first* Similarly synonymy. Synonymy is defined 
logically as mutual entailment, and this too is predicted naturally 
if the meaning of a sentence is a set of truth conditions: if two 
sentences mean the same, then they will have the same set of truth 
conditions; thus whenever one is true the other will be. Moreover 
both will also foe false under the same conditions, a second 
characteristic of mutually entailing sentences. More interesting 
is the delimitation of the set of contradictory sentences which, I 
have suggested (p.^ lf) should be blocked by the semantic component.
If meaning is defined as a statement of the conditions under which 
a sentence will be true, the oddity of contradictions is automatically 
captured. What contradictory sentences have in common, and in 
contrast to all other sentences is that (given that the meanings of 
words remain constant, and are not interpreted metaphorically) they 
can never be true: there is no possible state of affairs that they 
describe. They are therefore unlike other sentences, since the 
assignment of the value false is not a matter contingent fact.
7. Cf. ch.3 for a more detailed definition of entailment.
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Their separation from other non-deviant sentences as a natural class 
is thus automatically predicted.
That the prediction of entailment, contradiction etc is an 
automatic consequence of defining meaning in terms of truth conditions 
is powerful support for the theory, since these predictions were stated 
earlier (p*8f) as a necessary condition on the adequacy of a semantic 
theory. However these are only two of the conditions I set up for 
semantic theories to be judged against. In addition, a theory must 
(a) be recursive and (b) state a systematic relation between the 
syntactic structure of a sentence and its lexical items. Logicians 
such as Montague (1970b, 1972) and Lewis (1971), who have expounded 
a formal version of referential semantics for natural languages, 
appear to assume that all linguistic formulations of meaning meeting these 
two additional conditions are inadequate, and that a truth-based 
theory of meaning is necessarily mutually exclusive with any semantic 
theory devised in the framework of transformational grammar. This 
however seems to me unjustified, in the light of Bierwisch*s formulation 
of a semantic component. On the contrary, Bierwisch*s semantic 
markers (in the form of predicate plus argument(s) ) seem non-distinct 
from a set of abstract truth conditions - with one important caveats 
unlike a theory using conceptual semantic markers, a theory of truth 
conditions is open to falsification. For purposes of formalisation 
however, this difference is unimportant, and a formulation of truth 
conditions in the format of Bierwisch's semantic markers seems quite 
legitimate. Moreover, his rule of negation is naturally interpretable 
as a rule involving truth conditions. Thus while A boy ran to his
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mother is true if and only if the state of affairs described is such 
that a male, non-adult human went v/ith a fast motion to someone who 
was female, adult, and his mother, the negation of that sentence is 
true just in case any one or more of those conditions fails to hold 
in the world described. That is to say, a negative sentence is used 
to assert that the corresponding positive sentence is false. But 
A boy ran to his mother can be false for any of several reasons - 
either someone ran to their mother, but not a boy, or a boy went 
to his mother but didn't run, or a boy did something but not run 
anywhere, let alone to his mother, etc, etc. And this interpretation 
matches the output of Bierwisch's rule of negation. Thus what the 
negation rule states is all the possible ways in which the 
corresponding positive sentence could be false. And just as it is 
irrelevant in stating the meaning of a sentence to specify whether 
it is actually true or false for any given state of affairs, so it 
is irrelevant in stating the meaning of a negative sentence to 
specify which of the conditions of the corresponding positive sentence 
may have failed in any utterance of that sentence. Finally, a framework 
such as Bierwisch proposed fulfils the two additional conditions 
mentioned above (viz. recursiveness and a systematic statement 
relating the syntax of sentences and the meaning of lexical items).
I shall therefore assume that linguistic semantics, more specifically 
semantics as formulated by Bierwisch, has been implicitly a truth- 
conditional semantics. If this is so, it provides a natural explanation 
of both the descriptive adequacy of predicate calculus for describing 
the semantic structure of sentences and also the notational equivalence 
of de Morgan's law and Bierwisch*s rule of negation, since both predicate 
calculus and de Morgan's laws are defined within a truth-based system.
-67”
There is one apparent internal contradiction in my assumption
that Bierwisch's formulation of the semantic component can be used
to capture the concepts of truth condition, sense and reference as
I have used them, I referred earlier to sense and reference in
talking of the semantic properties of words. Yet in my original
presentation of Bierwisch1s model (ch.l p.30 ) I stated that reference
indices were generated by the base structure as a property
not of the lexical item but of the noun phrase node immediately
dominating it. This represents a claim that reference is not a
property of lexical items in isolation but only within a syntactic
structure. This claim appears to :foe correct. As Alston pointed out
(196^  p.l^ f) it is by no means clear that pencil of itself refers to
anything. If I wish to refer to the class of pencils, or a single
object which is a pencil, the item pencil is insufficient - it only
becomes a referring expression when it is part of a noun phrase
8
- i.e. a pencil, the pencils etc. This seems to indicate that the 
lexical item itself does not refer at all. As a reformulation, let 
us suggest that ey&ry sentence ± B  made up of words in a
certain relation (defined syntactically), and these words and relations 
together specify a set of conditions which constitute the meaning of 
that sentence (a set of truth conditions). A part of these conditions 
is that there be objects of whom the properties in question are 
predicated But it is a part of the conditions set by the meaning
of the sentence, not by the individual items. The items themselves 
specify descriptive conditions and, in the formulation given here,
8 ^ For an independent justification of this extension of the concept of 
reference to include indefinite noun phrases, cf. ch.5-6*
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the dominating node (NP} is interpreted as providing the conditions of 
reference. That is to say, an implication of reference to some object 
is a consequence of a lexical item’s entering a syntactic construction.
The specification of that object or action is provided by the lexical 
item. It follows automatically that what are entered in the lexicon 
are the senses of lexical items and not reference relations. As a 
lexical item in isolation they do not refer. Bierwisch’s formulation 
thus captures the observation mad© informally by Alston.
2.4 The Limitations of a Truth-Based Theory of Semantics: A Criticism 
and A Defence
2,4.1 The Relation Between Sentence and Statement
The major criticism of a truth-based theory of semantics is that 
such a theory must be restricted to statements, since it is only these 
which have the property of being true or false. And since not all sentences 
can be used to make statements, a theory which is restricted to analysing 
statements is not giving a complete account of meaning for natural 
languages. There are three common analyses of the relation between 
sentences and statements. In all three, this relation is defined in such 
a way that questions and imperatives are excluded (since they are said to 
be incapable of being true or false), together with some indicative 
sentences, e.g. Austin’s performatives (I promise to go home. I apologise.
I suggest .... etc), which are said by Austin to lack a truth value and 
therefore also cannot be statements. The least restrictive view excludes 
only these sentences from the set of sentences which can constitute state­
ments. There is a stricter view which by virtue of defining statements 
as having just one truth value assignment, true or false, excludes all 
sentences containing deictic elements from the set of sentences which 
can constitute statements - for example You are ill. He came here -
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since it is characteristic of such sentences that they change their
truth value according as the referents (i.e. the speaker and hearer)
change. But this relative rather than absolute truth-value assignment
is a general property of natural language sentences, since tense is
speaker-relative. Thus in order to constitute a statement under this
view, a sentence must be phrased in such a way that it will have one and
only one possible truth-value assignments for example Ruth Kemps on of 19
King Henry’s Road London is tired on 10 August 1975 at 5 m  (cf* for
example Quine 1966 and elsewhere). The most stringent view, that of
Strawson (1952, 1964) that the semantic analysis of sentences cannot
in principle be reduced to the concept of truth, since truth and falsity
are not properties of sentences at all, but only of statements*
The two most restrictive views can, I think, be side-stepped if we
agree with Lemmon (1966), Lewis (1972) and Davidson (1967) that sentences
9
do have a truth value relative to some context of utterance* Thus deictic 
and all indexical sentences will have a truth value relative to a person 
(the speaker), a plaoe and a time*. Yet this claim need not lead us into 
defining the full range of contexts for each and e v e r y  person in each and 
every possible state of affairs* The statement of the truth conditions of 
indexical sentences need be no different in kind from other sentences*
The theory is not aiming to predict truth-value assignments of particular 
utterances, but merely, for every sentence in the language, the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for its truth. The actual value a sentence 
may have relative to any specific context is irrelevant*
9* Of. Gh*3 (section 3*1*5) for a further discussion of statement and 
sentence, with respect to the logical definition of presupposition*
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Aooordingly I shall assume that predicting conditions on the truth 
of sentences is not illegitimate and that the problem of handling 
the truth conditions of deixis can be overcome (cf. Davidson (ibid) 
and Lewis (ibid) for more detailed analyses)*
2.4.2 Performative Verbs, Imperatives, and Questions - A Suggested Solution
Two chief criticisms of a truth-based semantics remains^ performatives,
and the non-indicatives - imperative and question. It has been claimed
by Austin (and others after him) that performatives have no truth value
(asserted by Austin in 1962 to be obvious and not in need of argument).
These verbs all have two properties: (i) they describe an act which
can only be carried out by speaking (or some other form of communication)
(ii) in the first person present tense, the action depicted by the
speaker is not so much described by his statement as carried out
by that statement. Thus I promise to go is not a description of
a promise but will itself constitute a promise when it is uttered.
The class of verbs is a fairly clear one: what is less convincing is
Austin's claim that they cannot be either true or false because they
11are actions, and not descriptions* This performative use is notably 
restricted to first person, simple present. In every other case, a 
truth-conditional analysis is straightforward and unexceptional.
As an example, take promises. John promised to go will be true if the 
action described constitutes an undertaking (either verbal or written)
10* The claim, widespread among logicians (cf. Strawson 1952 eh.3 section II) 
that the logical connectives *v* and * :> ' do not correspond to 
their natural-language counterparts and, or and if-then. I have not 
considered here since I shall consider arguments relating to and and or 
in oh*4 in connection with presupposition. The relation between '^> * and 
if-then has been discussed extensively by philosophers. Grice (cf. ch.7) 
argued in lectures in 1967-8 that the difference between the two was 
solely pragmatic (though his arguments are disputed by Cohen 1971)* For 
an argument that they must be * semantically identical, cf. Clark 1971 
<^ ith a counter-argument by Young 1972).
11* At several points, Austin more or less withdraws this claim. Cf. 1962, 
lecture XI particularly pp,134f, l44f.
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made by John sometime in the past to carry out some action in the
12future, namely going, and these conditions constitute the meaning
of the sentence. If these conditions are not met (because John's
statement did not constitute such a commitment, because John made no
statement at all, etc), then - just as a truth-based semantic analysis
predicts - the sentence is false* Now in the case of an utterance of
I promise to go. one of the conditions for the truth of the sentence
is automatically guaranteed by the utterance itself. And if in
addition the speaker is indeed committing himself to an undertaking,
it is arguable that the utterance of I promise to go constitutes a
true statement. Under this analysis, performative utterances can and
do carry a truth values what is odd about them is that the mere fact
of their utterance guarantees the fulfilment of at least part of the
conditions for the truth of the proposition conveyed. With the verb
say itself we have the limiting case where the very act of uttering
"I say that he is sick” guarantees the truth of the statement. As Lewis
points out (1972), to utter I am speaking is not only to speak but it
is also to speak the truth. The idiosyncratic feature of performative
statements is therefore not that they have no truth value but rather
that their truth value is at least partially cfeterniined by their very
utterance. If this is correct, then this class of verbs is not excluded
13from a truth-based semantics*
Some support for this argument is provided by looking at the 
contradictions that can arise in both performative and nonperformative 
utterances. If the analysis in which performative utterances are 
said to carry a truth value is correct, then we should predict that
12, For a more detailed analysis of promises, cf. Searle 19&9,
13, This view has been pu&forward by a number of peoples cf. in 
particular Lewis (ibid) pp.209 ff, who presents the most detailed 
account. Also Wiggins 1971, p.21 fn.b, Landesman 1972 p.31f»
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Constraints which hold on nonperformative utterances by virtue of the
meaning of promise will also hold for performative utterances: that is
to say, sentences which are contradictory in a nonperformative tense
will be contradictory in the simple present. This prediction does not
follow from Austin's analysis: since performative utterances have no
truth value, there is no theoretical basis for predicting, for example,
that what will provide contradictions in sentences capable of being
true or false should also provide contradictions in sentences which
\ L
can never have a truth value# Yet it seems clear that within each 
group of sentences (3)-(8), each containing two nonperformative 
sentences and one performative, all the sentences are equally,> 
odd, and odd for the same reason.
(3a)?*John warned Mary that the bull was dangerous though he didn't
assume it was
C3b)?*I warn you that the bull is dangerous though I'm not assuming it is
(3c)?*I* m warning you that the bull is dangerous though I'm not
assuming it is
(A-a) *John warned Mary that the bull was dangerous but he didn't say
anything
(ifb) *1 warn you that the bull is dangerous but I haven't said anything
(*tc) *I'm warning you that the bull is dangerous but I'm not saying
anything
(3a)?*John promised Mary that he had cleaned the sink though he didn't
assume that he had
(5b)?*I promise you I've cleaned the sink though I'm not assuming I have 
(3c)?*I'm promising you I've cleaned the sink though I'm not assuming
I have
(ба) *John promised Mary that he would clean the sink but he didn't
say anything
(бб) *1 promise you I'll clean the sink but I haven't said anything 
(6c) *I'mpromising you that I'll clean the sink but I haven't said
anything
l k 9 If a contradiction is defined as a statement which is necessarily
false, then performatives cannot provide contradictions by definition.
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(7b) *John promised Mary that he would clean the sink but he didn't
commit himself to doing so 
(7b) *1 promise you I'll clean the sink but I'm not committing myself
to doing so
(?c) *I'm promising you that I'll clean the sink but I'm not committing
myself to doing so
(8a)?*The Queen ordered the guards to chop off his head but she didn't
intend to give the impression that she had 
insisted that they do so 
(8b)?*l order you to "chop off his head but I don't mean to give the
impression that I insist that you do so 
(8c)?*I'm ordering you to chop off his head but I don't mean to give
the impression that I insist that you do so
Furthermore there is no difference in deviance between the simple
(performative) present tense and the progressive (nonperformative)
present tense, as the Austinian account might be expected to predict#
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the case for excluding
performative utterances as not having a truth value is weak and should
be dropped. Performative utterances will be analysed as statements like
other utterances, and they will not be excluded in principle from a
I£truth-based semantics# ■'
There remains the problem of imperative and question. How can they
be handled within a formal semantic theory? If as is almost universally 
l 6assumed, they cannot have a truth value, then they constitute 
exceptions to a theory of truth conditions. What consequences does this 
have for a theory of semantics in which meaning is so defined? There 
are five possibilities#
(1) The theory should be rejected, since these demonstrate it to be fa&se#
15# It follows from this argument that it is not a necessary condition of 
a sentence's being a true statement that it constitute a description#
The only necessary condition is that it stand in an exact correspondence 
with some arbitrary state of affairs#
]£-# One exception is Lewis (ibid)#
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Such an out-and-out rejection of a theory would demand the substitution 
of an alternative more explanatory theory. There are two possibilities!
(a) since the interpretation of questions, commands, and indeed 
assertions, appears to depend on some concept of illocutionary force, 
a general theory of speech acts should constitute the basis of natural 
language semantics; (b) since questions and commands undeniably 
involve the interaction of speaker and hearer, we might attempt to 
define meaning in these terms rather than in terms of truth conditions* 
The second alternative I shall discuss (and reject) in detail in chapter 
7, so I shall not consider it here* The first alternative is based on 
a misconception. The existence of questions and commands does not 
provide any evidence that concepts relating to the speech act such as 
illocutionary force need to be incorporated into natural language 
semantics; for interrogative and imperative forms are not indicators 
of illocutionary force. Questions and commands are open to as many 
interpretations as statements. Thus a question such as Are they 
thinking of leaving soon? is no more explicit as to its illocutionary 
force than is the statement They are thinking of leaving soon* It can 
be used either as an implicit command (if for example said by a bored 
emperor to his officer in front of some subordinates whom he wishes to 
get rid of), an implicit threat (if the same emperor intends to suggest 
that if the people in question did leave, they v/ould lose their jobs), 
or an implicit statement (if the implication is simply one of boredom 
on the part of the emperor), etc. etc. Furthermore, as these examples 
demonstrate, the identification of illocutionary force is just as 
indeterminate with non-statements as with statements. In short, there 
seems no reason to suppose any one-to-one correspondence between the
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operators assertion, question, and command, and concepts such as
illocutionary force. I therefore take it that the existence of questions
and commands does not in itself provide any evidence for a theory of
17meaning based on speech acts. '
(2) The .second possibility is that the theory of truth-conditional 
semantics should be maintained rigorously with no interpretation of 
any non-truth-conditional elements. This would exclude any 
interpretation of the syntactic markers Q and Imp on the grounds that 
these are pragmatic operators (cf. ch.7 p.2j:0). This would have the 
disastrous consequence that Are you quiet?, You are quiet and Be quiet 
would be predicted to be synonymous, since with no interpretation of
Q and Imp, the three sentences would have an identical set of truth 
conditions.
(3) One possible way of incorporating questions and imperatives into 
a truth-based semantics is to analyse them as having a semantic 
representation identical to their corresponding performative statement.
As such they would (if we assume that performative utterances are truth- 
bearing statements) not only have a truth value on every utterance, but 
they would correspond to statements which are very generally true.'
Thus for example (9) would have a semantic representation identical 
to that of (10), and similarly (11) and (12) would share a semantic 
representation.
(9) Get out
(10) I order you to get out
(11) Is John in the bathroom?
(12) I ask you to tell me whether John is in the bathroom
1.7# For a discussion of illocutionary force within a pragmatic framework 
cf, ch.8 section 8.9 
IS. Since they would be of the type whose truth was guaranteed by its 
utterance.
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However, this solution is based on the assumption that the paired 
sentences (9)”(10) and (11)-(12) are synonymous. Yet there are good 
reasons for thinking that pairs involving an assertion and its corres­
ponding performative statement (e.g. John is sick; 1 tell you that John 
is sick) are not synonymous; they have different truth conditions# And 
since one's intuitions about meaning judgements are even less clear 
on pairs such as (9)-(10) and (11)-(12), there is little justification 
for claiming synonymy in the cases of commands and questions and their 
corresponding performative statements if this parallel does not carry 
over to assertions. This solution must therefore be rejected.
(A) A further alternative is to predict truth conditions as a property 
of the common content of a sentence, question and imperative (a so- 
called 'sentence-radical') rather than on sentences themselves. This 
is the analysis proposed by Stenius (196?)• He suggests that every 
sentence be analysed as containing a sentence-radical and a modal 
element, the former signifying the descriptive content of the sentence 
and the latter its mood. Thus You be quiet, Are you quiet? and You are 
quiet all share the same sentence-radical but have different moods. A 
sentence-radical is further described as true if what it describes is 
the case, and false otherwise - irrespective of mood. Mood itself is 
defined in terms of separate semantic rules as follows;
Indicative rule; Produce a sentence in the indicative mood only if its
sentence-radical is true
Imperative rule; React to a sentence in the imperative mood by making
the sentence-radical true
Interrogative rules Answer the question by 'yes' or 'no', according as
its sentence-radical is true or false (cf. ibid 
pp. 268, 273).
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While an explanation along these lines seems intuitively sound, there 
are in fact considerable difficulties. Firstly, imperatives will 
under all normal circumstances be false since truth-value is assigned 
to the radical. Second, and more important, is the problem that if 
the rules given above are semantic rules, then it becomes semantically 
deviant to tell a lie, and similarly deviant to answer anything other 
than yes to a question such as Are bachelors unmarried? Yet it is 
clearly irrelevant to a semantic statement whether or not speakers 
tell the truth. Though Stenius attempts to argue against such 
criticisms, his rebuffs are not I think entirely just and the criticisms 
remain. A more exact statement of the indicative rule would surely 
include a weakening to 'only if there are good reasons for believing 
the sentence-radical is true*. Now 1 think there are important reasons 
(which will emerge in ch.A) why any semantic theory which introduces 
the concept of speaker's belief becomes in principle incapable of 
fulfilling quite basic conditions on linguistic theories, and as 
such is untenable. For the moment, I merely enter this reservation 
together with the previous criticisms as justification for not accepting 
this alternative.
(5) The final alternative is to have a truth-conditional semantics 
which gives no account of questions or imperatives except that they 
are defined, together with the assertion sign, as semantic primitives, 
not capable of being assessed as true or false. In this formulation, 
the relationship between Be late and I order you to be late or betv/een 
Am I wrong? and I ask you tofatl me whether I am wrong is captured 
indirectly, by defining ask and order in terms of the primitives Q 
and Imp respectively and stating that ask is followed by embedded
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19questions, and order by embedded imperatives. This alternative 
differs only from Stenius' suggestion in the definition of the symbols 
'21, 'if. Effectively, this framework also separates a sentence- 
radical on which truth conditions are stated, from a 'modal* element 
comprising one of the pragmatic mood operators '1- *?', ']'» Thus
the meaning of a yes-no question for example is defined by stating 
the truth conditions of the proposition being questioned and prefixing 
the semantic primitive . While the treatment of the actual operators 
* f- ', '?* and 'Is is admittedly ad-hoc, there is strong evidence to 
suggest that whatever solution is adopted for the interpretation of 
Q and Imp themselves, the semantic analysis of questions in particular 
must be in terms relating to truth conditions. The evidence concerns 
the constraints on or conjunction in questions. Or has been defined 
truth-functionally in the following ways?
Inclusive or Exclusive or
p Q P v Q P Q P v Q
T T T T T F
T F T T F T
F T T F T T
F F p F F F
This truth-functional definition of the meaning of or gives us a set 
of predictions. Since the condition on semantic well-formedness is 
that a sentence be true in some possible state of affairs, and since 
exclusive or demands that the conjuncts P and Q of any conjunction be 
able to differ in their truth value assignment (in the same way that 
pregnant demands that the object it is predicated of be female), it 
follows that where there is a truth dependence between conjuncts, the
l9. Cf, Stockwell, Schachter, Hall-Partee who argue (p,5^ 3 ) that complements 
of ask and order are questions and imperatives respectively for syntactic 
reasons.
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sentence as a whole will be contradictory. That is, there will be 
no state of affairs in which either P will be true and Q false, or 
vice versa; so P and Q in these cases will never jointly fulfil 
the conditions demanded by or. This prediction of deviance appears 
to be correct:
(13) ?*Either John left or Bill noticed
(l*f) ?*Either John was ill or he wasn’t well
(13) ?*Either Mary is dead or John killed her
(16) ?*Either John's theorem was right or Bill proved that it was right
(17) ?*Either Edward pretended to be sick or he wasn't sick
(18) ?* Either there was an exhibition or the mayor went to the exhibition
In every case, the sentence is odd if jor is interpreted exclusively, and 
in every case there is a relation of dependence between the conjuncts. 
Exactly the same phenomenon occurs in questions, where the appears 
to be invariably exclusive:
(19) *Did John leave or did Bill notice?^®
(20) *Are you going to stay here or are you not going to leave?
(21) *Was John's theorem right or did Bill prove that it was?
(22) *Was there an exhibition or did the mayor go to the exhibition?
(23) *Bid Edward pretend to be sick or wasn't he sick?
(2^ ) *ls Mary dead or did John kill her?
This ungrammaticality is predicted if the or in questions is given a 
truth-functional definition. Constraints on conjunction in questions 
can then be given a natural explanation. It follows that, whatever 
particular solution is adopted for interpreting the syntactic marker Q 
itself, the constituents of questions must be interpreted in terms 
of truth conditions.
This example is taken from R,Lakoff (1971) and is one of a set of 
examples that she uses to demonstrate the necessity for a performative 
analysis of questions. The above argument however shows that there is 
a natural means of predicting this deviance without the need of under­
lying higher verbs.
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In summary, I have argued that meaning for natural languages 
can be defined in terras of conditions on the truth of sentences, and 
that such a definition need not in principle exclude an analysis of 
performatives, questions or imperatives. Performative uses of a verb, 
I have analysed as no different from the remainder of the verb's 
paradigm. Questions and imperatives I argue must be entered as 
unanalysed semantic primitives. 1 cannot and would not wish to 
pretend that either of these arguments is conclusive. For my purposes 
however, it has been sufficient to show that an analysis of meaning 
in terms of truth conditions is not ruled out of court by the mere 
existence of performatives, imperatives, and questions.
More generally in this first section I have suggested that an 
interpretive semantic component along the lines envisaged by 
Bierwisch provides a formal description by recursive procedure of the 
truth conditions of the sentences of a language. In presenting this 
specification, I have assumed that the logic on which it is based 
contains the two values true and false. In the following section, we 
shall see how this analysis competes with two other analyses:
(a) one in which the meaning of sentences includes reference to the 
beliefs of speakers
(b) one in which the logic on which the semantic mechanism depends is 
not two-valued but three-valued, containing the extra value 
neither true nor false.
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CHAPTER 3 s Presupposition: Two Definitions
So far I have outlined a truth-conditional theory of meaning, 
and have shown how it is naturally compatible with the formulation 
of the semantic component in Bierwisch 19&9, 1971. In the introduction 
to chapter 1, I argued that presupposition constituted a possible 
falsification of this claim. In this chapter I shall give an account 
of two ways in which presupposition has been defined, in preparation 
for considering what issues these definitions raise.
Presupposition was defined by Strawson in an attempt to explain
1the relation betiireen a definite referring noun phrase and its referent. 
It was specifically intended as a refutation of Russell's analysis* 
Russell (1903) made, inter alia, two claims: that The King of France 
is bald is logically made up of two assertions (i) There is one and 
only one King of France, (ii) Whoever is the King of France is bald; 
and that the relation between The King of France is bald and There is 
a King of France is one of entailment* Strawson on the other hand 
claimed (1930, 1932, 1964) that The Kin  ^of France is bald is 
logically made up of a presupposition that there is a King of France 
and an assertion that he is bald; and that the relation between the 
two statements The King of France is bald and There is a King of 
France is one of presupposition. Presupposition therefore stands in 
direct contrast both to assertion and entailment. It is these two 
contrasts which lead to the two non-equivalent characterisations of
1. The term presupposition was first used by Frege (1892), whose account 
largely agrees with that of Strawson. 1 shall restrict myself to 
Strawson's account as it was this that attacked Russell's analysis.
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presupposition. While Strawson talks informally of what a speaker 
assumes in using sentences containing definite descriptions as 
opposed to what he actually states (1950), the formal definition 
of presupposition is in terms of the relation between two statements.
By definition then, the concept of presupposition contrasts with 
entailment.
3.1 Entailment v. Presupposition
Entailment I defined earlier (p. 64 ) as a relation between
sentences such that the truth of the second necessarily follows from
the truth of the first. Thus any statement will entail a statement 
2£>2 if when is true, must also be true. It is therefore not
possible to assert the truth of and deny the truth of £>2. A different
formulation of this same relation is to say that the truth of S2 is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the truth of
whereas the truth of is a sufficient but not necessary condition for
the truth of For example, the statement made by uttering That
person is a bachelor (S^ ) entails the statement made by uttering
That person is a man (Sg) since if 3 ^  is true, 3 ^  must be (demonstrating
the sufficiency of the truth of for the truth of 3 ^  • On the
other hand, 3 ^  must be true if is to be, though this does not itself
guarantee the truth of (demonstrating the necessity of the truth
of £>2 f°r the truth of S^ ). It follows from this set of defining conditions
that if $2 Is false, then 3 ^  must also be false. However if £>^ is
false, nothing follows - 3^, can be either true or false.
2. I am deliberately using statement here and not sentence in accordance 
with the logical definitions. Cf. Ch.2 for a discussion of truth as 
a property of sentences, and section 3•'-3 of this chapter for the 
justification of ascribing presuppositions to sentences.
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Presupposition differs from entailment in only two ways; the
consequence of S^  being false, and the consequence of being
false. For S^ to presuppose the truth of S2 must follow from
the truth of S^ , but if is false then S^  will have no truth value,
i.e. will be neither true nor false, or it will not constitute a
statement at all. It follows from this that if S^ is false,
must be true. Like entailment then, for a presupposition relation
to hold between two statements the truth of S^  must be a necessary
condition on the truth of S^ and conversely the truth of S^ must be
a sufficient condition on the truth of S2. But in addition, the truth
of S2 must also be a necessary condition of the falsity of S^ , and
conversely the falsity of S^ must be a sufficient condition for the
truth of S2* The original example The King of France is bald
is thus said to presuppose There is a King of France since, as
Strawson argues, one judges the truth or falsity of this statement
by assuming the existence of the King of France and by assessing on
the basis of this assumption whether or not he actually is bald.
If there is no King of France, then the statement The King of France
is bald is neither true nor false. It follows from this that
The King of France is not bald (which asserts the falsity of The King
of France is bald), is also said to be either true or false only if
there is a king of France. If there is no King of France it is said
to be just as odd to say The King of France is not bald as it is to
say The King of France is bald. As Strawson would have it, the question
of whether these statements are true or false simply does not arise if
3. It is not clear whether the difference between these two consequences is 
other than terminological Lemmon (1966 p.98) assumes that they are, but 
Strawson seems normally to accept the former (1964 p.106). If we accept 
the former we have to allow a definition of statement which does not 
demand the property of being either true or false. Since I shall be 
talking about presuppositions on sentences, the question of whether a 
statement can have no truth-value will not concern me. I shall adopt 
the former alternative.
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bthere is no such person as the King of France# The difference 
between entailment and presupposition is summarised in Table X;
Table I
Entailment Presupposition
S1 S2 S1 
T T T — » T
F 4—  F ~(TvF) F
F ^  T v F F — >  T
3*2 Speaker-Presuppositionss Presupposition v. Assertion
The discerning reader should be wondering at this point how the 
relation of presupposition - defined as it is in terms of the truth- 
dependence of statements - eould possibly constitute a potential 
falsifier of truth-based semantics# The answer is - it does not.
The trouble arises over the contrast between presupposition and 
assertion# Strawson's informal discussion of what is stated as 
opposed to what is assumed led to a characterisation of presupposition 
in terms of beliefs on the part of the speaker in making a statement# 
This re-interpretation of the term was first explicitly given by 
Sellars (195**) who infers from Strawson's initial account that what 
is presupposed in some utterance of The King of France is bald is that 
the speaker believes that there is a King of France and moreover that 
the hearer does so also. Presupposition is here opposed by definition 
to what a speaker would assert in uttering a given sentence. This 
concept is radically different from the logical definition since the 
defining criterion of presupposition yields quite different results#
4# Cf# Strawson 1950 section III#
3# Strawson 1950 is in fact indeterminate as between a truth-based 
characterisation of presupposition or a pragmatic one.
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In Sellars1 case presupposition bears no relation to truth, conditions but 
riafteS'imtba? to conditions for successful communication. Thus if the 
presupposition fails to hold, the speaker has in some sense spoken 
incorrectly. But as Strawson points out in his reply to Sellars (195*+)« 
this concept is neither incompatible nor compatible v/ith his own 
definition - it is merely different. Correct and incorrect usage are 
not co-extensive with the assignment of the truth-values true and 
false to Abatements. In fact, it has been suggested (by Garner 1971) 
that anyone wishing to use Sellars' concept of presupposition should 
scrap the term presupposition.
However Sellars' misinterpretation of Strawson is not wholly
unjustified, and it is not I think the sole or even the chief source
of the widespread conflation of speaker-presupposition and statement-
presupposition. There is a very general tendency in describing
presupposition to talk about what a speaker would be presupposing in
using a particular sentence to make a statement as opposed to what he
would actually be asserting. The dangers of this are hinted at by
Garner (ibid) who separates the various different uses of the terra
£
by philosophers and linguists. let even he claims that 'we could 
always rephrase what I have said (about statements - RMK) by talking 
explicitly about what, as a performer of an act of a certain kind, 
or as a producer of an object of a certain kind, a speaker does 
(or would)presuppose' (p.27). But this is to fall into the very trap 
he is warning other people of. This rephrasing by Garner is only 
not a danger if it is recognised as a consequence of the logical 
definition of presupposition, and not part of the definition itself.
6. He draws attention to this conflation in a footnote (p.27 fn.5) 
as a 'potential source of trouble*.
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If however, it is taken as a characterisation of presupposition, then
it invites conflation with a subtly different use of presupposition,
where all that a speaker assumes his hearer knows constitutes his
presuppositions and this stands in contrast with what that speaker
is informing his hearer of (asserting). Thus the utterance of
JOHN seduced Mary with contrastive stress on John, could be said to
presuppose not only that there is a man called John but also that
someone called Mary was seduced, and to assert that it was John 
7
that did it* In a similar way both John SEDUCED Mary and John 
seduced MARY would have a different set of presuppositions. Wow 
it is fairly certain that neither Strawson nor Garner would wish to 
conflate these two uses of presupposition, since the latter is not
g
susceptible to any truth-based definition. Indeed, it is 
essentially equivalent to presupposition in terms of speaker-belief.
But it is not clear how this use can be excluded by a characterisation 
of presupposition in terms of what the speaker presupposes in making 
such a statement. If therefore the logical definition of presupposition 
is to be kept distinct from presupposition defined in terms of speaker 
belief or assumption, the former must not be discussed in terms of 
what a speaker would do in saying a sentence, I shall therefore assume 
a) that the logically defined presupposition is a relation defined only 
between two statements^ and (b) that it stands in contrast to a 
pragmatically defined speaker presupposition, which is defined in 
terms of what the speaker assumes in saying particular utterances*
7. Cf. Chomsky 1971, and ch. 8 section 8,2*5 of this thesis*
8. Strawson appears to fluctuate between a position keeping these two 
separate (cf. p.85 and Strawson 195*+) and a position implicitly 
conflating them (cf. ch.5 section 5.1 of this thesis and Strawson 196*+a),
9* This will be extended shortly to include sentences*
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3*3 Presuppositions of Statements and Sentences
Before we can assess how or whether either of these concepts 
should be incorporated into a formal model of language, there remain 
two problems! (1) what is meant by statement?, (2) Can we justifiably 
speak of sentences bearing presuppositions? We have already seen in 
chapter 2 that statements are generally defined as abstract entities 
which are either true or false with respect to some context of 
utterance (with the possible caveat of footnote 3 of this chapter).
It is necessary to maintain a distinction between this definition 
of statement and the illocutionary act definition of statement.
The importance of the distinction rests in the fact that the 
illocutionary act of stating stands in contrast to the illocutionary 
acts of promising, warning, boasting etc. The logically defined 
statement does not. Wow it is clear that whatever the presuppositions 
of the logical statement made by The King of France visited the 
exhibition, we would not want these to stand in potential contrast 
to those of utterances where the same sentence is used as a boast, a 
warning^ or a threat. The essential feature of the logically defined 
statement is that whatever act is purported to have taken place, the 
statement itself and hence its presuppositions remain constant. The 
presuppositions of a logically defined statement are thus independent 
of the illocutionary force associated with it* On the contrary 
however, the presuppositions of the illocutionary act of stating 
need not in principle hold for other illocutionary acts.
While this distinction is maintained by Strawson, this is not 
the case with some of his interpreters, for example Garner (1971)•
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Indeed conflation of these two types of statement leads Garner (ibid)
to characterise presupposition failure (when is false) as a failure
to constitute a statement (rather than guaranteeing that the
statement in question be neither true nor false) on the grounds that
it 'allows a natural generalisation to speech acts of other kinds
and their objects, since it seems desirable to speak of the presuppositions
of promises, commands, questions, bets, warnings, and so on as w e l l
as those of statements' (p.31)* He then goes on from this to
characterise presupposition in terms of presuppositions on the part
of a speaker 'in the performance of an illocutionary act (or the
purported performance of one)* (p.*+2). His failure to distinguish the
illocutionary act of stating from the logically defined statement thus
leads directly to a conflation of the two different concepts of presupposition
which he initially sought to separate.^
More important perhaps for our purposes is that Garner, like 
Strawson, condemns discussions of the presuppositions of sentences 
(pp.38, *+2) and he does so on the basis of this conflation of the two 
uses of the term statement. His reason for not allowing presuppositions 
to be a property of sentences is significantly different from Strawson's. 
Strawson restricts presupposition to statements because it is only 
these he says which are true or false, not sentences* Garner 
however seems to exclude all presuppositions as a property of sentences 
on the grounds that 'the same sentence •••• can be used, on different 
occasions, to perform different kinds of illocutionary acts* (p.38).
But if, as I suggest, presupposition is a property of the logically
10.Cf. his comments on Sellars, referred to on p. 35
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defined statement , then the question of varying illocutionary act 
potential does not arise* Moreover if, as Lemmon suggests (1966 p.91), 
it is legitimate to speake of sentences as true or false relative to 
some context of utterance, an ^ extension implicit in all analyses of 
meaning as conditions on the truth of sentences (cf, chapter 2 
section 2,3), then it follows that to speak of presuppositions (and 
entailments) of sentences is not illegitimate either,
3,4 Summary
1 have now outlined two definitions of presupposition, one in
terms of a relation between statements or sentences (by definition
in contrast to entailment), the other in terms of what a speaker must
assume in saying a given sentence (by definition in contrast to 
11assertion). Neither concept is catered for in the linguistic
framework I outlined in chapters 1-2, Of the two concepts, logical
presupposition possibly presents the lesser difficulty for this
framework. The semantic components set up in chapter 1 were largely
justified by their predictive power - viz. the predicting of
entailments and contradictions. If now logical presupposition has to
be predicted, the logic underlying these predictions will have to
be altered to include three values (true, false, and neither true
nor false) and this will have to be reflected in either the
fb,nasalisation of the components themselves or in the formalisation of
the projection rules predicting the interpretations of sentences (cf. p.30f).
Such a change would for example affect the interpretive rule of negation
outlined in chapter 1 (as we shall see in chapters 4-5) since this
11, There are several problems in the definition of assertion which
I shall return to in detail. Gf. ch.5 p# 144if an<^  ch. 8 section
8.6.,
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is based on the de Morgan equivalence 
- ( P . Q ) r -P v -Q 
which need not hold in a three-valued logic. However the under­
lying assumptions about the nature of semantic representation 
would not be altered with such a revision. In contrast to this, 
speaker-presuppositions appear to give the lie to the whole frame­
work. If it can be shown that presupposition so defined must be 
stated as part of the semantic representation, the meaning, of a 
sentence, then it would appear that meaning itself can no longer 
be defined in terms of truth conditions. Two issues thus emerge;
(1) Should the formalism of the semantic component reflect a three­
valued logic rather than a two-valued logic?
(2) Is the whole framework outlined in chapters 1-2 in principle 
based on the wrong premises - i.e. should meaning be defined in 
some other way, for example in terms of speaker-hearer relations? 
With these issues in mind, I shall now consider the various ways in
which presupposition has been used (or misused) by linguists.
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CHAPTER k : Presupposition: Its Use By Linguists
We have now seen that the definitions of presupposition appear
to provide deciding evidence for two different issues: (a) whether or
not the logic of natural language semantics should be two or three
valued, (b) v/hether or not natural language semantics should even be
related to logic rather than to some quite different theory involving
speaker-hearer communication. In this chapter, I wish to see to what
extent the evidence from work in linguistics supports either of these
two hypotheses. What I shall argue is firstly that the majority of
claims for presupposition in fact turn out to be examples of entailment.
This confusion of entailment and presupposition, 1 suggest, has arisen
in linguistics larger by virtue of an incorrect analysis of negative
sentences. My argumentation will therefore rest heavily on the outline
of negation I gave in chapters 1 and 2. Secondly, I shall argue that
those examples which cannot legitimately be analysed as entailment
are not properties of sentences which should be predicted by a
semantic component of a formal theory at all* Indeed, they cannot
be if the theory is to remain predictive. Rather they constitute
part of a separate theory, a theory of pragmatics. Thus I shall
conclude that none of the purported presuppositions refute the
1
theoretical framework that I outlined in chapters :1 and 2.
1. For reasons of exegesis, I shall only give detailed consideration to 
discussions of presupposition which seem to have been most influential 
in determining the use other linguists have made of the term - viz. 
Fillmore's, the Kiparskys1, Keenan's, and the Lakoffs'. The term is 
now extremely widely used and uses by the many other linguists have 
been taken into account only peripherally, or not at all. In particular, 
cf. the articles on presupposition in Kiefer and Ruwet (eds.) 1972, 
which have come to my attention too recently to be incorporated into 
the discussion here.
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TJnfortunately most recent work done in semantics by linguists 
appears to have been done without sufficient regard for its philosophical 
consequences, and this is effectively to work in a semantic vacuum.
For example, most linguists writing on presupposition do not appear to 
recognise either that there are two distinct concepts of presupposition 
or that any use of the concept of presupposition raises a central issue 
for semantic theory in general. Not only are the two concepts of 
presupposition in general not distinguished, but presupposition is 
used as an extremely broad cover term which includes examples of
entailment (Fillmore 1969, 1971, Keenan 1971, 1972, Kiparsky and
Kiparsky 1970, Lakoff 1971, 1972), logical presupposition (Keenan 
ibid), Austin's implication and happiness conditions (Fillmore ibid,
Lakoff ibid), Grice's conventional and nonconventional implicature 
(Lakoff ibid, R.Lakoff 1971, Horn 1969, Chomsky 1971), and also 
lexical presupposition (Fillmore ibid). These distinctions are not 
recognised by the writers themselves, and presupposition is very 
generally defined as that which the speaker assumes to be true as 
opposed to what he asserts to be true. Given this application of the
term to almost every conceivable semantic and pragmatic relation,
it is hardly surprising that presupposition has been thought to have 
considerable explanatory validity,
If.l* The Introduction of Presupposition to Linguistics: Fillmore
The term presupposition was first used in linguistics by Fillmore 
(1969, 1971) who is one of the few linguists to recognise that there is 
an issue over how meaning should be defined. In 1969, he attempted to 
reflect the distinction between entailment and presupposition within a
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semantic feature analysis by dividing the components of meaning of 
lexical items into the meaning of an item and its presuppositions.
His criterion for so doing was a negation test, which in general 
reflects the defining criterion of presupposition that the truth and 
falsity of S^ , the presupposing sentence, be a sufficient condition for 
the truth of S2 , the presupposed sentence. This test divides the 
semantic components of a sentence into two sets - those which may fall
within the scope of negation (i.e. which may be interpreted as false
when the corresponding positive sentence is asserted to be false); and 
those which can never fall within the scope of negation (i.e. which must 
remain true when the corresponding positive sentence is asserted to be 
false). In the case of a lexical item, its presuppositions are said to 
be those elements of its meaning which are unaffected by negations i.e. 
they cannot be denied. For example, the item bachelor, in the relevant 
sense of the word, is claimed to have 'unmarried1 as its meaning and 
the components 'adult' and 'male' as its presuppositions on the grounds 
that That person is not a bachelor is not used to deny that the person 
is a male adult, but only to deny that he is unmarried (Fillmore 1969 
p.123). However this assumes that negative sentences have a single fully 
specified interpretation. This, as we have seen (ch.^  section 1.3*3), 
is false. In fact, each of the components can be interpreted as falling
within the scope of negation:
(1) That person is not a bachelor - he's married
(2) That person is not a bachelor - he's only five years old
(3) That person is not a bachelor - it's a woman
(if) That person is not a bachelor - it's a woman, who is married
(5) That person is not a bachelor - it's a spinster
(6) That’s not a bachelor - it isn't even a human being - it's a stone 
made to look like Bill, our only unmarried friend.
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If we take the negation test strictly, this set of sentences provides 
five contradictory results:
I bachelor Meaning: unmarried
Presupposition: male, adult, human (1)
II bachelor Meaning: adult and unmarried
Presupposition: male and human (2)
III bachelor Meaning: male and unmarried
Presupposition: adult and human (3), (*0
bachelor Meaning: male
Presupposition: unmarried, adult, human (3)
V bachelor Meaning: male, human, unmarried, adult (6)
Clearly this is wrong. What has been ignored is the inherent vagueness
of negative sentences and the variability in the interpretation of
their scope. Furthermore, since the examples demonstrate that any
part of the meaning of bachelor can be interpreted as not matching
the state of affairs described then in no case is a component presupposed.
On the contrary, the variability in scope of negation is a defining
criterion of an entailment relation (cf. ch. 3 Table I line 3, P* )
since the denial of the entailing sentence has no consequence for the
entailed sentence, which can be either true or false when the entailing
sentence is false. It therefore appears that That person is a bachelor
entails the maleness, adultness, etc, of the object described and does
not presuppose them. Thus none of the components of bachelor constitute
presuppositional components.
This confusion of entailment and presupposition is repeated in
Fillmore 1971, us we shall see. However since in this paper he adopts
a more fully specified theoretical position which is purportedly
contrary to the position being argued for in this thesis, I must make
a short digression and consider the theoretical implications first.
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Fillmore explicitly dismisses any form of componential analysis on the 
grounds that it is often ’completely ritualistic1, that there is ’no 
stopping place1 (p.27*0 , and that in unclear cases, the oddness bears 
little relation to the linguistic properties of the lexical items in 
question, but stems rather from what we happen to know about the world.
As an alternative he suggests that the meaning of sentences should be 
analysed, along the lines of the ordinary language philosophers, 
in terms of two levels, the illocutionary and the presuppositional, 
the latter constituting ’those conditions which must be satisfied 
in order for a particular illocutionary act to be effectively 
performed in saying particular sentences 1 (p.276). In other words, 
he is committing himself to a use theory of meaning, and is therefore 
making exactly the opposite claim to that which is being made in this 
thesis. He argues that both in philosophy and linguistics the wrong 
question has been asked; that the question should not be 'What is the 
meaning of this form?’ but rather 'What do I need to know in order to 
use this form appropriately and to understand other people when they 
use it?' (p.27*0 • However a framework which equates meaning with 
aspects of the illocutionary force of utterances is forced to distinguish 
between There are three bulls in that field said by a farmer to a 
passing walker, the same sentence said by a farmer to his financial 
backer, and the same sentence said by a farmer to his assistant, since 
in the first case, the utterance will constitute a warning, in the 
second case a boast, and in the third a mere statement. Moreover since 
Austin alleged that there were an indeterminate number of illocutionary 
forces, or at least a very large number (cf. Austin 1962 p.1^ 9), it 
follows that a strict speech act theory of semantics must predict that 
every sentence is if not indeterminately ambiguous at least ambiguous
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in anything up to one thousand ways. As we shall see in section 
this leads to consequences which no linguist would wish to accept. 
Fillmore only avoids these consequences by two ad-hoc caveats: 
first, the illocutionary level is called the ’explicit* level of 
communication, ruling out ad-hocly the fact that a statement may be 
used to boast, warn, etc - i.e. ruling out that aspect of communication 
which is a central part of a use theory of meaning; and second, at the 
presuppositional level he claims to be concerned ’only with those 
(conditions - RMK) that can be related to facts about the linguistic 
structure of sentences' (p.277), ruling out some of the conditions 
which are normally seen as an indisputed part of a speech act theory 
of meaning (cf. the preparatory and sincerity conditions on 
promising etc given in Searle 1969).
In this form, it is not obvious that Fillmore’s formulation is 
more than a terminological variant of a feature or component analysis 
of meaning. Indeed an analysis explicitly in terras of conditions on 
the use of linguistic items given his caveats meets just the same 
problems as componential analysis, over just the same border-line cases. 
Thus it is as inappropriate to say of a three-week old baby John’s 
child is not a virgin as to say John's child is not a human being but 
it is not clear that the oddity of the former can be related to ’facts 
about the linguistic structure' of the sentence. In addition, it is 
not clear what criteria Fillmore has for distinguishing what is part 
of the meaning of a lexical item, the illocutionary level, and what 
is not. And yet componential analysis which, according to Fillmore, 
assigns meaning in a ritualistic way, in principle provides criteria 
as follows: if a postulated component of meaning in a sentence can be
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denied without forming a contradiction, then it is not part of the 
meaning of that sentence. If it cannot, then it is. If furthermore 
the component can never be interpreted as being included in the scope 
of negation when that sentence is negated, then it will constitute a 
presuppositional component (cf. line 3 Table I p.8^ )• Given that 
Fillmore's criticisms of componential analysis are not entirely 
justified and moreover that his alternative analysis of meaning, 
with two quite ad-hoc caveats, comes up against exactly the same 
problems as a componential analysis, it is by no means certain that 
componential analysis is shown to be fundamentally at fault. There 
remains only the possibility that his analysis predicts a different 
and more sound description of a given set of data, and therefore 
could be said to provide a plausible alternative framework.
As a demonstration of his theoretical position, Fillmore gives
an analysis of a set of verbs of judging in terms of their 'illocutionary'
and ’presuppositional' aspects (their meaning and presupposition). Of
2
these verbs I shall consider in detail only criticise and accuse, but 
even this small amount of evidence demonstrates that componential 
analysis and Fillmore's are no more than terminological variants, 
except in cases of presupposition where Fillmore's own criterion (that 
of negation: cf. p. 93 ) contradicts his analysis. Thus we shall see 
that not only is Fillmore's theoretical position not a real alternative 
to an analysis in componential terms of truth conditions but his use 
of presupposition is again a confusion of this term with entailment.
Fillmore's specification of criticise and accuse is as follows:
2. There are a number of criticisms of detail that could be made of the other 
verbs. The most obvious mistake is perhaps the analysis of blame into three 
lexical items, apparently dependent on stress assignment, in exactly the 
manner of my pseudo-analysis of bachelor (cf. p.9if ). That this cannot be 
correct can be shown by considering John KICKED Ruth v. John kicked RUTH 
where in the former there is no doubt that he did something to her and in 
the latter that he kicked somebody, but which would not lead us to set up 
two lexical items kick (analogous to blame) one in which the entire lexical 
content was presupposed.
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ACCUSE (Judge, Defendant, Situation) (Performative)
Meaning : SAY (Judge, 'X', Addressee)
X - RESPONSIBLE (Situation, Defendant)
Presupposition : BAD (Situation)
CRITICISE (Judge, Defendant, Situation)
Meaning : SAY (Judge, 'X' , Addressee)
X - BAD (Situation)
Presupposition^ : RESPONSIBLE (Defendant, Situation)
Presupposition^ : ACTUAL (Situation)
These in effect claim that for X (the judge) to be described as accusing
Y (the defendant) of Z (the situation), X must say to someone, not
necessarily the defendant Y, that Y is responsible for Z, and it must
in addition be presupposed that the situation is bad. Conversely for
criticise, with the additional presupposition that Z actually happened.
It is not easy to test this analysis because of an equivocation over
who does the presupposing. Fillmore allows the following formulae
(where x is what is presupposed): ’Suppose there’s no question in
anybody’s mind that x' (p.283), 'There is no question about x' (p.282)
and 'If I say (36), I presuppose that x1 (p.282) (both the latter are
used with respect to criticise), Thus it is not clear whether the
presupposed element has to be true, to be generally assumed to be
true (whether it is or not), or to be assume<| to be true by the hearer.
However both analyses would presumably use data of the following sort:
(7) *John accused Mary of taking his books but he didn't say anything
(8) *John accused Mary of taking his books but he didn’t say she'd done so
(9)?*John accused Mary of taking his books but he wasn’t assuming
anybody had taken them
(10)?*John accused Mary of taking his books but he wasn't assuming
it was a bad thing to have done
(11) John accused Mary of taking his books but I couldn't see anything
wrong in it
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(12) John didn't accuse Mary of taking his books: he merely suggested
that she had
(13) John didn't accuse Mary of taking his books because he knew she
hadn't done so
(14) John didn't accuse Mary of taking his books: he didn't say anything
(13) John didn't accuse Mary of taking his books because he assumed
he'd lost them
(16) *John criticised Mary for taking his books but he didn't say anything
(17) *John criticised Mary for taking his books but he didn’t say there
was anything wrong in it
(18)?*John criticised Mary for taking his books though he was assuming
that she hadn't done so
(19)?*John criticised Mary for taking his books though he was not
assuming that anybody had taken them
(20) John didn't criticise Mary for taking his books because he knew
there was nothing wrong in doing so
(21) John didn't criticise Mary for taking his books because he knew
she hadn't done so
(22) John didn't criticise Mary for taking his books: he didn't say
anything
(23) John didn't criticise Mary for taking his books, because he
assumed he'd lost them
These sentences fall into two categories, apparent contradictions, 
and apparent non-contradictions. In each case, inhere an apparent 
contradiction arises, (?)-(10), (l6)-(19), I have tested whether a 
suggested basis for the contradiction holds when the statement John 
accused/criticised Mary of/for taking his books is denied, i.e. 
whether when the statement is asserted to be false, the_purported 
presupposition must remain true. Thus for example, sentences such 
as John criticised Mary for something she hadn't done suggest that 
Fillmore's presupposition^ o n  criticise is not an absolute presupposition
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but relative to the criticiser (confirmed by (l8))| but the fact that 
this component can be interpreted as falling within the scope of 
negation in (21) indicates that it is not a presuppositional component.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this set of examples is that none 
of the apparent presuppositions necessarily holds under negation! in 
each case the statement can be asserted to be false by virtue of the 
purportedly presupposed statement being taken to be false (cf, (12)-
(15) and (20)-(23)). In brief, I think the data provide evidence 
against Fillmore's analysis and in favour of the followings
ACCUSE i Judge say defendant responsible for situation 
Judge assume situation bad 
Judge assume situation actual
CRITICISE : Judge say situation bad
Judge assume defendant responsible for situation 
Judge assume situation actual
Moreover I think this procedure of testing a purported presupposition
by seeking interpretations of negative sentences which deny it (an
impossibility for a true presupposition) shows that there is no such
thing as lexical presupposition. Every case of lexical presupposition
that Fillmore suggests can be interpreted as falling within the scope
of negation, and these lexical properties seem to be no more than
reflexes of entailment in just the way that the semantic components
of Leech (1969), Katz and Fodor (1963), Bierwisch (1969, 1970, 1971),
etc., are set up on lexical items by virtue of entailment relations
between sentences in which the items occur. Since with respect to the
non-presuppositional components of meaning the two analyses of criticise
and accuse do not conflict, and since only ad-hoc caveats save Fillmore's
3. Gf. ch. .9 P.?97f for further justification for describing this relation­
ship as an entailment.
This conclusion has been demonstrated independently by Cohen (1973)•
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analysis from undesirable consequences, I suggest (a) that each of the
cases Fillmore puts forward as presupposition are in fact cases of
entailment and (b) that Fillmore has not demonstrated the relevance
of aspects of the speech act to the semantic analysis of lexical
items. On the contrary, I assume - along with Austin (cf. Austin 1962
p.100) - that the level of illocutionary force is quite separate from
5the level of meaning.
5.2 Factive Verbs! Kiparsky and Kiparsky, • •
An important premise of my criticism of Fillmore's hypothesis 
of 'lexical presupposition1 was that negative sentences could be shown 
to have variation in scope without this corresponding to a variation in 
meaning of the sentence itself. Thus I suggested that all the components 
of meaning in criticise and accuse are reflexes of entailment, and not 
presupposition, because they may be interpreted as constituting part 
of what is negated. The Kiparskys (1970) make some gesture towards 
this position in recognising that 'it is the SET of assertions that is 
operated on by ... negation1 (p.151) where the assertions of a sentence 
are 'all those propositions which follow from it by virtue of its 
meaning' (p.1^ 8). Any one of these assertions, they state, may fall 
within the scope of negation. Thus they give the following set of 
examples (p.152) as possible interpretations of Mary didn't clean the house 
(2*0 Someone may have cleaned the house, but not Mary
(25) Mary may have done something, but not clean the house
(26) Mary may have cleaned something, but not the house
(27) Mary may have done something to the house, but not clean it
(28) Mary may have been cleaning the house, but it didn't get clean 
However they would not accept the full consequences of my analysis since 
they maintain Fillmore's test for presupposition that the presuppositions
5. Cf. Ch.§ section S‘.9 for an analysis of illocutionary force within 
a pragmatic frameworks
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of a sentence are constant under negation. Thus the above sentence 
is said to presuppose that the house was or has been dirty. This 
negation test has one important caveat: the presuppositions of a 
sentence may be denied, but this does not constitute 'the straight­
forward denial of an event or situation, but rather the denial of the 
appropriateness of the word in question' (p.151). Thus certain 
interpretations of negative sentences are excluded by fiat as not 
constituting 'straightforward denial'. With their particular example, 
clean is said to presuppose that the object of which it is predicated 
was or has been dirty, and it follows that (29) would be described as
an example of straightforward denial, but (30) by contrast apparently
would deny the appropriateness of the word clean:
(29) The boy didn't clean the room - the woman did
(30) The boy didn't clean the room - he made it dirty
I find this distinction dubious. We have seen earlier (ch.^.p.66 )
that to deny some proposition 'P' is to claim that the conditions
specified by 'P' do not correspond to the state of affairs in
question. Informally, one might say that it is not appropriate to
use 'P1 unless there is an exact correspondence between *P' and the 
6state of affairs. Thus in the examples cited, it is just as
inappropriate to the situation to say 'John cleaned the room' if
in fact Mary did as it is to say 'John cleaned the room11 if in fact
he made it dirty. To deny some proposition, for example John cleaned
the room IS to say it is inappropriate to relate the predicate in
question to the particular subject, whatever the cause of the non- 
7correspondence•
6. Cf. the pragmatic maxim introduced in ch.7 p.2©2 "Do not say what 
you believe to be false".
7. Cf. Ch. 7 p.21*tf for an argument against postulating the more
special kind of denial even as a separate pragmatic type.
-103-
The Kiparskys characterise this 'special1 type of negation as 
characteristically having contrastive stress. But if one legislates 
against the type of negation in (30) as being merely a denial of 
the appropriacy of the word clean, one is bound to legislate against 
all contrastive stress negations-^  and such an exclusion would have also 
to exclude (29)• In this example the scope of negation was interpreted 
as being restricted to the set of conditions represented by boy. Since 
it is precisely these conditions which fail, one might say - parallel 
to (30) - that the word boy is inappropriate in this context. This 
exclusion seems quite unjustified. Moreover, allowing presupposition 
to be included within the interpretation of negation at all contradicts 
the logical definition of presupposition that it is not possible to 
assert that the presupposing sentence is false (i.e. deny it) if the 
presupposed sentence is false, since the former will be neither true 
nor false under these conditions. In (3), denying the appropriacy of 
clean, this is clearly not so.« there is nothing 'special' about this case.
The Kiparskys' discussion of presupposition is by way of 
introduction to the semantic and syntactic properties of the verbs 
they call 'factive' (cf. also Lees I960), e.g. regret, realise, be angry. 
These they claim presuppose the truth of their complements. However, 
like criticise and accuse, I think it can be shown that sentences 
negating these verbs can be interpreted as negating their complements 
as well:
(31) I don't regret causing trouble because I didn't
(32) He can't have realised I've been unfaithful to him because I haven’t
(33) He shouldn't be furious that I've failed because I haven't
(3*fO I didn't regret that John was leaving because I knew it wasn't true
(35) I don't regret that I was alone because I wasn't
In other words, if it is false to say that I have been unfaithful to my
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husband then it is also false to say that he realises that I have been 
unfaithful to him; it's false to say that John regrets going to the
g
party because he never went; etc.
Moreover there are some puzzling complications under their analysis. 
The Kiparskys capture the distinction between the presuppositions of a 
sentence and its assertions by claiming 'the assertions of a proposition 
(P^ ) are made relative to that proposition within its context of 
dominating propositions. Presuppositions on the other hand, are 
relative to the speaker' (p. 155 ). If presuppositions induced Iqy 1hese verbs
are relative to the speaker, then they should hold irrespective of the
sentences they are contained in. Yet in if-then sentences, they a?e 
clearly not presupposed to be true by the speaker:
(36) If you go to the party, you will regret it
(37) If you go to the party, you will realise what a mistake it was
9And in counterfactual conditionals, they are taken to be false:
(38) If you had been to the party, you would have regretted it
(39) If you'd seen John you would have realised it
In addition, Lakoff points out (1972) that when factive verbs are 
embedded as complements of verbs such as pretend and dream , their 
complements are no longer presupposed to be true:
(40) I dreamt I realised my mother was dying and I couldn't get
to her in time
(41) Sue pretended that her boss realised she had an IQ of 180
8. For a logical argument supporting this data (using the factive verb 
know), cf. Wilson 1972.
9. Counterfactual conditionals have themselves been said to presuppose the 
falsity of their consequent and antecedent (cf. Morgan 19&9)* This has 
been shown to be wrong on the one hand by Karttcwm&fl- (1971) who 
demonstrates, by examples such as If Harry had known that Sheila had 
survived he would have gone home, which he did anyway, that the 
consequent is not presupposed to be false(though heassumes the 
antecedent is) and on the other hand by Thomason (1973 fn.9) who gives 
the example If the patient had taken arsenic, he would be exhibiting 
just the symptoms he does now to show that the antecedent is not 
presupposed to be false either.
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(42) I pretended to realise X was dying of cancer though X had just
been told I only had pleurisy 
(1*3) I pretended to regret that John was leaving though I knew he wasn’t 
(MO John refuses to realise he’s dying of cancer, so maybe he won’t
That is, in for example (4-1) (Lakoff's e.g. 22a of section V), it is not
necessarily true that Sue has an IQ of 180 in order for (41) itself to
be true. As Lakoff reports (ibid. p.575) ’there are some speakers who
f:
find it hajd to make judgments about (22a)1 • Yet if realise and regret
induce presuppositions which are speaker-relative these should hold
irrespective of the construction in which they are contained. Lakoff
is forced to postulate dialect differences in these cases, an outlet
10
which is in this case quite unjustified.
Verbs such as pretend do not however merely constitute complications
for the Kiparsky analysis of factives as presupposing the truth of their
complement. They provide direct evidence against such an analysis• Pretend
11
is a verb which very generally implies the falsity of its complement. Now 
if sentences containing a factive verb are embedded as a complement of 
pretend. that complement will be implied to be false. But on the hypothesis 
that sentences containing factive verbs presuppose the truth of their 
complement it should follow that the complement of the factive verb must 
still be implied to be true, even though the sentence containing the 
factive verb is itself implied to be false. On the hypothesis that positive 
sentences containing factive verbs entail the truth of their complement,
10. I shall not give Lakoff's analysis in detail since in a footnote, he admits
that 'the treatment of presupposition in this section is woefully inad­
equate '. One specific error is his analysis of pretend as presupposing the 
falsity of its complement, but having the curious property that under 
negation it has no presupposition with respect to its complement. This 
curious property guarantees that the relation cannot be one of prasuppositfcail
11. It is arguable that this property is based on an entailment relation 
between any assertion containing pretend and the complement of the verb; 
but examples such as John pretended that he was ill and he found out
later that in fact he had been ill for a very long time suggest that the
relation is not that strong. (I am grateful to J.Lyons for pointing out 
to me examples of this type.) Cf. Ch.9 P*29?f for a further discussion 
of the nature of this relation#
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this prediction will not of course follow since if the entailing 
sentence is implied to be false (as it will be when embedded as the 
complement of pretend) the entailed sentence (the complement of the 
factive verb) may be either true or false* As we have seen in 
examples (4l)-(^3), the prediction made by the presupposition analysis 
is not borne out. Each of these examples can be interpreted in one of 
two ways - with the complement of the factive verb taken to be true 
or taken to be false:
(if5i) Sue pretended that her boss realised she had an IQ of 180 in
order to get a better job 
(45ii)Sue pretended that her boss realised she had an IQ of 180 though
In fact he didn't know how clever she was
(A6i) I pretended to realise I was dying of cancer though I knew it
was only sciatica 
(46ii)l pretended to realise I was dying of cancer though in fact I
couldn't make myself believe it
(V?i) 1 pretended to regret that John was leaving when I knew he had no
intention of doing so 
(A7ii)l pretended to regret that John was leaving because I didn't want
anyone to see how relieved I was
Moreover this variability in implication extends to the entire range of
12factive predicates, as witness (48)-(^ 9)s
(*l8i) The teacher pretended that he was angry that Pete was late though
he knew that Pete was there on time 
(A8ii)The teacher pretended that he was angry that Pete was late so that
Pete would be frightened 
(*+9i) Gerald pretended that it was most unfortunate that Ann was pregnant
though he knew in fact it wasn't true
(A9ii)Gerald pretended that it was most unfortunate that Ann was pregnant
though secretly he was very pleased
12, In fact it extends to the entire range of purported presuppositions as 
we shall see, Cf, KartijUnen 1973 who notices that judgments seem to 
differ in such cases. What Kartfeunen, like Lakoff, fails to point out 
is that this variability is an unambiguous indication that the relation 
in question is not one of presupposition, but of entailment.
-107-
This evidence suggests fairly unambiguously that the relation between positive
sentences containing factive verbs and the complements of those verbs
is not one of presupposition at all, but is a relation of entailment.
Moreover the anomalies which arise in a presuppositional analysis
with negation and conditionals no longer remain if the relation between
13factive verbs and their complements is analysed as based on entailment.
If John regrets that he went to the party (S^ ) entails John went to the 
party (S^), then the following predictions arise:
(a) If is negated, then there are at least two possible interpretations,
one in which is assumed to be true, and one in which it is not,
(b) In a construction such as If then - where any speaker
uttering a sentence of this type would not be asserting either constituent
conjunct - since is not asserted to be true, there is no reason to
14
a s & u m e  that £>2 must be. Furthermore exactly the same prediction could 
be made for sentences conjoined by or, and this turns out to be the case.
Thus there is nothing odd about (30)-(32) despite the fact that the truth 
of the factive complement is not assumed,
(30) Either John regretted going to the party or he didn’t go
(51) Either Bill was annoyed that Mary was late or she managed to
get there on time
(32) Either the President realises that he faces impeachment or the
the charge has been dropped
The reason is again the same: since the truth of neither conjunct would
be asserted in any utterance of this sentence, there is no reason for
13, I do not mean to imply by criticising the Kiparskys' use of the term 
presupposition that their entire analysis is thereby falsified. On the 
contrary, as we shall see in ch.6, section 6,4, the evidence they provide 
suggests fairly conclusively that a syntactic class of factive predicates 
needs to be distinguished, but these are a subset of predicates which 
entail the truth of their complement propositions,
14, Cf. Ch.8 section 8,6 for a pragmatic account of assertion.
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the truth of the factive complement to be necessarily assumed. On 
the contrary, the truth of the factive complement will only be a 
necessary consequence if the first conjunct turns out to be true 
(in which case the second conjunct will be false). Thus each of 
the oddities for a presupposition-based analysis of factives follows 
as an automatic consequence for an entailment-based analysis of the 
same set of verbs.
One final piece of evidence provides further confirmation of 
this analysis. Both Lakoff (1972) and Horn (unpublished Ph.D. thesis)
have claimed that presuppositions can be suspended under certain
15conditions. One of these is that the presupposing sentence be 
negated. Thus we have:
(53) John doesn't realise Sue loves him, if indeed she does
but not
(54) *John realises Sue loves him, if indeed she doe©
(55) John doesn't regret having his money stolen, if in fact it was
but not
(56) *John regrets having his money stolen, if in fact it was 
In each case, the implication need not be held to be true if the 
apparently presupposing sentence is negated. But again, this is prohibited
by definition for presupposition, and constitutes the hallmark of
16
entailment. Hence we have still not seen evidence for the necessity 
of changing the original framework of chapters 1-2 to accommodate a 
different logical relation of presupposition.
™  1^ 73
15. Kartbjanen^generalises this 'suspension' procedure, setting up ad-hoc 
•filtering' conditions which can be used to account for both this type 
of example and the examples above, with if-then and or. But this is 
to concede the point I am making that purported presuppositions of the 
constituent sentence are not a necessary implication of all sentences in 
which they occur but only of sentences in which the presupposing sentence 
is implied (or asserted) to be true*
16. Cf. Kartthlnen 1971b for a different analysis of sentences such as these.
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4*3 Some Bemaining Examples of Logically Defined Presupposition: Keenan
Keenan (1971) provides a large range of examples which are said to
demonstrate the reality of the relation of logical presupposition in
natural language, but all his examples can I think be handled as
entailments, in a way similar to the examples of Fillmore and the
Kiparskys* Keenan himself would not consider this counter-*evidence since,
unlike Strawson, he explicitly claims that presupposition is a type of
entailment. However, so far we have had reason to suggest that presupposition
as linguists ; use it is non-distinct from entailment. The defining
criterion of presupposition is that the truth of follows from the
falsity (negation) of as well as from the truth of His
examples include '"factive11 predicates, "definite" names, "cleft"
sentences, selectional restrictions, temporal subordinate clauses,
nonrestrictive relatives, certain aspectuals, iteratives and
17presuppositional quantifiers* (p.46f)* Factives I have already 
dealt with; definite noun phrases I shall consider in some detail 
in chapter 3 , when I shall turn to some problems in Strawson's analysis; 
selectional restrictions I argued in chapter 1 must be formulated as mere 
components of the lexical items in question and not as a separate entity 
(cf. p. 15ff ) - thus anticipating the discussion here. The remaining 
constructions are exemplified ii\(57)“(62).
(57) It was John who was sick (Presupposition: Someone was sick)
(58) John left before Margaret came (Presupposition: Margaret came)
(59) Fred ate another helping (Presupposition: Fred ate at least
one helping )
10(60) John stopped working (Presupposition: John was working
17. I shall not discuss quantifiers such as any, every, many, some, either 
here or in chapter 5 , since the interpretations of quantified, plural 
and generic noun phrases provide too many additional problems to be 
able to incorporate them in this thesis. For some indication of the 
general treatment of noun phrases cf. p. l?4f.
18. These are among the examples which Kart^ jUnen (1973) shows to be 
problematical.
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(61) Only Fred shot himself (Presuppositions Fred shot himself)
(62) John, who saw Bill, burst out laughing (Presupposition: John saw Bill) 
These involve various problems. Some of them do not have straight­
forward negations for syntactic or semantic reasons, and are thus not 
amenable to the negation test (e.g. nonrestrictive relatives, adverbial 
constructions and only constructions). But it is not clear that even in
these cases the falsity of the presupposing sentence necessarily implies
the truth of the presupposed one. Consider the following examples, 
contextualising denials of the truth of the above examples:
(6j5)?It is false to say that the King, who opened the exhibition in :
January, was assassi'hated in February, since 
the exhibition wasn't opened until March
(64) It is false to say that it was John who caught the thief since the
thief got away
(65) It is false to say that John left before Margaret came, because
19Margaret never came
(66) John has not stopped working. How can he have - he hasn't even started.
(67) Fred didn't eat another helping - he even refused the first one.
(68) It is false to say that only Fred shot himself because he was the
only one that did not
Furthermore, almost all these cases allow an interpretation when embedded
20below a verb such as pretend in which the presupposition fails to hold:
(69) Bill pretended that it was John who was sick though he realised that
none of them were
(70) Bill pretended that he had eaten one flower. Then he pretended that he
had eaten another flower. Then he pretended to
stop eating.
19. In some dialects of English this relation is not entailment either.
An announcement on the news, 1.8.72, was that 'They defused the bomb 
before it exploded'
20. The two exceptions are (58) and (62). The sentence adverbial and the 
non-restrictive relative clause cannot be interpreted as falling within 
the scope of pretend for independent reasons.
-Ill-
(71) Bill pretended that only Fred shot himself when in fact it was Bob
and not Fred that did.
As we saw in the case of the factive verbs, this interpretation is 
predicted by an entailment analysis but not by a presuppositional one. 
This predicts, against the evidence, that the purported presupposition 
of the constructions in question must be implied to be true when, as 
here, the presupposing statement is implied to be false.
Moreover these purported cases of presupposition meet Anomalies 
similar to those demonstrated by the factive predicates in conjoined 
sentences (either by and, or, or if-then), In none of the following 
cases conjoined by and is the purported presupposition of the subordinate 
sentence presupposed by the example as a whole: if the apparently 
presupposed sentence is false then the entire sentence is presumably 
false, not truth-valueless and * odd’ as presupposition failure is 
supposed to guarantee,
(72) Somebody killed John and it was Bill that did
(73) Someone was sick and it was John that was
(74) John ate one helping and then he ate another helping
(75) John was working and then he stopped working
(76) Margaret came and John left before Mary came
(77) Fred and only Fred shot himself
All these examples of Keenan, therefore seem - like the factives - 
more naturally explicable as relations of entailment, an analysis which 
makes exactly correct predictions.
The case for which this seems perhaps the least plausible is non- 
restrictive relatives (cf. my prefixed question-mark to e.g. (63)).
But there is independent evidence for not analysing these' clauses as 
presupposed. Consider examples (78)-(80).
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(78) The King, who opened Parliament on January 10th, was assassinated
in February
(79) The King, who was assassinated in February, opened Parliament on
January 10th
(80) The King opened Parliament on January 10th, and he was assassinated
in February
If non-restrictive relative clauses are analysed as presuppositional,
these three sentences will not be synonymous since they will have
different truth conditions. Yet in terms of propositional content, these
seem identical. It would surely be counter-intuitive to say that in a
state of affairs in which the King was assassinated in February but
Parliament wasn't opened until March, one would be bound to analyse
utterances of (78) and (79) differently, assigning the value 'Neither
true nor false' to (78) and the value 'False' to (79). The
relation between the statements (78)-(80) andrthe state of affairs in
question is surely the same - viz. a mis-match of exactly the same
order. Thus if one is false, as indeed both (79) and (80) are, then (78)
must be false too. I therefore see no reason for analysing (78) and (79) 
21as non-synonymous.
In general then, though Keenan's examples are somewhat more 
intractable and border-line than the Kiparskys' or Fillmore's, we 
have not yet come across any strong evidence that semantics of natural 
language should be based on a three-valued logic incorporating 
presupposition. In chapter  ^shall consider further reasons why such 
a logic should NOT be taken as the corner stone of semantics.
21. To analyse non-restrictive relative clauses in terms of presupposition 
is in any case counter to the Fregean analysis (cf. p.73 of ®each 
and Black (eds)).
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4,4 A Pragmatic Concept of Presuppositions Robin and George Lakoff 
Each of the arguments I have considered so far in this chapter 
has been formulated within a framework compatible with a component- 
based semantic analysis. Each has therefore been compatible with, or 
nondistinct from, a theory of meaning based on a definition of truth.
All I have been presenting evidence against is the need to relate 
such a theory of meaning to a three-valued logic (rather than the 
traditional two-valued logic). However, presupposition has been 
discussed by the Lakoffs in terms of speaker-hearer relations which 
are neither terminologically equivalent to nor even compatible with the 
framework that is proposed in this thesis. In her article on conjunction 
(1971), Robin Lakoff makes two claims:
(a) that there is evidence of a constraint on co-ordination which can 
only be explained in terms of presuppositions on the part of the 
speaker and deductions that he might make upon those presuppositions. 
Hence the concepts of speaker-presupposition and deduction must be 
included in the grammar;
(b) that there is evidence that not only has and two uses which differ 
in their presuppositions, but also that all co-ordinate conjunctions 
have two such uses.
If GO is correct, a semantic theory based exclusively on truth 
conditions must be inadequate because it will be unable to capture 
such a constraint. In arguing for (b) she claims that but differs in 
meaning from and by virtue of additional presuppositions, and that or 
has solely an exclusive meaning: both claims conflict with a truth- 
condition based analysis.
Her argument is based on the premise that My grandmother wrote me 
a letter yesterday and six men can fit in the back seat of a Ford is
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very odd and should be excluded by the grammar. In order to explain
this apparent constraint, she suggests the following solution. If two
sentences are to be conjoined, they must share a common relevance or
topic. This may be self-evident (and lexically definable) as in John
is a bore and Harry's not very interesting but may not be, as in
John wants to make Peking Duck and I know that the A and P is having a
sale on hoisin sauce. In this latter type of case, she argues one may
need to know 'presuppositions' with respect to either conjunct in
order to deduce a common topic: in this case that hoisin sauce is
the accompaniment to Peking Duck, that a sale is a good time to buy
things, and that now would therefore be a good time to make Peking
Duck 'making Peking Duck' thus being the common topic. By this
means, she claims, one can assess the relative grammaticality of a
sentence. The harder and more culturally specific the presuppositions,
the more likely a speaker is to reject it. Hence the assumed relative
acceptability of each of the following groups:
(8la!
(8lb 
(8lc
(82a
(82b
(83a
(83b
John eats apples and his brother drives a Ford
?John eats apples and many New Yorkers drive Fords
?John eats apples and I know many people who never see a doctor
The police came in and everyone swallowed their cigarettes 
?The police came in and everyone started eating their applesauce
John has a yacht but Bill has a large mortgage to pay off on his house 
?John has a house but Bill has a sore toe
(84a) John is a Republican but you can trust Bill 
(84b) *John is©Republican but Bill will take out the rubbish for you
For example, (8la) involves the presupposition that one's brother has
something to do with one, whereas (8lb) demands a less obvious presupposition
that John is a New Yorker; and in order to judge (8lc) grammatical, she
claims that one needs to presuppose knowledge of the proverb 'An apple
a day keeps the doctor awqy, (enabling the deduction of a common topic along
the following lines:
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The proverb means that if you eat apples you will bs healthy 
and you will not need to visit doctors 
People who never see doctors are people who are healthy 
Common topic : being healthy
Each of the pairs (82)»(84) is analysed in a similar way, involving
presuppositions about dru&s in (82a) , about what constitutes riches in
(85©), about the moral standard of Republicans in (84a). (82b),
(83b) and (84b) are all said to be odd because they lack any such
common topic. In each case, the meaning of the conjuncts, their
common topic, and hence the assessment of grammaticality are dependent
on what information the sentence is intended to convey. Since this
involves the presuppositions of a given sentence, the presuppositions
must be part of its underlying semantic representation.
She then gives a descriptive account of and, but and or in these
terms (cf. ibid p.126-149), ©nd she claims that the symmetric,
reversible and differs from the asymmetric, non-reversible and of
temporal sequence in that in the latter, the first conjunct is
presupposed. Analogous claims are made for but and or. This descriptive
analysis can be criticised quite independently of her theoretical
assumptions. For example, the claim that the and of temporal sequence
and the reversible and differ with respect to presuppositions is simply
false. Her examples are (37) What a night we had last night; the fuzz
came in during the party, and the cat kept dropping the kittens into
the punch bowl, and Mary screamed when Bill tried to abduct her, and
the strobe light never did arrive. and (38) Well, the story is as
follows: the police came in, and everyone swallowed their cigarettes,
and Bill choked on his, and they had to take him to the hospital, and
his mother just about went frantic when she heard, and I had to placate
her by lending her my copy of Portnoy's Complaint. She claims that if
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the first (or any non-final) conjunct in (38) is denied 'the result is 
bizarre, and renders the whole discourse somehow nonsensical, the 
usual result of denying a presupposition' (p.128). But compare the following 
as responses to (38):
(85a) No, that's not true: the police didn't come in. Mary suggested 
we try a new way of taking pot, and everyone swallowed their 
cigarettes. Otherwise the story's correct.
(85b) No, that's not true: Bill didn't choke on his cigarette - he 
wasn't even smoking. He'd swallowed a fly just as the police 
came in, and they had to take him to the hospital. Otherwise 
the story's correct.
(85c) No, that's not true: Bill's mother wasn't frantic. She was 
amused and said it sounded like an Ed McBain novel.
Thus the entire statement is false if any one conjunct is false, as the 
truth-functional definition of and predicts. The interpretation of 
and as having temporal sequence therefore does not rest on the notion 
of presupposition, given any standard definition of that term. More­
over it is not clear that sequence of time is part of the meaning
22./W'w of and at all, since the same implication occurs when there is no and:
(86a) The Lone Ranger mounted his horse and rode off into the sunset
(86b) *The Lone Ranger rode off into the sunset and mounted his horse.
(87a) The Lone Ranger mounted his horse. He rode off into the sunset.
(8?b) *The Lone Ranger rode off into the sunset. He mounted his horse.
So however the implication is achieved, it is not due to the presence
of a particular sense of and, unless a full stop is also given a
semantic characterisation of this kind! It seems therefore that the
interpretation of time sequence between sentences, whether conjoined or
not, is a property of discourse interpretation and not a semantic
23property of the conjunction itself.
22. This observation is due to Deirdre Wilson*
23. Cf. Ch.8 section 8®? for a pragmatic characterisation of this implication.
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Robin Lakoff analyses but as either presupposing between the 
conjuncts some contrast which can be lexically specified ('semantic 
opposition but') or as presupposing an expectation on the part of 
the speaker of the opposite of the second conjunct ('contrary-to- 
expectation but*) (p.133). Her examples are (57) John is tall but Bill 
is short and (60) John hates icecream, but so do I. There are 
several problems here. She herself discusses counter-examples which 
necessitate envisaging at least two additional meanings for but (p.136- 
1^ 2). In general thoughlj. for those cases where there is no lexical 
opposition, she sets up this second 'contrary-to«expectation' sense 
of but. So she analyses (60) as having the interpretation 'one 
would not expect that I would hate icecream'. But parallel examples 
need not have this interpretation; consider the utterance of John 
wants an icecream, but so do I in a situation where there is not 
enough money to buy us both icecreams, so neither of us can have one.
It is (a) not obvious how her analysis of but can handle this case, 
and (b) how it would predict that these two examples apparently 
involve a different sense of but. More generally, if there is a 
semantic component of contrastiveness in but then this should 
automatically enable one to predict a set of environments in which 
but may not occur, by virtue of there being no requisite contrast 
(analogous to *That man is pregnant where the environment does not 
meet the condition specified by pregnant). The above examples should 
facie cases; but they are not. And to retreat to a different 
but merely makes the original claim untestable. Moreover this account 
of but should in addition predict that examples such as John is rich but 
John is poor are grammatical because they meet the requisite condition
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of contrastiveness. There is no obvious way to block these sentences,
as Robin Lakoff herself points out (p. 134f.). It thus seems doubtful
whether a semantic analysis can predict any contrast in meaning
between but and and. (Their synonymy is of course what is predicted
\24by a truth-functional analysis.)
Her claim that natural language or has solely an exclusive
interpretation is also false. In analysing or, she sets up two
uses of exclusive or one of which is asymmetric, e.g. Either little
Seymour eats his dinner or his mother complains to the neighbours.
This she states makes no implication that if Seymour eats his dinner
his mother will not still complain; i.e. both conjuncts can be
true - by definition, inclusive or. So much for its non-existence in 
25natural language.
More important than any of these points of description, is an
assessment of her claim that 'two sentences may be conjoined if one
is relevant to the other, or if they share a common topic', where the
deduction of a common topic may depend on presuppositions on the part 
26of the speaker. I think this argument can be shown to be false, on 
two accountss first, on the grounds that every sentence she cites as 
ungrammatical, odd or unacceptable (the terms are used interchangeably) 
can be contextualised as a perfectly appropriate utterance (and she
24. Cf. ch.8 p.253f for a pragmatic account of but and ch. 9 for a 
discussion of the problem this account raises for the delimitation of 
the over-all linguistic theory.
25* For an argument supporting the opposite claim, that EXCLUSIVE or does 
not constitute a separate use of or, cf. Barrett and Stenner (1971).
26. This claim is marred by an unpardonable equivocation over the concept 
of grammaticality. Throughout the article, she consistently uses the 
terras grammatical, ungrammatical and grammaticality to rfefer to semantic 
judgments on sentences (pp. Il6, 125,127, 128, 130, 139, 142). However 
in the first footnote she states 'Let us try to reserve the term un­
grammatical (as I may not consistently do in this paper) for anomalies that 
arise out of violations of syntactic rules alone: John and Bill is here'. 
This might as well read as an instruction 'Please ignore everything I say'. 
To give her the benefit of the doubt, I shall assume that the footnote is 
a sop to critics of her position, and I shall henceforth ignore this caveat.
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would surely agree that the grammar must predict every possible 
sentence of the language and not merely the more likely ones); and 
secondly, on the grounds that her position demands that meanings of 
sentences are unpredictable independent of the actual speech act and 
hence the grammar itself is non-predictive (essentially equivalent 
to Bloomfield's conclusions about semantics - cf. Bloomfield 1933 
p,139f.), It is a straightforward matter to disagree with every 
example brought forward,Consider the following:
(88) We 've been wondering how many people can get into the back seat 
of a Ford and my grandmother decided to try the experiment. She 
tried it two days ago and she wrote me a letter yesterday and six 
men can fit in the back seat of a Ford.
(89) I'm going to tell you two very peculiar facts. Some people eat 
thistles and yesterday Mary killed a python with a stone.
In the second contextualisation any conjoined sentence is acceptable,
given that the conjuncts themselves are not in some way anomalous or
mutually contradictory. But if all sentences can be construed to
have some sort of link, or common topic, then the inclusion of this
concept in the grammar to determine grammaticality constraints is
vacuous. More interesting are the consequences of her position.
She herself points out one of them - namely that sentences which under
all traditional analyses of ambiguity would be unambiguous may have
different presuppositions, reflected in different semantic representations,
and are therefore by definition ambiguous. This new type of ambiguity
she calls 'contextual* (p.121). It arises because if presupposition
is defined as broadly as she allows, no sentence will have a unique set
of presuppositions. She suggests that ambiguity of this type only
arises in border-line cases: the worse the sentence is, the more
interpretations people will strain to produce (p,121f.). The example
she demonstrates this with is John wants to make Peking Duck and I know
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that the A and P is having a sale on hoisin sauce, which can be 
interpreted with more than one set of presuppositions leading to 
different common topics. But this possibility is not restricted 
to the border-line cases. It is merely that if there is a common 
interpretation, people will not naturally seek an uncommon one. For 
example, she suggests that a possible common topic of a sentence like 
John owns a yacht and Bill has a lovely house in Knightsbridge is 
derived from the presuppositions that owning a yacht is an example 
of 'conspicuous consumption' and so is owning a lovely house in 
Knightsbridge. But in a situation where both speaker and hearer 
are very rich, the speaker might well not have these presuppositions 
and might continue 'but since most of our friends either have ocean­
going vessels or live abroad, I think they won't fit in' , where the 
earlier presuppositions are in fact implicitly contradicted, and the 
common topic is the insufficient wealth of John and Bill. In her 
terms, this sentence would therefore need two different semantic 
representations to reflect this. But do we want to say that by 
virtue of its use in two different situations the sentence has two 
different meanings? In any case, to own a lovely house in Knightsbridge 
is not a necessary sign of 'conspicuous consumption' - it might be very 
small; or suppose fashion changed, and Knightsbridge became a slum 
area. Would we want to say that the meaning of Bill has a lovely house 
in Knightsbridge is different in each of these cases? It is clear 
that in principle every sentence can be analysed with at least as many 
different sets of presuppositions as here, and if furthermore the 
sentence were used with an illocutionary force other than that of 
statement, e.g. promise, boast, etc., the sets of presuppositions fast 
become indeterminate.
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This is not the only problem. In characterising presupposition
as part of the underlying semantic representation, if presuppositions
are not stated as part of the meaning of lexical items, one must give
up the standard claim that the meaning of a sentence is a function of
the meaning of its constituent parts. Though she is not explicit
on this point, it would seem that she is relinquishing this claim,
since presuppositions are not claimed to be a property of the lexical
item. But if the interpretation of presuppositions is not related
to the lexical items, how are they to be derived? They are presumably
part of the beliefs of the speaker, or derive from his knowledge
about the situation. But if this is so, the meanings of sentences
cannot be determined independent of the speaker of a sentence in a
27particular speech-act situation. We are thus faced with an analysis 
of meaning which claims that every sentence has an indeterminate 
number of indeterminable meaning representations. And if the meanings 
of sentences are indeterminable, then meaning-relations between 
sentences such as implication, contradiction, by definition cannot be 
predicted. Moreover, in her terms, it follows that the grammaticality 
of sentences cannot be determined either, independent of the situation 
in which they are uttered. But this has the immediate consequence that 
one's grammar is not predictive. We are thus faced with the conclusion 
that a theory which incorporates a speaker-relative concept of pre­
supposition as part of its semantic representation is in principle
28unable to fulfil any of the four conditions I set up initially (cf p.8f)
27. Similar consequences follow from describing the requisite presupposition 
as a property of the lexical item in question: cf. e.g. (84b) and the 
necessary specification of Republican.
28. Namely (a) the ability to predict sentence meaning (b) the ability to 
predict the set of grammatical sentences and (c) the ability to predict 
entailments etc by (d) a finite set of rules.
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as a pre-requisite for any semantic theory. This impasse stems from 
defining presupposition in terms of assumptions on the part of the 
speaker. If presupposition is to be a useable term in semantics, 
it seems clear that it cannot be defined in these terms.
George Lakoff's article in the same volume (1971c) the Robin 
Lakoff article I have just discussed argues along similar lines. His 
arguments concern the interaction of but, either, too, and contrastive 
stress placement, with presuppositions and deductions on those 
presuppositions* For example he analyses too (along the lines of 
Georgia Green, 1968) as having two uses (cf. p.64f.), one where there 
is an explicit point of similarity between the too conjuncts, another 
where some point of similarity is presupposed or deduoed (analogous 
to Robin Lakoff's analysis of all conjunctions): e.g. John's honest 
and Bill's honest too. The mayor's a Republican and the used-car dealer 
is honest too. Thus in the second example, one must either presuppose 
that all Republicans are honest or that the mayor is the used-car 
dealer. Given these presuppositions, simple rules of inference allow 
identity of either predicate or subject to be deduced, as Lakoff 
demonstrates. In a comparable way, reciprocal contrastive stress can 
be predicted in conjoined sentences under two conditions: (a) where the 
conjuncts are identical except for a subject-object switch, and (b) 
where there are presuppositions from which such an identity can be 
deduced by formal rules of inference: e.g. JOHN insulted MARY and then 
SHE insulted HIM, JOHN called MARY a virgin, and then SHE insulted HIM.29 
This latter example is therefore only grammatical relative to the 
presupposition that to call someone a virgin is to insult them* So, 
like Robin Lakoff in the case with but, Lakoff draws the conclusion
29* Cf. Ch.8 p,279f for a pragmatic explanation of these examples.
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that the interpretation and hence the grammaticality of the sentences
depends on presuppositions about the sentence, and deductions following
from those presuppositions, which are not part of the meaning of the
lexical items in the sentence. His argument is thus open to the
same criticisms as his wife’s, and seems to be heading for a theoretical
contradiction. In order to explain the distribution of the elements
in language, one is forced to set up a non-predictive theory.
He attempts to avoid this contradiction by arguing (1971b) that
the task of the grammar is to generate sentence and presupposition
pairs: the judgment of whether or not a sentence is grammatical
is thus he claims not context or speaker relative but merely relative
to a particular presupposition which is, like the sentence itself, a
construct of the competence model. But this attempt to avoid the
consequence of non-predictability is not successful. Consider the
power of such a grammar in connection with Robin Lakoff's data. It
has to generate pairs, or n-tuples, such as:
John wants to make Peking Duck and I know that the A and P is having
a sale on hoisin sauce 
Peking Duck is an item of Chinese cookery 
Hoisin sauce is used for cooking Peking Duck
from which the common topic of 'cooking Peking Duck* can by some extra
mechanism be deduced. Yet it must not generate as a well-formed
pair the above sentence and the presupposition 'Hoisin sauce is used
to kill fleas which collect in ducks' feathers' (unless of course
there are additional presuppositions such as 'Ducks become edible
when fleas are removed from their feathers'). As it stands, this
sentence-presupposition pair is not grammatical: speakers know that
killing fleas on ducks has nothing to do with cooking. But the
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semantic specification of both the sentence and the presupposition
contains the word duck and therefore there seems no way of preventing
the deductive mechanism from predicting that this sentence- 
presupposition pair is grammatical* The problem is not restricted to 
this particular sentence-presupposition complex. Consider (90) and (91).
(90) Si Pope John is dying and the cat's in the bath
Pr: I have a brother who is a schitzophrenic Catholic and whenever 
he hears a Catholic is sick he puts the cat in the bath
(91) S: Pope John is dying and the cat'*s in the bath
Pr; I have a schizophrenic brother who puts the cat in the 
bath when he has a turn
In the case of (90), a relatively simple deduction process allows us to
predict .a'common topic between the conjuncts of the sentence since
from both conjuncts one can deduce, via the presupposition, that a
Catholic is sick. But it is equally possible to deduce a common
topic in (91) via its presupposition where the predicted existence of
a common topic does not match our intuitions; for the first conjunct
entails that someone is sick and from the second conjunct, via the
presupposition, we can deduce that since John is sick, someone is
sick. Thus the mechanism is forced to predict a common topic and
hence the grammaticality of (91). The point is this: if the mechanism
has sufficient power to predict the required sentence-presupposition
pairs, it will have absolute and unconstrainable power. It is thus
not a valid means of avoiding the charge of unpredictability. The
problem thus remains: speaker-relative presuppositions cannot be
incorporated into the linguistic model without giving up all of the
four essential pre-requisities on one's formal model (cf. fn.28 of
this chapter).
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5.5 Summary
What sort of conclusion can be drawn from this medley of negative 
criticisms? First, I have argued that none of Fillmore's, Kiparskys' 
or Keenan's examples provide counter-examples to an entailment analysis, 
since among other reasons in each case the purported presupposition can 
be interpreted as denied when the presupposing sentence is denied, a 
possibility excluded by a presupposition analysis. Secondly, I argued 
that speaker-relative concepts cannot be included in a predictive 
semantic theory because if they are, then the semantics automatically 
loses its predictive power. I therefore concluded that speaker- 
relative concepts must be excluded bjjr fiat. On the one hand, I have 
rejected every linguistic account of logical presupposition as 
confusing presupposition and entailment: on the other hand, I have 
legislated against speaker-presuppositions. The concepts of 
presupposition thus seem to be being squeezed out of theoretical 
existence. So, on present evidence, the framework outlined in 
chapters 1 and 2 does not appear to require revision.
Three main forms of rejoinder could however be made. First, I 
have still not touched on the problem of reference, for which presupposition 
was first introduced. Thus a semantic theory has still to predict a 
presuppositional relation in order to explain the nature of the relation 
between a definite noun phrase and its referent. Secondly, in analysing 
the Fillmore-Keenan-Kiparsky examples as entailment, I have excluded 
the possibility of capturing what constitutes a 'natural interpretation', 
a concept which is captured by their use of presupposition. Each of 
the cases I constructed as a falsifier to a presupposition-based
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analysis constituted a 'less likely' interpretation as opposed to the 
'most likely' interpretation. Thus for example I didn't regret going 
to the party because I didn't go is clearly not the 'natural' 
interpretation of I didn't regret going to the party.
These two complaints can however be met - the first trivially, 
since I shall consider Strawson's analysis of presupposition in the 
following chapter. Less trivially, I think arguments along the 
lines of earlier sections of this chapter can be extended to the whole 
concept of presupposition. The second complaint claims in effect that 
an analysis in terms of entailment could not be correct since it does 
not distinguish between more and less likely interpretations. Pre­
supposition on the other hand can be used to distinguish between 
30these two. However this is to misuse the term presupposition.
The definition of presupposition is in terms of necessary implication, 
and it is clear I think that the falsity of the apparently presupposing 
sentence does not of necessity guarantee the truth of the presupposed 
sentences, in all the cases we have considered. Furthermore, one of 
the aims of a semantic theory outlined initially was to predict all 
possible interpretations of every well-formed sentence of the language. 
Thus a semantic theory is not only committed to predicting the obvious 
interpretations of sentences but all possible interpretations.
Analogously, it is now standard to reject a syntax which only describes 
the obvious sentences of any language on the grounds that it would not 
only be a very uninteresting one but it would also not capture the 
necessary generalisations. It is however arguable that a complete account 
of natural languages should contain some form of prediction as to what 
constitutes a natural interpretation; but I shall argue in chapters 7-9
30. Notice how Keenan (1972) in discussing presupposition is careful 
to refer to 'natural denial' (p.^9).
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that this is naturally explained with the domain of a theory of 
communication (pragmatics) as part of an over-all theory of 
performance. The explanation of why a sentence such as I didn't 
regret going to the party because I didn't go is extremely 
unlikely ever; ■ to occur will thus be comparable in status to the 
explanation of the impossibility of I met the man the girl the boy 
the dog bit seduced kissed.
There is one final over-all criticism v/hich should be made.
My analysis dismissed somewhat off-handedly contrastiveness of but,
temporal sequence and and, and the concept of common topic, yet each
of these clearly contributes to the interpretation of sentences in
some sense. Moreover, I offered no explanation whatever of Lakoff's
examples of stress assignment. What these examples have in common
is that none of them can be explained in terms of conditions for
the truth of sentences. Furthermore, there is the more general
$1problem of contrastive stress, which I argued explicitly in chapter 3  
(p.86 ) could not be accounted for by a logical definition of 
presupposition because it could not be explained in terms of truth 
conditions. This group of examples together seem to constitute the 
falsifying counter-examples to my claim that meaning for natural 
languages can be explained in terms of truth conditions. However, 
the exclusion of most of these examples from semantic theory can be 
justified (cf, the reasons given in analysing but (p*H7) and and 
(p. 116 )• There is one yet more serious counter-example. At least 
one lexical item has a meaning which cannot be explained at all in 
terms of truth conditions: even.
31. The phenomenon of contrastive stress is a well-known one, and has been
discussed in some detail recently by Chomsky 1971. Of. ch. 1 section 1*3*4. 
and ch.8 section8.4X for a discussion and re-analysis of Chomsky's data*
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Even, like many other items, has been analysed in terms of 
32presupposition. It has been said for example that in saying 
Even Max tried on the pants a speaker asserts that Max tried on the 
pants and presupposes Qa) that other people tried on the pants and 
(b) that it is surprising that Max tried on the pants. However 
Fraser (1971) points out that presupposition is not the right relation 
to describe the properties of even. In particular the implication 
that 1 <stWf 'fcrietL oti. tk*. pwds*, though a semantic property of the sentence 
in question, is not a presupposition and nor is it an entailment. For 
as Fraser points out 'there is certainly something very strange about
(2) (Even Max tried on the pants - RMK) if Max turned out to be the only 
one to try on the pants, but I think we can still assert that (2) is 
either true or false depending on the empirical evidence' (p.153).
He suggests that the implication that ©MvWpeopU^ bfieei on-fcke_ parity is rather 
an implication as defined by Austin (cf. Austin 1962 p.48). Similarly 
for the implication of surprise (cf. p. 154). But this is the 
relation which holds between my saying Max tried on the pants and my 
believing that Max tried on the pants, which is generally agreed to be 
pragmatic and not a semantic relation. Even therefore constitutes a 
clear counter-example to the claim that the contribution lexical items 
make to the meaning of sentences can be defined in terms of truth conditions.
It is no coincidence that the exceptions I have listed here have 
at some stage been labelled as involving presupposition, since they are
32. Cf. Horn 1969 and Fraser 1971*
- 129-
all naturally explicable in terms of what a speaker presupposes (or 
assumes) as opposed to what he asserts. I do not however believe, 
despite the evidence which these counter-examples present, that the 
theory of truth conditions has thereby been shown to be false and 
should be replaced by a non-predictive speaker-oriented semantics.
On the contrary, I hope to show in chapter. 8 that these apparent 
counter-examples are not falsifying examples, and that the 
generalisations captured within the framework put forward here can - 
and must - be maintained. As with the concept of 'natural 
interpretation’ I shall explain these apparent counter-examples 
within the framework of a theory of pragmatics - viz, a theory which 
seeks to characterise how speakers use the sentences of a language 
to effect successful communication.
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CHAPTER 3 % The Problem of Reference and The Semantic
Interpretation of Noun Phrases 
in chapter 4 I argued that despite certain counter-examples which 
remained to be explained, there was strong evidence to suggest that 
presupposition had not only been misused by linguists but appeared to 
be nondistinet from entailment in all the examples I considered.
Before taking into account the exceptions to my hypothesis that have 
already accumulated, I wish to consider what evidence there is either 
for or against Strawson's analysis of definite noun phrases.^ 1 shall
therefore consider in more detail the problem of definite noun phrases 
for which Strawson (and Frege before him) set up the logical relation 
of presupposition. In brief, I shall argue that the same type of 
evidence which was used in the previous chapter to demonstrate the 
entailment basis of certain semantic relations is available also in 
the case of definite noun phrases, and that they too stand in an 
entailment relation to their referent. In consequence, the separate 
logical relation of presupposition does not exist. In addition there 
is independent evidence concerning the truth-functional definition of 
the logical connectives which leads to the same conclusion. In this 
chapter I shall therefore be arguing that the framework set up in 
chapters 1-2 can in principle predict the reference properties of 
definite noun phrases without the addition of some reflex of a 
presuppositional relation. Furthermore, we shall see in the light 
of this analysis that there is evidence to suggest that definite and 
indefinite (specific) noun phrases should be identical in their 
semantic representation.
1. Initially I shall assume that definite noun phrases constitute a 
homogeneous set, as philosophers have done. But cf, p*152 ff.
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5*1 The Referring Properties of Definite Noun Phrases:
Entailment or Presupposition?
First let us recapitulate the main differences between Russell's 
analysis and that of Strawson, Russell (1905) claimed that sentences 
such as The King of France is wise should not be analysed in a simple
subject-predicate form but as the conjunction of:
There is a King of France 
There is not more than one King of France 
There is nothing which is the King of France and not wise 
Since every conjunction of the form P . Q entails P (and £), it 
follows that The King of France is wise entails There is a King of France. 
Thus when There is a King of France is false and there is no such man, 
then The King of France is wise is also false. Strawson however sets 
up a new logical relation of> presupposition to handle this relation.
He argues that it is only false to say that the King of France is wise, 
if he is not wise. If there is no such man, then it is neither true nor 
false to say that he is wise. Conversely The King of France is not
wise is only true if there is such a man. If there isn't, then - like
its positive congener - it is neither true nor false*
Thus these examples constitute the prima facie cases for the 
negation test discussed in chapter 4. That is, in both the positive 
and negative forms, The King of France is wise and The King of France 
is not wise, the implication of the existence of the King of France 
is held constant. Or so it appears. On this account it should 
therefore be contradictory to negate a sentence containing a definite 
phrase and to simultaneously imply that the existential sentence 
corresponding to the implication of reference on the noun phrase is
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false. But consider the following;
(1) The moon wasn't hidden by the clouds because there weren't any
(2) A; Did the neighbours break the window?
B: No, it wasn't the fault of the neighbours - we haven't got any
neighbours.
(3) The exhibition was not visited by the King of France - France
hasn't got a King
(4) Jones has not spent the morning at the local swimming pool - there
isn't a swimming pool in this town
(5) Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of
any expression of ordinary language; for
2ordinary language has no exact logic.
Examples (l)-(4) are modified examples from Strawson 1964a, and he 
points out (p.112) that 'it may seem natural enough to say that it is 
quite untrue, or is false that Jones spent the morning at the local 
swimming-pool, since there isn't one; that, however Jones spent the 
morning, he did not spend it at the local swimming-pool, since there's 
no such place,1 The linguistic corollary to this statement is that 
these examples demonstrate how, among the possible interpretations of 
negative sentences, there IS one in which the reference properties of 
a noun phrase fall within the scope of negation. These thus constitute 
counter-examples to an analysis of reference in terms of presupposition. 
Notice moreover that they are not counter-examples to an entailment- 
based analysis of reference, since the difference between presupposition 
and entailment is that in the case of entailment but not presupposition, 
the falsity of the entailing sentence allows the entailed sentence to 
be either true or false (cf. ch.3 Table I line 3 p.84 )•
2. This is the concluding sentence of 'On Referring1g Its existence 
as a counter-example to the analysis presented in that article is 
pointed out by Bsr-Hillel (1954).
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What examples (l)-(5) have in common is that the definite noun 
phrase in question is not in subject position; and, as Strawson 
points out (1954 p.226), it is much less natural to interpret the 
implication of existence on a noun phrase as falling within the scope 
of the denial if that noun phrase is in subject position. However,
I think it is fairly clear that counterparts to examples (l)-(4) in 
which the relevant noun phrase is in subject position can be 
interpreted as having their existence denied. (Such an interpretation 
will normally demand contrastive stress.)
(6) The CLOUDS weren't hiding the moon - there weren't any clouds
(7) No, the NEIGHBOURS didn't break it - we haven't got any neighbours
(8) The liing of FRANCE didn't visit the exhibition - France hasn't
got a king
(9) The swimming pool at ELY wasn't closed - there isn't a swimming
pool there
Compare also:
(10) My HUSBAND didn't come to meet me - I'm not married.
Now clearly, as before, these examples provide 'unnatural' interpretations 
of negative sentence. However I would argue again (cf. p.126) that 
negative sentences have a semantic representation which allows a 
disjunct, set of interpretations and that the initial aim of the 
semantic model must be to predict what the logical limits to the 
possible number of interpretations are before it can characterise 
which is more or less likely. These examples therefore suggest that 
the implication of reference of definite noun phrases may fall within 
the scope of negation though clearly it need not. This being so, the 
relationship of reference would seem to be an entailment relation and 
not one of presupposition.
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This analysis is supported by further examples of Strawson's 
(1964a) where he points out that if the predicate of the sentence is 
explicitly stated to be the topic of conversation, then it becomes 
more natural to deny the truth of the statement by virtue of the non­
existence of the subject:
(11) A; What outstanding events have occurred recently in the social
and political fields?
B: The King of France married again.
A: No, that's not true - there isn't such a person.
(12) A; What examples if any are there of famous contemporary figures
who are bald?
B: The King of France is bald.
A: No, that's not true. There's no such man.
Thus in the context where being bald is the topic, it is quite natural 
to cfeny the truth of The King of France is bald on the grounds that he 
does not exist.
Each of these examples provides evidence against an analysis 
in terms of presupposition. It is thus incumbent on someone wishing 
to maintain this position to explain away these examples. Strawson 
attempts to defend his position by analysing the concept of truth 
and truth-assignment in terms of 'topic', where the 'topic' of a 
statement is what the statement is about. What he claims is that 
'assessments of statements as true or untrue are commonly, though 
not only, topic-centred in the same way as the statements assessed; 
and when, as commonly, this is so,* we may say that the statement is 
assessed as putative information about its topic.1 (p.ll6). Thus 
he claims that since in the case of for example (3) the exhibition 
is the established topic then it can be the case that it is false
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to say of the exhibition that it was visited by a non-existent person. 
But if the King of France is claimed to be the topic, as in The King 
of France visited the exhibition, and this noun phrase does not have 
a referent, there is no topic about which to assess the truth-value 
of the predicate. In this case, it has no truth-value. It follows 
that a passive form of a sentence may be false while, under the same 
circumstances, the active form has no truth value at all* Furthermore, 
the same active sentence may be false in one speech-act situation 
and truth-valueless in another while the state of affairs to which the 
sentence refers remains constant. What has been varied is the 
speaker's choice of topic. Thus The King of France visited the 
exhibition will lack a truth value if the King of France is the topic
and there's no such man, or if the exhibition is the topic and there
was no exhibition. If however the King of France is the topic
and there is such a man, but there was no exhibition, then the
statement will merely be false. Similarly if the exhibition is the 
topic and the speaker is correct in thinking there was an exhibition 
but mistaken in thinking there was a King of France.
But such an analysis is untenable. This constitutes a radical 
change in the conception of truth: it is no longer defined as a 
relation between an abstract statement (or sentence) and a particular 
state of affairs but rather in relation to a speaker, a hearer, and a 
state of affairs. That is, the assignment of truth value is dependent 
on what information the speaker is intending to convey to the hearer. 
Notice first that a large body of contradictions will no longer be 
labelled as such since the conjunction of any sentence containing a 
definite noun phrase with its negative counterpart will not be
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necessarily false. It may be neither true nor false. Notice secondly 
that if this definition of truth were correct, the statement of 
meaning of a sentence as a set of truth conditions would have to be 
abandoned, since the truth of a sentence under this characterisation 
would not depend solely on the relation between the constituent parts 
of the sentence and the objects and relations to which they refer, but 
also on what information the speaker was intending to convey. It 
follows from this that sentences, on a truth-condition account of 
meaning, could not be said to have a particular meaning independent 
of the context in which they are spoken. The meaning would be 
dependent on wha'ft information was already known beforehand by the 
speaker and his audience. This consequence follows because, since 
truth,'^.dependent on the information a speaker is intending to 
convey, the meaning of an utterance must also be dependent on the 
speaker’s intentions. But if this holds, sentences become indefinitely 
ambiguous, the limits on a semantic theory are not definable, and 
semantics thereby becomes an inoperable discipline. Exactly the same 
consequences follow as follow from the incorporation of speaker- 
presupposition into semantics.
Moreover the argument seems unavoidably circular. The definition 
of truth is dependent on a concept of topic. Topic itself is more or 
less undefined. However, informally, a characterisation of topic will 
depend on what a speaker assumes to be true, and is thus in some real 
sense dependent on the notion of presupposition. But presupposition 
is defined in terms of truthi hence the circle*
3. Cf. Hochberg 1970
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A definition of truth which avoids this circularity is given by 
Dummett (1938/59)* According to his definition,
*A statement, so long as it is not ambiguous or vague, divides all 
possible states of affairs into just two classes. For a given 
state of affairs, either the statement is used in such a way that 
a man who asserted it but envisaged that state of affairs as a 
possibility would be held to have spoken misleadingly, or the 
assertion of the statement would not be taken as expressing the 
speaker's exclusion of that possibility. If a statement of the 
first kind obtains, the statement is false; if all actual 
states of affairs are of the second kind, it is true. It is 
thus prima facie senseless to say of any statement that in such- 
and-such a statetcif affairs it would be neither true nor false."
This analysis casts doubt on the premises of a presuppositional logic, 
the possibility of a truth-valueless statement. If the definition 
provided by Dummett is in the main correct, as I believe it is, 
the counter-examples (1)-(12) raised earlier remain unexplained.
The philosophical literature on this problem is extensive, and
bI shall not consider it all. However, further evidence has been 
provided by Nerlich (1965) that the relation between a sentence 
containing a uniquely referring noun phrase and the appropriate 
existential must be one of entailment. It is well-known that entail­
ment is a transitive relation such that for any sentences S^ , S^  and 
if entails and entails S^ , then it follows that entails 
S^. A straightforward example is This rose is crimson entails This 
rose is red. The latter in its turn entails This rose is coloured 
and hence This rose is crimson entails This rose is coloured.
Nerlich points out that by the rule of transitivity The King of France
k, Cf. Geach 1958-9, Caton 1959, Odegard 1963, Roberts, 1969, Cassin 
1970a,b, Jacobson 1970, Hochberg 1970, Schnitzer 1971, to name but 
a few.
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in 1965 is bald must entail There is a King of France in 1965. since 
the former entails There is a bald King of France in 1965 which 
itself entails There is a King of France in 1965* To postulate a 
separate logical relation of presupposition to account for this is 
therefore a matter of legislation, and the law of transitivity will 
have to be relinquished. Moreover both he and Linsky (1967) 
noticed that if a statement S1 is a necessary condition of the truth 
and falsity of a statement then it must by definition be a 
necessary condition of the truth of S^ . This in its turn entails that 
£>2 is a sufficient condition for the truth of • But this 
defines entailment. Hence, whatever presupposition is, it must be 
an entailment. -
In earlier chapters I used two main types of evidence to demonstrate 
the entailment basis of the postulated presuppositions (i) the interpretation 
of negative sentences (ii) the interpretation of sentences with pretend 
and dream as the superordinate verb. This second test provides 
further indication heie of the entailment nature of the implication of 
reference* In sentences in which the falsity of the embedded sentence 
is implied, a presupposition analysis should predict that a definite 
noun phrase in that sentence should be bound to imply the existence 
of a referent. This prediction is not borne outs 
(13) John pretended that the King of France seduced his sister
(13) can clearly be true even if there is no King of France. Thus 
it does not necessarily imply the existence of the King of France.
A similar phenomenon occurs in sentences with believe and dream 
as the superordinate verbs. These have no commitment to a specific 
truth-value - they can be either true or false, whatever the truth- 
value of the subordinate sentence.
(1*0 Bill dreamt the Queen of Germany was dying
(15) Amahl believes that Franklin Roosevelt is the King of America.
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The truth or falsity of each of these sentences is not dependent 
on any constituent of its complement sentence: so even though 
these contain proper names or definite noun phrases which in present 
circumstances have no referent, the entire sentence may be true. For 
a presuppositional analysis, these examples are embarrassing. If 
however the referring property of definite noun phrases were analysed 
as one of entailment, such a situation would follow as an automatic 
consequence. Because dream and believe have complements which are 
uncommitted as to truth value, all meaning properties (viz. entail- 
ments) may or may not hold. Hence the opaqueness of reference under 
these conditions. More strongly, pretend as we have seen generally 
implies the falsity of its complement (unless it is negated). If a 
sentence containing pretend is true, then since the complement 
sentence will be implied to be false, it follows from an entailment 
analysis of reference that implications of existence may or may not 
be true. The indeterminacy of noun phrases in that environment is 
the hallmark of entailment.
3 » 2. presupposition and Three-Valued Logic
Perhaps the most damaging evidence against a presupposition- 
based framework however comes not from arguments as to whether or 
not opaque and negative sentences containing definite noun phrases 
possess certain properties, as both cases are complex and controversial, 
but on the contrary from drawing out the consequences of accepting as 
a basis for natural-language semantics a logic which contains the 
three values True, False, and Neither True nor False. We have already 
seen some of the problems which arise in the definition of truth if 
a three-valued logic is assumed. Yet it may seem nevertheless that
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in the case of simple sentences the concept of '-(T v F)* matches 
the native speaker's intuition about the oddity of saying either 
"The King of France is bald" or "The King of France is not bald" 
when there is no such man. Whatever the clearness of this 
intuition, it does not extend into complex propositions. Take for 
example any proposition of the form P , Q, Presumably we would be 
prepared in principle to agree with Keenan (1972) that if either 
conjunct is neither true nor false, then the whole claim will be 
neither true nor false: it is just as odd to make the complex claim
(l6) The King of France is coming to the exhibition and Mary has got
a headache
if there is no such man as it is merely to assert the first conjunct. 
Thus we might suggest the following three-valued truth-table for P.Q;
p Q P . Q
T T T
T F F
F T F
F z6 Z
Z F Z
T Z z
Z T z
Z Z z
However this truth-value assignment does not always match one's
intuitions as neatly as it appeared to in (l6). Compare (1?) and (18)
(1?) John beats his wife and his children
(18) John is married and he beats his wife
5, For a discussion of some of the problems connected with presupposition 
and the various definitions of and within a three-valued logic, cf, 
Kartunnen 1973*
6, I am following the notation of Keenan (ibid) in labelling the third 
value 'Z'•
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(17) is like (16) in matching neatly our intuitions that if a pre­
supposition of one conjunct is false, the entire sentence will be odd.
Thus - one might argue - it is odd (not merely false) to say (1?) if 
John has no wife. However in (18), this is not so: if John is not
married, then the claim is simply false. Furthermore it is not odd
at all to say It is false that John is married and he beats his wife 
if he is not married: on the contrary it is true. But we cannot 
allow the truth-functional definition of and to depend on the semantic 
properties of its parts. Thus we are faced with a contradiction. When 
one of the conjuncts of P,Q is neither true nor false, we appear to 
need to assign the entire statement sometimes the value neither true nor 
false, but sometimes the value false.
There is a further problem associated with the definition of and 
given in the truth table. Suppose I bet example (19)*
(19) In 1975, the Pope will not give the annual address but it will be the
Prefect of the Sacred College of Rites who gives it.
What in fact happens is that the Pope dies in 197^ and they do not 
replace him. So in 1975, the Prefect of the Sacred College of Rites 
gives the address. Do 1 win my bet? It seems clear that I do.
Yet this intuition cannot be captured in a presuppositional three­
valued logic, A presuppositional logic claims that both the positive 
and negative claims containing a definite noun phrase are vitiated and 
are neither true nor false if there is no referent corresponding to 
the definite noun phrase. Thus the claim that the Pope will not give 
the annual address must turn out to be neither true nor false if 
there is no Pope, But since P but can only be true (like P , Q.) 
if both conjuncts are true, a presuppositional logic must predict
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that under the circumstances described, I do not win my bet.
None of these problems arise if we assume the validity of a 
two-valued logic, A conjunction of P . Q will be false if either 
conjunct is false and thus (3.6)—(19) will all be false if one of the 
definite noun phrases in either conjunct fails to refer. Aid the 
fact that I win the bet stated in (19-) if it turns out there is no 
Pope and the Prefect of the Sacred College of Rites delivers the 
address is naturally predicted. If there is no Pope, then the 
prediction that the Pope will not give the annual address will turn 
out to be true. Thus two anomalies which arise in a three-valued 
logic are naturally explained within a framework based on a two­
valued logic.
Anomalies of this kind arise with each logical connective.
Consider a three-valued truth table for P or ft. What happens when 
one conjunct is true and the other conjunct neither true nor false: 
is the entire proposition, true, or neither true nor false? Some 
cases suggest one assignment, some the other. If we maintain the 
intuition that a third value is used to enable us to capture what 
a speaker assumes in uttering sentences, then presumably of (20) 
we would wish to say that There is a mayor of London is 
presupposed - it would certainly be assumed to be true by anyone 
who spoke it under all normal conditions:
(20) Either the Mayor of London visited the exhibition or the
organiser was very upset
Along these lines then, we would want to say that if there was no mayor
of London then the entire proposition made by (20) is neither true nor
false. In contrast to (20) consider (2l),
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(21) Either there wasn't a mayor of London or the Mayor of London
visited the exhibition
If in this case the first conjunct is true, then it seems clear that 
the whole claim is true, despite the fact that the second conjunct 
is necessarily neither true nor false. Again we are facing a contra­
diction, Either we have to depart from the intuition for which 
presuppositions were set up in the first place by defining or in 
such a way that P v Q wi3.1 be true just in case either conjunct is
7true (ignoring the assumptions speakers make in uttering sentences) 
or we have to allow more than one definition of or (quite apart from 
the problem of exclusive or).
Moreover, as with and, we face problems with bets. Suppose John 
bets (22)f
(22) Either the Mayor of Inglesham won't go to the meeting or the
meeting will be postponed
and what infect happens is that the mayor dies shortly before the 
meeting, but the meeting is still held. Does John win his bet?
Or if he bets (23),
(23) On December 1st 1975, either the Pope will not give the annual
address, or America will drop 100 bombs on-Vietnam
what is the outcome when it turns out that America doesn't drop any bombs 
on Vietnam but since the Pope is dead somebody else gives the annual 
address? Are the bets successful? Though these cases are less clear than 
the case of conjunction by and, it seems to me that there is little
g
doubt that strictly speaking in both cases John has won his bet.
7. This is the option taken by Keenan (ibid).
8. Whether these bets could be upheld in a court of law is not relevant since 
the legal doctrine of frustration which is relevant here is not defined in 
terms of the semantics of the statement (contract) in question but refers 
to extra-linguistic knowledge concerning the particular circumstances 
involved (e.g. a tanker contracted to carry oil from A to.B will not be
in breach of contract if when B is at war, it refuses so to do, unless of 
course this is specifically provided for in the contract).
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But § three-valued logic cannot account for this intuition. Since 
in both cases one conjunct is false, and one conjunct is truth- 
valueless, whatever the value the entire proposition may have it 
cannot be true* But if John wins his bets,then the propositions ABE 
true. And just as before with and/but * what provides an anomaly for 
a three-valued logic is automatically accounted for by a two-valued 
logic. A two-valued logic predicts that if there is no object for a 
definite noun phrase to refer to then a negative statement containing 
it must be true. Thus the first conjuncts of (19) and (20) are true 
under such conditions and the whole proposition will therefore be 
true even if the second conjunct is false.
Finally let us consider P p Q. Hea^  speakers* intuitions are
notoriously hazy. In a three-valued logic, one of the problems we
have to decide is what value to give the whole proposition if P
is neither true nor false and Q is false. If we wished to seek
parallellism with the two-value definition of PD Q, we might
want to say that in this case the entire proposition should be true.
Some examples seem to support this. If I say (24-):
(24-) If the Regent of Lithuania visited Enid's art gallery, then
9
I'm a Dutchman
since the expression If X, then I'm a Dutchman is commonly used to 
suggest the absurdity of X, then it seems reasonable to suggest that 
(24-) is true if there's no Regent ©$ Lithuania and I'm not a Dutchman. 
The problem arises with the negative statement The Regent of Lithuania 
did not visit Enid's art gallery. According to a three-valued logic 
this will have the same truth value as its positive counterpart if
9. This type of example was pointed out to me by Deirdre Wilson.
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there is no such man as the Regent of Lithuania - neither true nor 
false. So a three-valued logic predicts that the substitution of the 
negative statement for its positive counterpart in (24) should not 
alter the truth value of the whole. But it seems clear that it does.
If there is no Regent of Lithuania and I am not a Dutchman then the 
claim made in (^ 5) is surely false.
(25) If the Regent of Lithuania did not visit Enid’s art gallery,
then I'm a Dutchman.
To put it another way, if you promise that if the Regent of Lithuania
does not visit Enid's art gallery, then you'll eat your hat, when
it transpires that he didn't because there's no such man then you
should feel forced to eat your hat. That is to say, the antecedent
of both conditionals is true, and thus the entire proposition is true
only if the consequent is true. Otherwise it is false. Thus the claim
in ('25) is false if there is no Regent but 1 am not a Dutchman. This
is precisely the result predicted by a two-valued logic - but not by
a three-valued logic, which predicts that in both the cases (24) and (25)
the entire proposition will be true if I'm not a Dutchman* Like the
examples with or and and, this prediction does not match the native
speaker's intuition.
There is one further example involving P ^  Q which concerns a
counter-argumemt given by Strawson (1964a) to an attempt to disprove
the validity of a three-valued logic. The argument Strawson cites
runs as follows. Let P be a statement which is neither true nor false.
Then the statement P is true is false. If it's false that P is true,
then P must be false. But the statement P is false is also false.
If it's false that P is false, then P is true. Therefore P is both
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true and false. Since this is self-contradictory, the three-value
theory is false. Strawson's counter-argument (ibid p.109) is that
if P lacks a truth value, then any statement assessing it as true,
or any statement assessing it as false similarly lack a truth value.
But this counter-argument will not I think do. Consider (26)
(26) If John has won his bet, then it is false that the mayor opened the
exhibition
in conjunction with a state of affairs in which (a) John bet that there 
was no mayor and (b) John won his bet. A three-valued logic has 
three alternatives (i) to say that (26) is neither true nor false since 
the antecedent is true and the consequent neither true nor false,
(ii) to say that P 3  Q can be true when the antecedent is true and the 
consequent neither true nor false, (iii) to admit that if it is true
that there was no mayor then the statement It is false that the mayor
opened the exhibition is true. 1 take it that no-one would be prepared 
to support the second alternative. But the first does not match 
one's intuitions. (26) seems true, given the state of affairs in
question. Thus we seem bound to accept alternative (iii). But
this is an admission that the relation between the two statements 
The mayor opened the exhibition and There was a mayor is one of entailment 
and not presupposition.
Thus v/e find that despite its initial apparent ability to capture 
certain properties of definite noun phrases, an analysis based on a 
three-valued logic not only makes a considerable number of wrong 
predictions with respect to negation and opaque environments such as 
pretend, but faces a number of embarrassing anomalies. Yet for each 
of the cases raised against a presuppositional analysis, an analysis of 
the referential properties of definite noun phrases in terms of
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entailment makes predictions consonant with the native speaker's 
intuitions. Thus the sum conclusion of the evidence I have presented 
is that definite noun phrases, as delimited by Russell (cf. Russell 
1905), entail the existence of their referents and do not presuppose 
their existence.
The main burden of my arguments has rested on the interpretation 
of negative statements, which I argued were unspecified as to scope 
of negation, allowing even interpretations in\hich the existence of 
objects referred to by definite noun phrases was denied. One could 
however retort that in criticising Strawson's account of presupposition 
I have in addition departed from Russell's account. In On Denoting,
Russell claims (p.489 f.) that the negation of a sentence containing 
a definite description is not a disjunction but is ambiguous. This 
is pointed out by Schnitzer (1971) v/ho draws attention to some 
awkward consequences created by this claim. In particular, as he 
points out, if negative sentences are said to be ambiguous, then 
The King of France is bald can be shown either to entail or to 
presuppose that there is a King of France, depending on how the 
scope of negation is construed. If The King of France is not bald 
is understood as 'It is false that the King of France exists (and 
is bald)' then The King of France is bald will entail There is a 
King of France (since if the latter is false, the negation as under­
stood above will be true). If hov/ever The King of France is not bald 
is understood as 'The King of France exists and is not bald* The King 
of France is bald will presuppose that there is a King of France since 
the negation of The King of France is bald still, under this interpretation, 
implies that there is a King of France, Schnitzer shows furthermore
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that if the negative sentence is assumed to be ambiguous,
The King of France is bald will neither entail nor presuppose 
Whoever is the King of France is bald. However none of these 
consequences arise if negative sentences containing definite 
descriptions are analysed as vague or unspecified with respect to 
their scope, like all other negative sentences. Further evidence in 
support of this is provided by the linguistic test of vagueness - 
the do so test (cf. ch.l p.57 )• To recapitulate, vagueness in
sentences is preserved across sentence pronominalisation, and so is 
ambiguity. That is to say, a vague sentence which is pronominalised 
will allow independent specifications of the vague attributes in its 
two occurrences. An ambiguous sentence on the other hand, must share 
the same interpretation with its pronominalised counterpart. Negative 
sentences in general allow independent specifications of a pro-form; and 
they do so even when this pro-form involves a definite referring 
noun phrase* Thus we get not only (2?) but also (28) and (29).
(27) John didn't run away, and Bill didn't either, John walked as
slowly as he could, whereas Bill stayed where he was.
(28) Bill didn't see the satellite through the telescope and Joan didn't
either. Bill didn't because there wasn't a satellite 
by the time he got there and Joan didn't because she 
couldn't focus the telescope properly.
(29) The King of France didn't visit the Duke's world-famous exhibition
and Prince Ivan didn't either. Prince Ivan didn't 
because he was in prison on a treason charge; and the 
King of France didn't because there is no such person*
The interpretation of negative sentences as vague - even allowing an
interpretation in which definite noun phrases fall within the negation's
scope - thus seems justified.
-1^9“
5.3 Assertions Strawson v. Russell
All my arguments have led in the same direction, that presupposition, 
as a new logical relation, is in natural language not distinct from 
entailment. Natural language therefore appears to be analysable in 
terms of a two-valued logic and not some other logic; and I have 
suggested that any argument to the contrary is based on a false 
analysis of negative sentences. The foundation stone of either 
argument is what constitutes a possible interpretation of negative 
sentences. This is not however the source of Srawsonfs disagreement 
with Russell. Their disagreement can I think be traced to a confusion 
over the term assertion. Assertion is not used by Strawson in the 
same sense as Russell, though Strawson appears to assume that there 
is no radical difference. The distinction is analogous to the 
distinction I made earlier (p.87f) between statement defined logically 
and statement defined as an illocutionary act. Assertion is used by 
Russell in the sense of a commitment to the truth of certain conditions. 
Thus Searle (19^ 9) defines assertion as *a (very special kind of) 
commitment to the truth of a proposition1 (Searle 1969 p.29)* This 
definition has as an automatic consequence that if a speaker asserts 
(is committed to the truth of) some sentence then he is automatically 
asserting (committed to the truth of) all the entailments of that 
sentence. To infer that *anyone who asserted S (The King of France 
is wise - RMK) would be asserting that (1) There is a king of France 
(2) There is not more than one king of France (3) There is nothing which 
is king of France and is not wise1 (Strawson 1950 p.3 2 b )  is therefore 
not an incorrect inference, given the above characterisation of assertion.
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But this concept of assertion is clearly not equivalent to assert 
in the sense of 'to give information of some kind to an audience'.
©nly the latter stands in contrast to what a speaker assumes. This 
latter sense is used by Strawson. He claims that 'To use the 
sentence (The table is covered with books - RMK) is not to assert, 
but it is (in the special sense discussed) to imply, that there is 
only one thing which is both of the kind specified (i.e. a table) 
and is being referred to10 by the speaker' and * referring to 
or mentioning a particular thing cannot be dissolved into any kind 
of assertion. To refer is not to assert, though you refer in order 
to go on to assert.' (Strawson 1950 p.333). Yet Strawson appears to 
assume that there is no difference between his sense of assertion, and 
that of Russell. He argues that one of the false things that Russell 
claims is that in asserting The King of France is wise a speaker would 
also be asserting that there at present existed one and only one Icing 
of France. Further he argues that since all a speaker would be 
asserting is the wiseness of such a man, then it is only on the 
grounds of his putative wiseness that that assertion can be assessed 
as true or false* It is this claim which conflates the two uses 
of the term assert and it leads directly to the incorporation of 
some undefined notion of topic into the definition of truth, a 
procedure which I have already argued leads to circularity.
The argument in &vour of presupposition seems therefore to be 
founded on a misconception. Clearly Russell would not accept the 
characterisation (and the consequences) of assertion that Strawson 
assumes. Such a characterisation is indistinguishable from a non-truth- 
functional use of assertion, in which JOHN hit Mary asserts that it
10. Strawson's italics.
-151-
was John that hit Mary but assumes (presupposes) that someone hit Mary. 
(Of. ch.3 p.86). The conflation of an illocutionary definition and a 
logical definition also emerges in Strawson's use of the word state. H© 
claims in K)n Referring* that 'to use the word the is ... to imply that the 
existential conditions .* are fulfilled. But to use the in this way 
is not to 'state' that these conditions are fulfilled* (p.332). Here 
he appears to use state in an illocutionary sense. But this sense 
of state is not of the same class as a logically defined statement, 
to which Russell was seeking an explanation. This type of cohfusion is 
best (i.e. most crudely) displayed not by Strawson, but by Searle, 
who claims that Russell's analysis is incorrect on the grounds that 
'it is absurd to suppose that someone who asks "Does the queen of 
England know the king of France?" makes two assertions, one of them 
true and one false* (Searle 1969 p.162). The absurdity lies rather 
in Searle's refusal to recognise that assertion is being used in two 
quite separate ways. Moreover it is not so obvious that the supposition 
he outlines is incorrect, given the Russellian use of assertion. Indeed 
Geach (1965) - along the lines of Russell - claims exactly this. He 
suggests not only that the assertion John is aware of the fact that 
his wife is unfaithful is equivalent to the pair of assertions. John 
is convinced that his wife is unfaithful and John's wife is unfaithful 
but that in asking the question Is John aware of the fact that his 
wife is deceiving him? 'I am not just asking a question; I am 
asserting that John's wife is deceiving him' (p.^ 5^ )« Since I have 
argued earlier that meaning is quite separate from aspects of the 
speech act (cf. ch. 2 section 2 .^ .2  and ch. k  section *f.l) and moreover 
that meaning on a truth-conditional basis therefore relates directly 
not to the speech act of stating, to which it is logically prior, but 
to the logical statement, I shall therefore assume that an analysis
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of reference for definite noun phrases cannot be in terms of what 
a speaker assumes in uttering sentences. This assumption, together 
with the earlier arguments given against an analysis of reference 
in terms of a three-valued logic, commit me to asserting that pre­
supposition, as Strawson defines it, is not part of a semantic 
explanation of natural language, since it appears to have been 
conceived on the basis of a conflation of the logical structure 
of statements and their illocutionary function.
5*^ Anaphora; The Problem of Goreference
I have assumed so far that the property of reference of the 
definite noun phrase is a unitary phenomenon (of, fn.l of this 
chapter). This is clearly an oversimplification. There are 
three main functions of the definite article as an indicator of 
definite reference;
1) anaphoric; I saw a man hanging around this morning and when I came
back the man had moved
2) definite description with relative clause;
John annoyed the man he had dismissed.
The man who X met yesterday came back fjgain today
3) nonlinguistically anaphoric; Did you wind the clock?
The King of France is bald
The moon was hidden behind the clouds
In all that precedes, I have only discussed type (3) and I have argued
that this implication of reference can be interpreted as falling within
the scope of negation. But this is the only one of the three types
which can be. The other two types are neither of them negatable.
John didn't annoy the man he had dismissed always implies John had
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dismissed a man just as A dog and a cat ran across the road and the - 
dog wasn't chasing the cat implies the existence of a specific dog 
and a specific cat. One might argue that these constitute a clear 
case of presupposition (as Keenan does - 1971). However this would 
not I think be justified. Let us look at the evidence more closely.
A descriptive account of the in these two types of example is 
relatively straightforward. The function of the is as a linguistic 
coreference indicator to some noun phrase previously occurring. The 
linearity involved in the distribution of a and the is essential 
to the interpretation of the definite article. Consider examples
(3&)-(33>:
(30) Someone came into the room and told a boy that the police were
outside, while the boy was talking to a pretty girl
(31) While a boy was talking to a pretty girl, someone came into the room
and told the boy that the police were outside
(32) Someone came into the room and told the boy that the police were out­
side, while a boy was talking to a pretty girl
(33) While the boy was talking to a pretty girl, someone came into the room
and told a boy that the police were outside
In both (30) and (31) the indefinite noun phrase is to the left of the
11lexically identical definite noun phrase and this allows a reading 
of coreference. When this condition is not fulfilled as in (32) and 
(339 the readings are that these two instances of boy do not refer to 
the same object. Thus (30) and (31) are synonymous but (31), (32) and
(33) ane not. But it is sentence-pairs (30) and (33) 1 and (31) and
(32), which are identical morpheme for morpheme and which would - other 
things being equal - have identical representations (both semantic and 
syntactic). Thus, however the distribution of a and the is to be
11* There are numerous problems about this statement of identity. For 
some discussion, cf. Lakoff 1968,p.63ff, and Kartunnen 1971a*
-154-
predicted, it is clearly dependent not on deep structure order but 
on surface structure. Moreover, if an interpretation of coreference 
is required, the is obligatory. If a is substituted for the in (50) 
and ( 31), there is a necessary implication that two boys are involved, 
not one. The evidence therefore suggests that we explain these 
occurrences of the as indicating a second-mention instance of the 
noun phrase it modifies, and analyse definite and indefinite noun 
phrases as differing only in that a definite noun phrase is a second 
instance of the indefinite noun phrase,, since this would provide an 
automatic means of explaining the synonymy of (30) and (3X9 despite 
their non-identity morpheme for morpheme.
Definite noun phrases with relative clauses are exactly comparable
to non-modified definite noun phrases; the function of the definite
article is to establish anaphoric coreferentiality;
(34) A man with a moustache was talking to a man who was bald on the
pavement at the side of the road when suddenly 
the man who was bald took out a gun
Here, as with the simple definite noun phrase (type 1), the occurrence
of the must be analysed as differing from the indefinite noun phrase
only in that it constitutes a second occurrence of the noun phrase,
since again the is obligatory if an interpretation of coreference is
required.
If this analysis is correct, and both these uses of the definite 
article are a reflex of a second mention of the object to which the 
noun phrase is referring, then there is an automatic explanation of why 
this use of the definite noun phrase cannot be interpreted as falling 
within the scope of negation. The law of contradiction predicts that 
a sentence cannot be simultaneously both true and false. So for
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example, the semantic interpretation of a sentence such as John saw a 
girl at the party predicts that the sentence v/ill be true if, among 
other things, there was a girl at the party. But the sentence John 
didn't dance with the girl because there weren't any girls there is 
true under contrary conditions. Thus general principles of 
contradiction rule out the conjunction John saw a girl at the party 
but he didn't dance with the girl because there weren't any girls there. 
Similarly A man with a moustache was talking to a man who was bald at the 
far end of the room but the man who was bald was not replying must 
imply that there was such a bald man, since to interpret The man who was 
bald was not replying as true because there was no such man provides 
a contradiction with the preceding conjunct. On these grounds, a noun 
phrase with linguistically anaphoric the can never be interpreted 
as falling within the scope of negation, since to do so will always 
set up a contradiction with the preceding instance of that noun phrase. 
Non-linguistically anaphoric the differs from anaphoric the in just 
this respect. There is no prior explicit commitment to the existence 
of some object in the former case, and so a necessary contradiction 
does not arise - this use of the is interpreted as falling within 
the scope of negation. Hence the nondeviance of
(35) I didn't wind the clock because we haven't got one
(36) The moon wasn't hidden by the clouds, because there weren't any 
It therefore seems that the natural explanation for anaphoric definite 
noun phrases, with or without relative clauses, is that they constitute 
second mention of the object the noun phrase describes, thus automatically 
providing an account of why they are not interpretable as falling within 
the scope of negation. If this is a correct explanation, then there are 
no grounds for setting up a new logical relation of presupposition just
to account for these cases.
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Evidence that this general analysis is correct is provided by 
the contrastive interpretations of indefinite, anaphoric-definite and 
nonanaphoric-definite noun phrases when embedded in a complement 
sentence below pretend, the verb whose use commonly implies the 
falsity of its complement. We saw earlier that the implication of 
existence of non-anaphoric the could be interpreted as false within 
a pretend complement. Thus John pretended that the King of France 
seduced his sister (e.g. (12) p.138) does not depend for its truth 
on there being a king of France. This may, or may not be, true.
Thus (37) Is not a contradiction.
(3?) John pretended that the King of France seduced his sister
though there is no such man
Compare also
(38) John pretended that the clouds were hiding the moon though there
weren't any
(j$9 John pretended that he was winding the clock, though there wasn't
one there
By contrast the anaphoric uses of the cannot normally enter sentences 
in a similar way without contradictions
(40$)?*John pretended that he was stroking the woman beside him though
there was no-one there 
(4Qb) John pretended that he was stroking the woman beside him though
he never touched her
(4laV John pretended that he was stroking a woman beside him though
there was no-one there 
(41b) John pretended that he was stroking a woman beside him though
he never touched her
(42a)?*John pretended that he was stroking the woman who was standing
beside him though there was no-one there
(42b) John pretended that he was stroking the woman who was standing
beside him though he never touched her
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(43a) John pretended that he was stroking a woman who was standing
beside him though there was no-one there 
(43b) John pretended that he was stroking a woman who v/as standing
beside him though he never touched her
In each of these cases an account of the contrast between interpretations
with indefinite and definite noun phrases in terms of first and second
mention of some object predicts this distribution in the following way*-
The indefinite noun phrase can be interpreted as false since there is
no prior commitment to the truth of the the existence of the object
to which the noun phrase refers. The definite noun phrase cannot, as
there is such a prior commitment - it constitutes a second mention
of some object previously referred to and because the previous mention
of this object is not explicitly included with the scope of pretend
in these example, it is understood to be outside the scope of the
verb. Hence, as in the other cases (cf. p.l54f) general rules of
contradiction block such an interpretation.
A presupposition-supporter might well retort at this point that to
eliminate presupposition only to bring in a notion of 'prior commitment'
is in effect to bring presupposition in again by the back door. But
this would be quite unjustified. This notion of prior commitment is
not in these cases relative to the world which guarantees the truth
of the sentence in which the definite noun phrase occurs (as a
presuppositional analysis would predict): rather it is relative to
the world in which the first mention of the noun phrase in question 
1 ?was asserted. Consider the following sentences:
(44) John pretended there was a woman beside him and that he v/as
striking the woman
(45) John dreamt that he seduced a woman, and the woman fought him
(46) John wants to buy a car which is convertible and the car must be green
(47) John wants to catch a fish this afternoon when the tide is out and then
eat the fish he has caught for supper
12. Cf. Hintikka 1969 PP*157 ff and 1972 for a lucid account of reference 
in modal contexts, using the concept of possible world*
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(48,) yij great-grandfather seduced a woman and the woman therefore became
a nun
(4.9) John will catch a fish this afternoon and we shall make sure that
the fish is shared amongst us all.
Each of the above sentences contains an indefinite noun phrase and a
definite noun phrase which are coreferential• However none of them
unambiguously imply a specific referent to whose existence the speaker
must be committed in asserting the sentence. On the contrary, £.1 of
them constitute opaque contexts: that is to say, they describe worlds
or states of affairs which may be compatible with the actual world but
which need not (in some cases, must not) be co-extensive with the real
world. Thus for example John may want something which exists, but he
may want something which only exists in the hypothetical state of
13affairs that he envisages and desires. So it is that in each of the
above examples, the referent that the two noun phrases refer to may be
a real-world referent, but it may not be. Thus for example (49) is true
under two possible interpretations - either if John is going to catch
a specific fish, which - say - he has seen, or if there is going to
be a state of affairs such that there is a fish which he catches.
Analogously, (48) can be true whether or not there is a specific
woman who my great-grandfather seduced alive at the time of utterance.
It does not affect the truth conditions of the sentence if in fact there
14is no such woman to refer to in the world relative to the speaker.
But these opaque contexts are not restricted to a particular set of 
verbs. They include future and past tense, as we have seen. Each of
13. This is the concept of 'possible world' which I introduced in ch«2 
cf. p. 60.
14. This appears to be the basis of Chomsky's suggestion (1971) that Einstein 
taught John physics would foe used if Einstein were dead, as opposed to 
Einstein has taught John physics vhich presupposes that he is alive.
An account more in line with the analysis here would be that past tense 
is an opaque context describing a world which is necessarily neb co­
extensive with the present, whereas perfect aspect does not provide an 
opaque environment but is interpreted as co-extensive with the present.
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these examples is an embarrassment for a presuppositional analysis,
since they constitute cases where there is no implication of an
actual referent to which the definite noun phrase refers. Moreover,
like negation, each of these opaque operators is vague with respect
15to its scope and not ambiguous. Each passes the vagueness test 
(cf. p. 37 ) in allowing verb-phrase pronominalisation without 
demanding agreement in the specification of whether or not the noun 
phrase in question has a specific referent*
(59) My great grandfather seduced a woman, and so did my grandfather.
Only my grandfather's woman is alive today.
(51) John wants to buy a car and so does Bill, but only Bill knows
exactly the car he wants.
(52’) John dreamt a woman was sleeping in bed beside him, and so did Bill.
Bill woke up to find there was.
For all these cases, an analysis of reference in terms of entailraent
predicts as an automatic consequence that opaque and negative contexts
will be unspecified as to whether any of the entailments of the
constituents of that context hold. A presupposition analysis has to
legislate against these case.
Now in the cases I considered previously - in which I claimed there
was a 'prior commitment' - the definite noun phrase has no precursor
within the opaque context. This being the case, its precursor is
16generally understood to be outside the opaque context, preventing
15. Despite numerous claims to the contrary. Cf. Baker 1966, Jackendoff 1971» 
Hall-Partee 1972.
16. Actually the relation between worlds is considerably more complex than 
this. Coreference may either cross into an opaque world as in (i) or from 
an opaque world to the real world as in (ii) or remain within the opaque 
world as in (iii):
(i) John met a girl and he dreamt he seduced her
(ii)Yesterday John dreamt that he hurt a girl and today she came round 
(Si)John dreamt that he hurt a girl and she cried
In the two cases where coreference is across worlds, the two worlds must 
agree in the interpretation given to that referent. In terms of referential 
indices the constraints are as follows: if within one world an object can 
be referred to by more than one name, each of these references must bear 
the same index. This is true for both real-world coreference and coreference 
in an opaque world. Where coreference occurs across worlds, these worlds 
must agree in assigning the same index to a particular object,
Cf, Hintikka 1969, 1972.
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the definite noun phrase from being interpreted as within the opaque
state of affairs. The exceptions to this general position are cases
where the predicate responsible for the opaque environment is
repeated in a discourse. Thus examples in (40a) and (43a) do not
imply the actual existence of a referent if they occur in the
17following environment:
(33) John pretended that there was a woman beside him. Then he
pretended that he was stroking the woman beside
him though in fact there was no-one there
(.34)?John pretended there was a woman standing beside him. Then
he stood up and pretended to stroke the woman v/ho 
was standing beside him, though in fact there was 
no-one there.
These examples, particularly (53)» provide us with further evidence 
that the implication of reference on an anaphoric definite noun phrase 
is not based on a relation of presupposition, but on entailment since 
only the latter predicts the variability of reference implications 
within opaque environments. The evidence thus suggests that all 
definite noun phrases entail the existence of their referent, despite 
the fact that in negative sentences they divicfc into two classes, only 
one of which allows an interpretation that denies the existence of the 
referent. The other class - those whose existence has already been 
implied by a preceding indefinite (or definite) noun phrase ^  cannot do 
so on account of the contradiction that would be set up. The nature of 
this relation between two noun phrases which are lexically identical 
save that where one has an indefinite article and the other a definite
17. For some reason that I cannot explain the occurrence of an explicit 
tense marker within the definite noun phrase in (54) makes it worse 
than (;53), Since I have not given any detailed consideration of the 
enormous problems involved in the semantics of tense, this remains 
an anomaly.
-161-
article can be formally captured simply by means of the linear 
representation of sentences. It would therefore be redundant to add 
any additional inherent specification to definite noun phrases to 
distinguish them from their corresponding indefinite noun phrases.
It follows that definite and indefinite noun phrases have an identical 
semantic representation.
The question then arises as to whether the non-linguistically 
anaphoric definite noun phrases should be distinct from their 
corresponding indefinite noun phrase. Russell assumes that they are, 
by virtue of an implication of uniqueness. That is The King of France 
visited the exhibition entails, in his analysis, that there is one and
i-imi in  • 11 n— , nrr-T in r f i it iti ■iiirim i iTtrT-niiin~«>iiiiir-r-iiii ilf'T fi i'ir * *
only one king of France, whereas A King of France visited the exhibition 
does not. It is doubtful however whether this relationship is one of 
entailment. If it were, and the semantic representation of The King of 
France visited the exhibition had to include a conjunction of the 
statements There is one and only one of King of France and The King of 
France visited the exhibition (l ignore the noun phrase in the predicate), 
then it should follow that the statement will be false if either one 
of its conjuncts is false (an argument which is by now familiar).
However the statement It is not true that the King of France visited the 
exhibition because there is more than one king of France seems quite 
as incoherent as the same sentence with an indefinite noun phrase, where 
uniqueness is clearly not entailed:
("55) It is not true that a king of France visited the exhibition
because there is more than one king of France
The truth of the statement in question in both cases is quite unaffected
by whether or not there is more than one king of France. Compare
(56) It is not true that the head of school came to see me because we
have two heads of school
(57) It is not true that a head of school came to see me because we
have two heads of school
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It is simply irrelevant to the truth of the statement The head of school 
came to see me that there may be more than one head of school*
Similarly with (58):
(5$) The glass has fallen on the floor
This does not entail that only one glass has fallen on the floor 
since if in fact seven other glasses fell on the floor as well
(58) would not thereby be false* Rather the conditions under which 
(5®) be true are exactly those which guarantee the truth of A glass 
has fallen on the floor. What is additionally implied in the use of 
the definite noun phrase is however that the object referred to by 
the definite noun phrase is uniquely identifiable by the hearer; 
but this implication is not an entailment either. The truth of 
any of the statements The King of France visited the exhibition,
The head of school came to see me. The glass has fallen on the floor 
is clearly not affected by whether or not the hearer is in fact able 
to identify the particular objects referred to in any speaker's 
utterance of the sentences. Thus, as we would predict of a relation 
involving speaker-hearer interaction, the implication of uniqueness 
on non-anaphoric definite noun phrases is not a truth-conditional 
implication and hence is not merely not an entailment relation taut 
is arguably not even a semantic relation. Since, as we have 
seen, this is the only putative distinction between (non-anaphoric) 
definite noun phrases and indefinite noun phrases, I shall therefore 
assume that, like the anaphoric the, the non-anaphoric the is 
nondistinct in its semantic representation from the indefinite article.
One important exception to this conclusion is the predicative use 
of the indefinite noun phrase, which does not enter into a relation
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of reference at all. It is also an exception to the generalisation 
adopted in the formalism described in ch.l (cf. p.30) that all noun 
phrases bear a referring index. It is not at all obvious how to deal 
with these examples except possibly by setting up two mutually 
exclusive indefinite articles, one referring and one not. This 
solution is not entirely ad-hoc since their behaviour is importantly 
different. (It does not however explain the anomaly in the formalism 
of referring indices.) Notice for example that a referring use of 
the indefinite article cannot occur after the definite article and 
maintain an implication of coreference. Thus The man came into the 
room and a man immediately did up his coat cannot imply that the 
same man both came into the room and did up his coat. This is not 
so with the non-referring use;
(59) The man is a big lout
(60) John hit the man, a big lout of a fellow
The indefinite noun phrase clearly does indicate properties of the 
object referred to by the definite noun phrase, and not some other 
object. For reasons such as these I shall assume that the predicative
use of the indefinite article has to be represented as quite distinct
from its referring use. And in all that follows, I shall only be 
concerned with this referring use of the indefinite noun phrase,
5.5 Summary
The central argument of this chapter has been - like that of the 
previous chapter - a negative one; I have suggested that the logical
18. I shall also not take into account here the generic use of either the 
indefinite or the definite article. While the concept of reference as 
I have used it here might reasonably be expected to include reference 
to a whole class, generics provide additional problems of their own 
which are not relevant to the main arguments of this thesis. I have 
also omitted the use of the definite article in superlative constructions 
on the grounds that this is an extended and not a central use.
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relation necessary to describe the implication of reference in 
definite noun phrases is entailment, and not presupposition. Thus 
the conflation by linguists of presupposition and entailment (cf. ch. 4) 
is not merely a foolish and philosophically insensitive mis-use of 
relations defined within logic but stems from the fact that in natural 
language presupposition is not logically distinct from entailment, 
despite Strawson's claim to the contrary. What I am in effect suggesting 
is that the discussion of presupposition within a formal linguistic 
framework has been a red herring, since the arguments originally 
establishing the need for such a new logical relation are not valid.
A consequence of my argument is that both definite and indefinite 
noun phrases entail the existence of the object to which they refer and 
should therefore be given the same semantic representation. We shall 
see in the following chapter how the conclusions of this chapter can 
be characterised in our formal framework.
The list of counter-examples or anomalies to a truth-based 
semantics has grown longer with each chapter. This chapter has added 
to the list not only the extremely 'marked' nature of the interpretation® 
of negative sentences which include the implication of reference in the 
scope of negation, but also (more seriously perhaps) the implication 
in definite noun phrases of the hearer's ability to uniquely identify 
the object described, an implication which is the basis of the distinction 
between definite and indefinite noun phrases. However on the basis that 
a semantic theory must not only be predictive but must also make the 
correct predictions (cf. p.8f ), I suggest that the restriction is a 
legitimate one and the apparent anomalies which arise can be naturally
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explained by a theory of pragmatics. Two large problems thus remain;
I) the further specification of our linguistic framework to predict 
the data we have discussed in this and the preceding chapter
II) the specification of a theory of pragmatics.
These form the burden of the four remaining chapters.
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CHAPTER 6 i The Formalisation of The Solution
The conclusions reached in chapters 4 and 5 provide two main 
problems of formal description;
(1) How should the theoretical account reflect the demonstrated 
relations of entailment - (a) between a non-opaque sentence containing 
a factive verb and its complement (b) between a non-opaque sentence 
containing a specific noun phrase (definite or indefinite) and the 
consequent claim of existence of the referent of that noun phrase
(2) How can the distribution of the definite article be predicted
(a) where the two co-referring noun phrases (of which the second 
contains the definite article) are within the same sentence (b) v/hen 
the co-referring noun phrases are not within the same sentence
(c) when there is no explicit prior noun phrase for the definite noun 
phrase to co-refer to. As we shall see, there is reason to suppose 
that cases such as factive verbs which entail the truth of their 
complements should be analysed as containing a definite noun head.
This being so, the formal representation of factives depends on the 
analysis given to definite noun phrases. I shall therefore discuss 
first the means of capturing the distribution of the definite noun 
phrase - i.e, problem (2),
6.1 The Syntactic Relation Between Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases
I have already argued that definite and indefinite noun phrases should
have an identical semantic representation. On this basis, some linguists 
have argued that they should be given the same underlying syntactic
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representation, deriving the definite article by a rule of
1
*Definitisation* from an underlying indefinite article. On 
semantic grounds, $£uroda for example argues that co-referential noun 
phrases J&ould have an identical deep-structure representation on the 
grounds that if they did not, then examples (1) and (*f) would have an 
identical deep structure, and so would examples (2) and (3); but (1) 
and (2) would not. If however, the were derived transformationally 
from a second instance of some noun phrase by a rule of definitisation 
which follows adverb preposing, then identical deep structures would 
be assigned to (1) and (2), but not to (3) and (£(•).
(1) Someone came into the room and told a boy that the police were
outside, while the boy was talking to a pretty girl
(2) While a boy was talking to a pretty girl, someone came into the
room and told the boy that the police were outside
(3) Someone came into the room and told the boy that the police were out­
side , while a boy was talking to a pretty girl
(A) While the boy was talking to a pretty girl, someone came into the
room and told a boy that the police were outside
A transformational derivation of anaphoric the thus correctly describes
two occurrences of the same noun phrase in (1) and (2) and different
noun phrases in (3) and (*t).
What syntactic justification is there for this analysis?
According to the principles suggested in chapter 1, the evidence would
have to show that indefinite and definite noun phrases did not differ
in their syntactic constraints. Two putative counter-examples to this
claim are the hypotheses that only definite noun phrases can take non-
restrictive relative clauses (henceforth NERCs), and that indefinite
noun phrases cannot occur in negative sentences. Thus one might
l.Cf. Annear 1965, Robbins 1968* Kuroda 1968.
2*These examples are repeated from ch.3 for convenience.
3.Cf. C.Smith (196*0 who distinguishes between two uses of the indefinite 
noun phrase, only one of which can take NKRCs, and Baker 1966.
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argue that of the following examples, (5), (7), (9), (10), (12) and 
(1*0 are acceptable,, but (6), (8), (11), (13) and (13) are not;
(3) The book, which is about linguistics, would be very helpful
(6) *A book, which is about linguistics, would be very helpful
(7) A book which is about linguistics would be very helpful
(8) *Any book, which is about linguistics, would be useful
(9) And book which is about linguistics would be useful
(10) He is an anthropologist who studies Indian tribes
(11)*He is an anthropologist, who studies Indian tribes
(12) The halfback didn't run with the ball
(13)*A halfback didn't run with the ball 
(l^t-) John didn't see the salesman
L
(15)*John didn't see a salesman.
The evidence given is insufficient. There are circumstances in which 
an indefinite noun phrase can take a NRRC and does enter negative 
sentences;
(16) John didn't see a lorry which was coming round the corner
(17) John didn't see a lorry, which was coming round the corner
(18) John didn't buy a car which was convertible
(19)?John didn't buy a car, which was convertible
(20)*A picture, which has a gold frame, may soon be painted by John
(21) A book, which was written by Paisley, was publicly burned by
Catholics today
(22) A man didn't see me and stepped off the pavement in front of the car.
5
The negation constraint is shown by these examples to be simply wrong.
So too is the constraint on NRRC formation. (17), (19) and (21) all 
contain NERCs modifying indefinite noun phrases. What then is the 
nature of the relation between indefiniteness and negation on the one
A-. Examples (13) and (15) are from Baker 1966*
5. Stockwell et al (1973) wisely disagree with Baker's data (cf, p.72).
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nand, and NRRC formation on the other? (17) appears to contain a 
referring instance of an indefinite noun phrase in a negative sentence, 
with a NRRC modifying it. So does <tt>. (16) and (18) are of the same
negative construction (containing an indefinite noun phrase with a 
restrictive relative clause) but their interpretations do not seem 
parallel, (16) seems to suggest that there was a specific lorry but
(18) does not suggest the existence of a specific convertible, These 
four examples indicate that an indefinite noun phrase in a negative 
sentence can either be interpreted as referring to a specific object 
or as not doing so*^  If this evidence is correct, it should enable one 
to predict that John didn't see a lorry has two possible interpretations;
(23) John didn't see a lorry f “ 111 faot he aldn,t see a I ®  traffic
*■ and it nearly ran him down
Similarly with examples (13) and (15):
(2%) A halfback did not run with the ball! " he di<3n,t eveu touoh “
I - you don't have halfbacks in Rugby
The hallmarks of entailment are in ©vidence, An indefinite noun phrase
implies the existence of some object and this implication may but need
not fall within the scope of negation, John saw a lorry thus entails
There is a lorry« I am therefore assigning to indefinite noun phrases
7the property of referring to some object, a conclusion which provides 
additional support for the semantic analysis of a and the in the 
preceding chapter. The postulated negation constraint thus seems 
nonexistent.
What of constraints on NRRC formation? Notice that in each of
(17) i v(19) and (21) the interpretation of the indefinite noun phrase
6. (17) also demonstrates the incorrectness of a constraint suggested by 
C,Smith (ibid) that NRRGs cannot occur with either the or ja in the 
predicate of negative sentences. The deviance of her example, He didn't 
write a novel, which was published by McGraw-Hill, is particular to verbs 
such as write which take objects of result, Cp, eg (20), For some 
discussion of these, cf. Fillmore 1968 p.if f, and also Vendler 1967a 
(pp,97-121) who calls them 'accomplishment' verbs,
7, This analysis has to some extent been anticipated by Barbara Hall-Partee 
(1972) who talks about the referring properties of indefinite noun phrases.
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must imply the existence of some referent, even (as in (17) and (19)) 
when the indefinite noun phrase is contained in a negative sentence.
Moreover examples (8), (11) and (20), which are all clearly deviant, 
contain indefinite noun phrases which do not imply the existence of a 
specific referent, A first explanation for this distribution is that 
there is a constraint on NRRC formation such that NRRGs can only modify 
noun phrases which imply a specific referent. Restrictive relative 
clause (RRC) formation has no prohibition of this kind since (10) and
(18) are grammatical though only the latter is even able to carry 
a referential interpretation* Since I have argued that negative 
sentences with an indefinite noun phrase are open to more than one 
interpretation, this entails that examples (6) and (19) which contain 
NRRGs, are deviant only if they are not given an interpretation in which 
the noun phrase in question has a referent. Though this interpretation may
g
be difficult to evoke in some cases, for example (19), the sentence (and
others like it), must be allowed a referential interpretation on the grounds
9of its interpretation when embedded in a. sentence such as (25):
(25) In the end John decided not to buy a car, which then stayed in the
showrooms for six months
Moreover, the constraint on NRRCs as reformulated should predict that
whenever an noun phrase is open to either a referring or a nonreferring
interpretation, a modifying NRRC will disambiguate the sentence, though
a RRG will not. There are two types of environment in which indefinite
noun phrases have two interpretations, negative sentences and opaque
environments. Negative sentences we have already seen are indeterminate as
8, This is particularly difficult in (6) which contains the modal would, an
opaque operator like will, cf. p,157ff•
The referential interpretation is the natural one in this type of example
if ja is replaced by one. Cf. Perlmutter 1970 for an argument that a is 
the unstressed variant of one.
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to an implication of reference for indefinite noun phrases, unless 
that noun phrase is modified by a NRRC, Opaque environments present 
exactly the same phenomenon.
(26) John is looking for a car
(27) John is looking for a car which is convertible
(28) John is looking for a car, which is convertible
(26) and (27) are indeterminate as to whether John has a specific car
he wishes to buy, but (28) must mean that there is a particular object*
These examples of relative clause modification demonstrate that the
constraints involved in NRRC formation are dependent not on the form
of the article but on the referring properties of both definite and
10indefinite noun phrases*
However the analysis given above is simplistic for exactly the 
same reasons as a description of definite noun phrases as necessarily 
implying a specific real-world referent is simplistic (cf, ch.5), Thus, 
though a NRRC implies a specific referent in the examples (17), (19) 
and (21) above, it need not. Consider (29),
(29) John dreamt he seduced a woman, who fought him
Here, as in the examples with a definite noun phrase on p.!57f, and unlike 
the earlier examples in this section, the NRRC allows an interpretation 
in which the action described takes place within the dream. The
referent it modifies is therefore not necessarily a specific, real- 
world referent. The reason for this is straightforward. The syntactic 
evidence for deriving NRRCs from an underlying conjoint structure is 
reasonably convincing (cf. Lakoff 1968 pp*4lff). This being so, 
sentences of the form John bought a car. which is green will be
■Mill —BgMlLI IMllUHL— —B
derived from the structure underlying John bought a car and the car is 
green* But NRRCs therefore correspond to the second-mention anaphoric
10. The existence of this constraint (though yet to be modified: cf. p.l?2 ) 
provides added support for this rather wider use of the terra reference 
than is common among philosophers.
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definite article. It follows automatically that NRRCs should have the
11same constraints as the definite article. This prediction is borne 
out by examples (30)-(33)*
(30) *Any book, which is about linguistics, would be useful
(31) *Any book would be useful and the book is about linguistics
(32) *John is an anthropologist, who hit me
(33) *John is an anthropologist, and the anthropologist hit me.
Neither anaphoric definite noun phrase nor NRRCs can occur where the 
preceding noun phrase has no implication of a referent. Their shared 
constraint is therefore that the noun phrase in question must imply 
the existence of a referent in some world, and that where coreference 
is across worlds, the worlds must agree in their interpretation at 
this point. It follows from this (by virtue of their underlying 
conjunct structure) that the NRRCs lie outside the scope of negation 
in examples (17) and (19) above, and outside the scope of look for
in (28). They will have an underlying structure of the following form?
conj
neg NP VP
(17)
S
conj
VPNP NP
NP
look for
(28)
11, Cf. also pronominalisation which occurs in a similar range of
environments. Though cf. Hall-Partee 1972 for a discussion of the 
many problems involved.
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The interpretation of in both cases is therefore relative to the 
speaker (by virtue of the deictic property of the tense). To avoid 
contradiction, the interpretation of the indefinite noun phrase in 
of (17) as having a referent must therefore not be included in the scop© 
of negation. Thus not only do NRRCs occur with definite and indefinite 
noun phrases under the same conditions, but these conditions are 
exactly those which allow the occurrence of anaphoric definite noun 
phrases.
In this section, we have seen how two apparent distinctions in the 
behaviour of definite and indefinite noun phrases were incorrectly 
formulated, and specifically that constraints on NRRC formation which 
appeared to demand some property of reference were met by both definite 
and indefinite noun phrases. Moreover this reference constraint turned 
out to be exactly the condition which is demanded by anaphoric definite 
noun phrases (incidentally confirming the correctness of the analysis 
of NRRCs as underlying conjunct©). We can therefore, after a somewhat 
circuitous route, conclude in the absence of further putative counter­
examples that syntactic constraints on definite and indefinite noun
12phrases are identical,
6.2 Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases; A Preliminary Formulation 
of Their Syntactic and Semantic Properties
In a formulation of the above analysis, we have to reflect the 
following facts:
12, This conclusion has of course the same caveats as did the corresponding 
conclusion in ch. 5 about the semantic representation of definite and 
indefinite noun phrases. Cf. ch. 3  j».l62f.
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Fact Is Noun phrases, both definite and indefinite, will be interpreted 
as having a specific referent if they are not within the scope of a 
modal operator or a negation operator. If they are, they may retain 
the implication of a specific referent, but they may not.
Fact 2: Definite noun phrases in general constitute second mention 
indefinite noun phrases. The second fact I shall capture in the standard 
way within a sentence by postulating a rule of definitisation assigning 
the feature C+Def] to the second of two coreferential noun phrases, 
to take place after adverb movement (cf. p*l67 and Kuroda 1968,
Stockwell et al 1973)* The morphological rules then guarantee that 
any noun phrase marked C+Def] acquires the and any noun phrase not so 
marked remains with ej, The exceptions - non-anaphoric definite noun 
phrases - will arbitrarily have the in underlying structure, with a 
syntactic feature C+Def]. For further details of this formulation, 
see the next section, where more difficult counter-examples are also 
considered.
The formalisation of the semantic properties of noun phrases is not 
so straightforward. The form of the interpretation will depend to a 
large extent on how the interpretation of quantified, plural and generic 
noun phrases is formalised. Yet each of these constitutes a study of 
its own and I cannot go into these problems here. Bierwisch (1971) 
has argued that the quantification theory of modern logic is not suited 
to an analysis of quantification in natural language on the grounds 
that unlike the existential and universal quantifiers, which characterise 
sets by enumerating the individuals in those sets, the quantifiers (and 
plural noun phrases) of natural language appear to operate with sets as 
primitive terms. Evidence for this is given by (a) sentences such as
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(34) The boys saw the girls
(35) The boys hit the girls
since only the former necessitates that each boy stands in the specified
relation to each girl, and an interpretation in terms of logical
quantifiers would therefore have to distinguish between the two sentences; 
and (b) sentences such as The Homans destroyed Carthage where the act 
of destroying Carthage is not even understood as applying to each or 
indeed any one Roman individually but rather to the groupm  a whole.
On the basis of evidence such as this Bierwisch sets up a different 
type of semantic element from that considered in chapter 1 - namely, 
a semantic element which delimits the set substitutable for the variable 
X^ in the semantic reading of a noun phrase, and I shall adopt his 
formulation here. Unlike the predicating features already discussed 
which specify the conditions to be met by the objects of the set 
referred to, the delimiting features apply to the set as a whole,
Bierwisch suggests two ways in which these features might be formulatedg 
an operator (QX^ ) is formed by combining the delimiting feature Q 
with the variable X^ and this operator is either prefixed to the reading 
of the whole sentence (or the next higher constituent) or it is prefixed 
to the reading of the noun phrase itself. As in logic, brackets indicate 
the scope of the operator. The two alternative formulations are then 
as follows for some sentence containing a two place predicate;
(i) (QXp ( [B]X^ . (QX2) ( [C]X2 . ) )
(ii) [S] (QXp ( Cfflxp (QX2)( [C]X2 )
Though Bierwisch does not choose between these two formulations, we shall see 
that alternative (i) allows for a correct prediction of the interpretation 
of negative sentences (with one additional rule for interpreting negation
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in combination with such an operator) whereas alternative (ii) does not.
Let us assume then that each noun phrase is assigned a reference
index in its underlying structure (needed for syntactic purposes such
as relativisation) and that whether a noun phrase has the feature C+Def]
13or not, the semantic representation of the noun phrase will include 
the operator (Spec X^) to characterise the fact that a single fixed 
object is referred to by that noun phrase. The interpretation of a 
sentence such as A/The King bought a/the chandelier will then (ignoring
N 1^tense) be along the lines of one of the following schemas
(a) (SpecX1) ( [K]X1 . (SpecX2) ( [C]X2 . E I X ^  ) )
(b) [B] (SpecX1) ( D C ^  ) (SpecX^) ( [C]X2 )
The interpretation of the negation of such a sentence must then be
able to predict that the positive statement could be false for at least
any one of the following reasons: that the King sold the chandelier,
that he sold a candlestick, that he bought a candlestick, that the duke
bought or sold the chandelier, that there was no chandelier, or that there
was no king. To what extent are either of the above formulations
successful in predicting such a disjunction of possibilities? Before
answering this question we need some formulation of the interaction of
negation and (SpecX^ ) and 1 tentatively suggest the following addition
15to the negation rule given in chapter 1 :
Neg (SpeoX±) ( CS]Xi ) S A/ (SpecX.j) ( telX.^ )
V  (SpecXp ( [SllX.j, ) S (A/SpecX^ ) ( [SlX^ v (SpeoXi)A/( K]X± )
In the limiting case where [3] is a single predicate:
V  (SpecXp( [S]X± ) = (A/Specxp( GUXj ) v (SpecXjK CA/SJX^
13* It is only non-anaphoric definite noun phrases which have C+Def] 
present in deep structure. Cf. p.I?*U 
1*U [K] represents the complex of features characterising king. [B] the
complex of features characterising the two-place relation buy, and 
[C] the complex of features characterising chandelier.
15* [S] represents any complex of features whose arguments contain the 
variable X. bound by the operator (SpecX.). tA / 1 is the antonymy 
operator: £f. ch.l p. 33*
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Informally what this rule states is that if it is not true that some 
fixed object has the attribute (or complex of attributes [S], then 
either there is no such fixed object (with the attribute OS]) or there 
is some fixed object but it does not have the attribute 03]. The 
negation rule then applies to the sentence reading (ja) (alternative
(i)) as follows:
A/ (SpecX1)( CK]XX . (SpecX2)( [C]X2 . [BlX^))
• (A/SpecX1)( [K]X^ . (SpecX2)( [C]X2 . CBlX^)) v
(SpecX1) A/( DQ^ . (SpecX2)( [C]X2 . M X ^ ) )
» (A/SpecX1)( [K]XX . (SpecX2)( [C]X2 . DBjX^)) v
(SpecX^ ( CA/K]X1 v A/(SpecX2) ( [C]X2 . [BjX^))
- (A/SpecX1)( CK]X1 . (SpecX2)( CC]X2 . CBjX^)) v
(SpecX1)( [A/K]X1 v (A/SpecX2>( CC]X2 . [BjX^) v (SpecX^Oi]^. CBjX^))
- (A/SpecX1)( CK]X1 . (SpecX2) ( [C]X2 . CBjX^)) v
(SpecXx) ([A/K]X1 v (A/SpecX2) ( [C]X2 . D D X ^ )  v  
(SpecX2)([A/C]X2 v CA/BlX^))
This gives exactly the result we need - namely that a given statement 
will be false if one or any combination of the semantic properties is
not met in the state of affairs it describes. In particular it allows
the combination of [A/K]Xx and/or [A/C]X2 and/or [A/B]XXX2# Bierwisch*s 
alternative (ii) cannot predict this range of possibilities. It v/ould 
predict the following reading:
A/ [B] (SpecX1)( CK]XX ) (SpecX2)( [C]X2 )
• [A/B] (SpecXx)([K]Xx) (SpecX2 >(CC]X2> v
CB] A/(SpecXx)(CK]Xx) v A/(SpecX2 )([C]X2 ) 16
16. The negation rule I have applied here is the equivalent to that given 
above, viz: A/ [S] (SpecX^ ) a  CA/S] (SpecX^ ) v Ds] (A/SpecX^ )
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s CA/B] (SpecX1)([K]X1) (SpecX^)(CCjX^ ) v
[B] (A/SpecX1)([K]X1) v (fipecX.^  ([A/K^) v (A/SpecX2) ( [C]X2) v
(SpeoX2)([A/C]X2)
But this formulation does not allow the combination of [A/B] and either 
[A/C] or Ca/K] a combination clearly demanded by sentences such as 
The King didn't buy the chandelier: what happened was that the Duke 
sold the candlestick. I shall therefore assume that the first 
alternative is the correct one.
In addition to such a negation rule, analogous rules will be 
needed for the interpretation of opaque contexts, since these provide 
exactly the same indeterminacy in the interpretation of the reference 
of noun phrases within their scope as negation (cf. ch.5 PP 138f^ 56ff ) •
These rules will differ according as for example the operator demands 
that the 1world' it describes not be co-extensive with the real world 
(of which a possible example is pretend. though cf. ch.*f fn.ll), or whether 
the operator allows the case where the 'world' it describes is co-extensive 
with the real world (e.g. look for, believe). I shall not provide a 
formalisation of these since the details are not central to the argument
17. For a different proposal, cf. Jackendoff 1971 who argues that any
formalism which uses quantifiers whose scope is as large as an entire 
proposition (e.g. traditional quantificational logic) is in principle 
incapable of capturing the appropriate interpretation of sentences 
containing opaque contexts, on the grounds that for example John is 
trying to find a pretty girl does not mean that 'John is trying to cause 
there to be a pretty girl such that he finds her* since he is not trying 
to make someone exist. His translation of the predicate calculus formula 
is not however correct. It should read 'John is trying to cause it to 
be true that there is a pretty girl such that he finds her' which does 
not entail that John is trying to cause the girl's existence. (For a 
related discussion of operators like cause which do not 'penetrate' to 
the entailments of their propositional argument, cf. Dretske 1970) .
In any case, when his own analysis of the referential properties of 
noun phrases is extended to entire sentences, Jackendoffs system falls 
prey to all the problems of quantificational logic, and is thus no 
more than a terminological equivalent.
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of this thesis. However I think the existence of these rules in
principle cannot be doubted. Furthermore these rules will only affect
the interpretation of the noun phrases and their indices: they will
not constitute deletion rules. The syntactic function of the index
for relativisation etc will therefore be unaltered despite the fact
that the interpretation of the index may be that there is no real-
world referent (as in for example: John did not buy a car which is
18convertible - he bought a lorry).
6.3 Inter-Sentence Relations - Which Solution?
I have so far argued about and formalised the relation between 
definite and indefinite noun phrases within the framework of a sentence- 
based grammar, and I have more or less ignored the problem of relations 
between indefinite and definite noun phrases across sentence boundaries.
Yet it is well-known that anaphora is not restricted to the confines of 
the single sentence, and the critical reader may have doubted my 
conclusions on the strength of these examples. This problem must now b© 
faced. There are three possible solutions:
(A) to treat definite noun phrases as always constituting a second 
mention of some indefinite noun phrase and as therefore containing - 
either in the underlying structure or in the semantic interpretation - 
the information that there was a prior mention of that noun phrase;
(B) to treat sentences with only a definite noun phrase as different
in principle from sentences containing co-referring pairs of indefinite 
and definite noun phrases;
18. This avoids the problem pointed out by Baker (1966) that a noun,
though it have no referent, may still allow restrictive relative clause 
modification which apparently demands coreference between the super­
ordinate noun phrase and the noun phrase in the embedded sentence.
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(C) to treat indefinite and definite noun phrases identically, and to 
treat sentences with only a definite noun phrase ad-hocly on the basis 
that inter-sentence relations are excluded by fiat, since they constitute 
part of a theory of discourse, not a theory of semantics. Alternative
. . 19
(A) has occasionally .been put forward* However it is in my
view untenable. The syntax of a simple sentence cannot be allowed
to have a conjoint sentence as part of its underlying structure for
two reasons! (i) there is no syntactic evidence to justify such an
underlying structure - I can conceive of no relevant syntactic constraints
which a simple sentence such as A man hit the girl would share with a
conjoint structure such as There is a girl and a man hit the girl
(cf, ch,l s e c t i o n ( i i )  general conditions on recoverability
prohibit such an analysis, since the details of the sentence preceding
the occurrence of any given definite noun phrase are quite undecidable.
It is not even possible to predict that the preceding sentence contain
an indefinite noun phrase since it may not. The preceding noun phrase
might itself be definite, or a pronoun (as in (36)):
(36) A man came. He sat down and eventually a girl came. At that
point the man left.
Similar reasons militate against a semantic rule stating as part of the
interpretation of a simple sentence that the preceding sentence
has contained in it an indefinite noun phrase. To incorporate either
type of rule into the grammar would be to transform the grammar from a
grammar predicting the sentences of some language into a grammar
19. Cf. Baker 1966 Jackson 1971,
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predicting the discourse of some language. But, as the example above
shows, the structure of a discourse is not predictable in the way
that the structure of a sentence is. One cannot predict what sentence
will precede or follow any given sentence. Thus any attempt to
incorporate such a prediction into the grammar is in principle
doomed to failure.
The second alternative, (B), treats definite noun phrases with
no preceding coreferential noun phrase as different in kind from
definite noun phrases which form such a pair. This is in effect a
weaker form of a presupposition-based theory. Definite noun phrases
with no preceding indefinite noun phrase (whether with a relative
clause or not) would be said to presuppose the existence of the
referent, whereas in co-ordinate structures where the constraints
are naturally explicable in terms of entailment, an analysis of the
definite noun phrases in question as entailing the existence of their
20referent would seem more appropriate. Such an analysis is not 
however satisfactory, since the very general claim that inter­
sentence relations are in principle different from intra-sentence 
relations would follow as a consequence. This solution - despite 
its superficial attractiveness in accounting for certain constraints 
on sentences (e.g. the protection of definite noun phrases with restrictive 
relative clauses from the scope of negation) seems therefore to lead to 
a highly counter-intuitive conclusion. It is not the case that all 
inter-sentence relations are different in kind from relations within 
a sentence. Indeed, coreference causes this theoretical difficulty 
just because it is the same phenomenon which is operating both between 
and within sentences. A framework which treats one and the same
20, This solution is not in fact adopted by anyone, but unless some 
such solution is adopted the examples given here in preceding 
sections provide an embarrassing wealth of counter-examples.
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phenomenon in the form of two quite different statements, referring 
to two different logics, is not one to he accepted lightly.
The third alternative, (C), is to admit the limits of one's model 
openly, to provide a mechanism which deals with the counter-examples 
albeit ad-hocly and which provides a general theory within which the 
ad-hoc distinction can be explained away. It is this final alternative 
which - in the face of no adequate alternative solution - 1 wish to 
put forward. Definite noun phrases which have no preceding noun phrase 
with which they explicitly corefer, must be entered in the underlying 
structure of the sentence as definite noun phrases. To effect this, 
we shall say that all noun phrases have a referring index in underlying 
structure and they may optionally have an additional syntactic feature 
C+Def]. This feature does not take part in any transformation 
and is not interpreted by the semantic rules operating at the base.
The definitisation rule then operates on coreferential noun phrases, 
without taking these [+Def] features already in the phrase marker into 
account. That is, it applies irrespective of whether the first noun 
phrase of the co-referring pair is marked C+Def] and it applies 
redundantly where a i+.Def] feature was assigned in the base on a co­
referential noun phrase. The morphological rules then guarantee the 
spelling out of the and a. The feature C+Def] , like the feature C+’Pro], 
will not be given any interpretation by the grammar, which will predict 
synonymy between The man hit me and A man hit me. This is arguably 
not counter-intuitive. The distinction between The man hit me and A man 
hit me is, as we have already seen (cf. ch. 3 p. 3*62 ), explicable in 
terms of the speaker's assumption of what the hearer knows. The man hit
-183-
me implies that the hearer knows who is being referred to, while A man 
hit me does not. But as I have already argued in chapter h  (p 121ff) 
this type of relation cannot and should not be handled within a 
formal model and so must be excluded by fiat.
6 . k  The Formulation of Factive Complements
In the light of the formulation given to definite noun phrases in 
the last two sections, we are now in a position to discuss a possible 
formulation of the interpretation of the factive verbs. We saw 
in chapter 1 that some predicates take propositions as arguments - e.g. 
[CAUSE]; and from the discussion of factives in chapter it becomes 
clear that propositions which operate as arguments must be divided into 
at least two types - those whose truth is entailed by the superordinate 
predicate and those whose truth-value assignment is independent of the 
superordinate predicate* The factive predicates delimited by the 
Kiparskys (1970) constitute a subset of those predicates which entail 
the truth of their (propositional) argument, and the Kiparskys argued 
on syntactic and semantic grounds that sentences containing factive 
predicates plus thab complements or gerunds should be derived from an 
underlying structure identical to sentences containing an explicit 
definite noun phrase complement - i.e. that John regretted that Mary was 
sick and John regretted the fact that Mary was sick should have the same 
underlying structure. The syntactic evidence that they offer for the 
distinction between factive and non-factive verbs is:
(i) Only factives can take the full range of ^ rundives (without tense 
or adverbial constraints) as object complements - hence the distribution
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(37) John regretted Bill's having whipped the dog so hard
(38) John resented Edward's seeing his sister every day
(39) *John thought Bill's whipping Mary
(40) *Edward assumed .^lice's creating a fuss in each lecture
21(ii) Only non-factives allow the transformation of 'raising' to 
object position;
(41) *John regretted Mary to be right
(42) *Edward resented Bill to be the winner
(43) John believed Mary to be right
(44) Edward expected Bill to be the winner
(iii) Only non-factives allow the rule of negative transportation
(cf. R.Lakoff 1969) - thus
(45) John thought that Bill wasn't there
is equivalent to
(46) John didn't think that Bill was there
but this is not true of the pair (47)-(48)
(4?) John didn't regret that Bill was there
(48) John regretted that Bill wasn't there
(iv) Only factives can be followed by the fact that S  construction, which
is synonymous with a simple that complement
(49) John regrets the fact that Mary came early
(50) John resents the fact that Mary came early
(51) *John thinks the fact that Bill is right
(52) *Jo imagined the fact that Peter was there
To this list we can add two further criteria; (v) the sequence of tense
22constraint and (vi) adverb preposing. Non-factive verbs share the
21. This rule has also been referred to as pronoun-replaceraent (Rosenbaum 
1967)and _it-re placement (Jacobs and Rosenbaum I96&).
22. These criteria were mentioned in a different connection by Ross in 
a lecture in Cambridge, April 1973*
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property that the tense of the embedded complement clause must agree
with the verb complements the normal tense contrast of present and
past
(53) At first my parents deeply regretted that
any more children
decided not to have
(5*0 My parents eventually realised that
any children !^,m ? determinedI was J not to have
(53) At first my parents thought/believed/imagined that
not to have any children
( *I've |
| iia i deoided
(vi), Adverb preposing, concerns the ease with which an adverb of the 
embedded complement clause can be moved to the front of the superordinate 
clause, Non-factives allow this} factives do not. Thus we get
(56) I think he'll be in York tomorrow
(57) Tomorrow I think he'll be in York
(58) I Imagine that Tom will give the game away tomorrow
(59) Tomorrow I imagine that Tom will give the game away
(60) I suggest we go to Windsor tomorrow
(61) Tomorrow I suggest we go to Windsor
(62) I realise that Mary is leaving tomorrow 
(65) *Tomorrow I realise that Mary is leaving
(6*0 I resent it that Mary is leaving tomorrow
(65) *Tomorrow I resent it that Mary is leaving
(66) I'm suprised that Mary is leaving tomorrow
(6?) *Tomorrow I'm surprised that Mary is leaving
23In the light of this evidence I shall assume - together with the Kiparskys 
that factive and non-factive complements differ in that the former is 
assigned an underlying structure of the forms
23# There are several verbs which do not fulfil all the criteria of the 
semantic class to which they belongt but in each case the verb will 
fulfil a majority of the conditions! e.g. imagine which takes the full 
range of gerundives but which allows negative transportation (I don't 
imagine he'll come) and adverb preposing (cf. eg's (58)-(59))* requires 
sequence of tense agreement (*They imagined that you are sick) and 
cannot take the fact that S  constructions.
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The problem we now meet of formalising the semantic interpretation of
factive complements thus becomes one of formalising the interpretation
of those definite noun phrases where the head noun and the entire
modifying proposition are co-referential.
Bierwisch (1971) has argued (p.425 ) that these 'fact* noun
phrases should be interpreted - along lines indicated by Reichenbach
(194?) - as involving the specification of a given fact where the
24proposition expressed is the name of that fact. Formally, this
25is expressed as (SpecX^)([P]X^ ) for some proposition P whose truth
26is entailed by the statement in which it is embedded as a complement.
For example, if we represent the semantic components of regret 
schematically as [REGRET] , those of king as [K] and those of The Queen 
is sick as [P], then the semantic representation of The King regrets 
that the Queen is sick will be:
(SpecX1)(QaX1 . (SpecX2)([P]X2 . [REGRET]X^))
Now, in the case of the Kiparskys1 factive verbs, there is a 
close correspondence between the deep-structure syntactic representation
24* Cf. Keenan 1972 p.4l9f for a similar formal characterisation of 
factive predicates.
25* This formulation assumes the position argued earlier (ch.5 section 5*3) 
that definite and indefinite noun phrases are semantically nondistinct*
26. Definite noun phrases containing relative clauses are distinct from 
this since there is no variable ranging over the proposition itself*
Thus the ambiguity of the fact that Mary wrote is reflected schematically 
in two different semantic representations:
(a) for the relative: (SpecX^)([F]X^  • (SpecX^)([M]X2 • [W]X2X^))
(b) for the non-relative: (SpecX^)([(SpecX2)([M]X2 . [W]X2)]X^ )
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and the semantic representation, the syntactic representation reflecting 
the syntactic behaviour of this class of items. Yet this form of 
semantic representation is not restricted to the factive predicates: 
it is general to all semantic predicates which take a proposition as 
argument whose truth is entailed. Thus [CAUSE] for example, which in 
positive statements entails the truth of its complement proposition, 
will be of the form represented here. So The King of France killed 
the Queen of Persia, which contains the predicate [CAUSE] and entails 
the truth of The Queen of Persia died, will have a semantic representation 
which is not
(SpecX1)([K]X1 . (SpecX2)([Q]X2 . [CAUSE] X^DXEEjX^)) 27 
where the second argument of [CAUSE] is a proposition, but rather
?8
(Specxp ([K]X1 . (SpeoX2)([(SpeoX,)([Q]X, . DlE]X )]X2 . [CAUSE]X^))
Implicit in this formulation is the claim that the relation between a 
true proposition and the state of affairs which it expresses can 
be explained by means of the same formal mechanism as the relation 
between a symbol and the specific object to which it refers. There 
are many philosophical problems attendant on this claims and suggestioas 
which have been put forward along these lines have proved controversial - 
cf. particularly Reichenbach's 'fact functions* (Reichenbach 1947 p. 269 ff ) 
and Frege's concept of truth-value being the referent of a proposition 
(Frege 1892, translated 1966 p.63). I cannot enter here into all the 
issues which such a formulation implies. However, should the claim 
that objects and facts can legitimately be treated as the same type of
27. I assume here and elsewhere in this section for simplicity that [DIE] 
is primitive, since its internal structure is not germane to the 
arguments here.
28. It might seem that the semantic representation should have the quantifier 
scope of X2 and X-, reversed so that the existence of the Queen of 
Persia in the above example is outside the range of the [CAUSE] 
predicate. Arguments to this effect have been given by Jackendoff
1971* For arguments against this alternative, cf. fn.17 of this chapter.
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forma 1 object prove too strong, it would be a straightforward matter
to allow another form of quantifier which ranged only over propositions.
Since this would be a veakening of the theory, I shall maintain the more
29restrictive form in the absence of further evidence. Some confirmation 
of the correctness of this analysis can however be gained by seeing how 
this formal mechanism interacts with the rule of negation. Given the 
e& Haematic semantic representation of The King of France killed the 
Queen of Persia suggested on the previous page, and given the rule of 
negation;
A/CP.Q] s [A/P v A/q] (cf. p. 33 )
and its subparts
[A/P] » [-P] where P is the sole member of a set (cf. p. 33 )
A/(SpecX^)([S]Xi) 5 (A/SpecXi)([S]Xi v (SpecXi)([A/S]Xi) (cf, p. 176 ) 
the negation rule would predict that The King of France did not kill 
the Queen of Persia be assigned a semantic interpretation as follows;
A/ (SpecX^ ([K]X1 . (SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3 . D O T ] ^ ) ^  . [CAUSE] X ^ )  )
1 (A/SpecX1)([K]X1 ,(SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3.[DIE]X3)]X2 . [C AUSE] X ^ )  ) v 
(Spe6X1)A/([K]X1 . (SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3.DDIE]X3)]X2 . [CAUSE]X^))
5 (A/SpecX1)([K]X1 . (SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3.[DXE]X3)]X2 . [CAUSElX^)) v 
(SpecX1)([A/K]X1 v A/(SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3.[DIE]X3)]X2 . [CAUSE]X^))
£ (A/SpecX1) ( DClX^ (SpecX2) ( [(SpecX^ ( [Q]X3, [DIE]X3)]X2. [CAUSE^X^ ) v 
(SpecX1)([A/K]X1 v (A/SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3.DlE]X3)]X2.[CAUSE]X1X2) v 
(SpecX2)A/([(SpecX3)([Q]X3 . [DIE]X3)]X2 . [CAUSE]X^))
5 (A/SpecX1)([K]X1 . (SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3,[DIE]X3)]X2.[CAUSE]XxX2)) v 
(SpecX1)([A/K]X1 v (A/SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3,[DIE]X3)]X2.[CAUSE]X1X2) v 
(SpecX2)(A/[(SpecX3)([Q]X3 . DlE]X3>]X2 v [A/CAUSE]X^))
29, For some discussion of this question, cf. Martin 1971l> who first argues 
against Reichenbach*s use of the same operators over facts and objects, 
but who later (p.!29f.) admits that a perfectly satisfactory formal 
system would also hold if the distinction between the two were not 
taken as primitive. For support of the w e a k e r  view that propositions 
should legitimately be quantified over, cf, Vendler 1987b,
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5 (A/SpecX^ ) (CK]X^  . (SpeoX2)CC(SpeoX5)CMX3.Dl]!aX3)3X2#CCAUSE]X1X2)) v
(SpecX1)([A/K]X1 v (A/SpecX2) ( [(SpecX^ ( [QlX^ , [DIE]X3)]X2 • [CAUSE]X^) v 
(SpecX2)(C(A/SpecX3)([Q3X3.CDXS]X3) v (SpecX^A/C[Q]X3#CD]S3X3)3X2 v
Ca/cause3x1x2))
s (A/SpeeX^ ) ( CK3X^  . CSpecX2)([(SpecX3)(CQ3X3.CDXE3X3)3X2. ^ 323x ^ 2)) v 
(SpecX^ ) ( [A/K3X1 v (A/3pecX2) ( C(SpecX3) ( CQ3X3* CDXE3X3)3X2# [CAUSE3X^ X2) v  
(SpecX2)([(A/SpecX3)(CQ3X3.[DIE3X3) v (SpecX^ ( CA/Q3X3 v  [A/DIE3X3)3X2 v
[a/cause3x1x2))
This is just the result we want. We have (at least) seven possible 
30interpretations, each of which is exemplified in the following 
contextualisations. (corresponding in order to the order of the disjuncts) %
(68) The King of France didn't kill the Queen of Persia - there's no such
person as the King of France
(69) The King of France didn't kill the Queen of Persia - it was the
Shah who did
(70) The King of France didn't kill the Queen of Persia - she's here
(71) The King of France didn't kill the Queen of Persia - there's no
such person as the Queen of Persia
(72) The King of France didn't kill the Queen of Persia - he killed
the Queen of Ethiopia
(73) The King of France didn't kill the Queen of Persia - he merely
made her very ill
(7*0 The King of France didn't kill the Queen of Persia - nobody did,
she just died
Informally, the rule states that The King of France did not kill the 
Queen of Persia is true just in case any one or more of the predicate 
terms falls within the scope of negation and hence the property to
30. There are more than seven possible interpretations, since the 'v* 
of the negation rule is inclusive.
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which it corresponds fails to hold in the state of affairs being
described. Furthermore, it states that if any of the delimiting
argument features is interpreted as falling within the scope of negation,
then all the components which depend on the argument in question must
of necessity fail. Thus if theife dfe no referent corresponding to X^
not only is there no King of France but there cannot have been a
killing of the type described; if there was no fact corresponding to X2,
then either there was no Queen of Persia or she didn't die; and conversely
if there was no Queen of Persia then there cannot have been a fact
corresponding to X2* Thus our independently justified negation rule
predicts correctly that (a) if the statement There is a King of France 3B
then of necessity The King of France did not kill the Queen of Persia
is true; (b) if the entailed fact is false then either it is false
because she did not die, or because There is a Queen of Persia is false;
and ( g ) if There is a Queen of Persia is false independently of whatever
31action the King of France may or may not have taken, them not only 
is it of necessity false that the Queen of Persia died at the time 
specified, but also it is of necessity true that the King of France did 
not kill the Queen of Persia.
As a further example, take The King regrets that the Queen is sick, 
which we represented schematically before ass
(SpecX1)(CK]X1 . (SpecX2)([P]X2 . [REGRET] X^))
If we now break down the semantic structure of 'P' giving the components 
of queen as [Q] and those of sick as [S] we get:
31* The complication caused here by the use of the verb kill in this 
example is irrelevant to the general point.
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(SpecX1)([K]X1 . (SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([q]X3 . [S]X3)]X2 . [REGRET] X ^ ) )
The semantic representation of The King does not regret that the Queen
*** —* '“mum niiiniinMii«n«nft.iiijam  wfeaib——asa
is sick is then predicted to be
A/ (SpecX1)([K]X1 * (SpecX2)([(SpecX3)(CQ]X3 . [S]X3)]X2 . [REGRET] X^)) 
g (A/SpecX1)([K]X1 . (SpecX2) ([(SpecX^ ([Q]X3. [S]X3>]X2 . [REGRET] X ^ )  ) v
(SpecX^A/C DOX^ (SpecX2) ( [(SpecX^ ) ( [Q]X3* [S]X )^]X2* [REGRETlX^) )
i (A/SpecX1)([K]X1 . (SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3a[S]X3)]X2,[REGRET]XxX2)) v
(SpecX1)([A/K]X1 v A/(SpecX2) ( [(SpecX^ ) ( [Q]X3„ [S]X3)]X2* [REGRET] X ^ )  ) 
s (A/SpecX1)([K]X1 . (SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3*[S]X3)]X2„[REGRET]X1X2)) v 
(SpecX1) ( [A/K]Xxv (A/SpecX2) ([(SpecX^ ( [Q]X3# [S]X3)]X2# [REGRET] X ^ )  v 
(SpecX2)A/([(SpecX3)([Q]X3 . [S]^)^ . [REGRET]X^)) 
s (A/SpecX1) ([IC]X1 . (SpecX2)([(SpecX3)[Q]X3<,[S]X3)]X2.[REGRET]X1X2)) v 
(SpecX1)([A/K]X1 v (A/SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3*[S]X3)]X2.[REGRET]X1X2) v 
(SpecX2) (A/[(SpecX3) ( [Q]X3# [S]X3>]X2 ¥ [A/REGRET] X ^ ) ) 
s  (A/SpecX1)([K]X1 . (SpecX2) ([(SpecX^ ( [Q]X3# [S]X3)]X2# [REGRET]X^)) V
(^pecX^)([A/K]XX ¥ (A/SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3.[S]X3)]X2.[REGRET]X1X2) v
(SpecX2)([(A/SpecX3)([Q]X3.[G]X3> v (SpecX3)A/([Q]X3*[S]X3>]X2 v 
[A/REGRET]XXX2)>
= (A/SpecX1)([K]X1 . (SpecX2) ( [(SpecX^ ( [Q]X?. [S]X3)]X2# [REGRET] X ^ )  ) v
(a)
(SpecX1)([A/K]X1 v (A/SpecX2)([(SpecX3)([Q]X3»[S]X3)]X2 .[REGRET]X1X2) v 
(b) Co)
(SpecX2 )([(A/SpecX3 )([Q]X3* [S]X3) v (SpecX^ ( [A/Q]X3 v [A/S]X3)]X2 ¥/
^  (f)
[A/REGRET]XXX2))
As before, the output of the rule predicts that if any of the quantifiers 
is negated, and hence there is no specific argument to which to 
attribute the respective predicates, then all the predicate features
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which depend on that argument must also fail to correspond to properties 
in the state of affairs being described. Thus if there is no King, 
then The King does not regret that the Queen is sick must be true since 
the regret predicate must also fail to hold (though it may still be 
true that the Queen is sick, since the specification of X^ itself 
does not depend on X^); if there is no fact X-, then either there is 
no queen or she isn*t sick and of necessity the King cannot have 
regretted it; and if there is no queen corresponding to X^ then there 
can be no fact X^ since X^ is solely dependent on a conjoint set of 
properties pertaining to X^ and hence again the King cannot have 
suffered regret. This is ‘exactly the result we need - specifically 
that if there is no fact corresponding to X^ and The Queen is sick is 
false, then (of? Necessity) The King does not regret that the Queen is 
sick is thereby true; and if there is no Queen, then (a) The Queen is 
sick is false and (b), as before, The King does not regret that the Quee 
is sick is therefore true* It thus seems that our independently 
motivated formal mechanism gives the correct result in a non- 
vacuous way.
Some details of the formulation must now be made more explicit.
All propositional arguments in the semantic interpretation of a 
sentence whose truth is entailed are represented as falling within the 
scope of the’Spec* quantifier, which also binds object-variables, 
according to the schema (SpecX^)(CP]X^). Their semantic representation 
is thus closely analogous to specific noun phrases. In the case of 
factive verbs and adjectives, this semantic parallel is explicitly 
reflected in the syntactic representation, which contains an underlying
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definite noun phrase* The feature of definiteness is specified at the
level of deep structure since the definite article in phrases such
as the fact that Mary came are never anaphoric (cf. p.l82). Indeed
this type of construction demands the definite articles a fact that
32Mary came is ungrammatical as a noun-phrase construction* A
33syntactic subcategorisational restriction on the lexical entry fact 
will therefore guarantee that a rule assigning fe-Def] to noun phrases 
optionally will in this case be obligatory. The semantic interpretation 
of the entailed complements of factives in both positive and negative 
sentences is then predicted by rules of interpretation which are 
independently justified,
6,3 Summary
We have seen in this chapter how if we assume (a) that definite 
and indefinite noun phrases are in general non-distinct both in their 
underlying syntactic representation and in their semantic representation 
and (b) that factives are non*»distinct from definite noun phrases of 
the type the fact that £ in their underlying syntactic and semantic 
representation, then the already existing framework proposedby~Bierwischt 
with only minor extensions (cf, p. 176 ), makes all and only the 
predictions the data demand. While the prediction of correct
interpretations only provides functional justification for the analysis 
in hand, I take it that such predictive success provides at least strong 
partial confirmation of the philosophical assumptions on which it is
32. It is not of course in sentences such as lt*s a fact that Mary came 
but these constitute cases where extraposition has taken place,
33« Of the form C+Def S]
based. Thus concepts such as Reichenbach's 'fact functions' receive 
some confirmation.
More generally, in this central section, I have considered what 
evidence there is for the incorporation into natural language 
semantics of either a logical or a speaker-oriented concept of 
presupposition. The conclusions were however negatives the evidence 
suggests on the contrary that the semantic component of the grammar 
should not be revised to allow for the concept of presupposition, 
whichever way it is defined.
One of the most important assumption® I have made throughout has 
been the need to predict all the possible interpretations of negative 
sentences (given the agreement that 'interpretation' be understood in 
a truth-conditional sense). So there has been no attempt to predict 
in the specification of negative sentences what constitute likely 
interpretations and what much less likely ones - either in the case of 
sentences containing factive verbs or in the case of sentences containing 
definite noun phrases. In both, the rule of negation merely predicts 
all the logical possible ways in which negative sentences can be true.
It might be argued (as I suggested on p. 125f ) that likely interpretations 
(as the more 'natural') should be distinguished from unlikely ones, and 
that this becomes a problem only if a relation of presupposition, 
however it is defined, is not recognised. But we shall see in the 
following section that an explanation of this problem is not a semantic 
matter.
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CBAPTER 7 s Towards a Pragmatic Theory
Throughout chapters 4-6 I have had constant recourse to a theory of 
pragmatics* Whenever I faced counter-examples, both more and less 
serious, my excuse has been that this is a phenomenon which it is the 
function of a pragmatic theory to explain, and not that of a semantic 
theory* This excuse is little more than a lame fudge if there is no 
pragmatic theory to carry out the task assigned to it* We must now 
therefore ask what form such a pragmatic theory could take* Unfortunately 
there are as many divergent delimitations of pragmatics as there are of 
semantics* When Morris first introduced the trichotomy of syntax, 
semantics and pragmatics (1938* 1946)* pragmatics was characterised as 
the study of the relation between an utterance and its interpreters 
(speaker and hearer)* But since Bar-Hillel suggested in 1954 that pragmatics 
concern itself with the interpretation of indexioal expressions, there 
have arisen two quite separate applications of the term pragmatics*
It can be applied to the study of speech acts (of. Stalnaker 1972 p*383f), 
or to an interpretation of indexioal sentences (cf. Stalnaker ibid p*583ffj> 
Montague 1972). However in arguing that the semantics of a natural language
i)
involves a statement of the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
truth of the sentences of that language, I have already assumed (cf. p.69f) 
that such a statement in the case of indexioal sentences is part of 
semantics (as argued by Davidson 1967, Lewis 1972, Wiggins 1971). In any 
case I have referred to the need for a pragmatic theory at the points 
where the interpretation of sentences in natural language appearto 
involve phenomena which do not play any part in a truth definition for 
that language. And a pragmatics such as Montague's (Montague 1968, 1972)
1. Cf. Hintikka 1968, Martin 1971b, Stalnaker 1972, Thomason 1973*
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which assigns a truth value to indexioal (and other) sentences (relative 
to some arbitrary world) is no nearer to explaining these phenomena than 
a semantics stating necessary and sufficient conditions for truth*
I an not therefore using pragmatics here in the sense of Bar-Hillel,
Montague and others* In the sense to be adopted here, pragmatics 
refers to the study of sentences in use* and I shall be assuming that 
a pragmatic theory is a theory which has to explain how a language is 
used to enable any speaker to communicate with any hearer (of* Thomason 
1973 and Wiggins 1971» who make an equivalent use of the term)* Such a, 
theory is put forward by Grice (1957> 19&1, 1968, 1969), and in the 
remainder of this thesis, I shall attempt to show how the problems and 
implications pertaining to non-truth-conditional properties of utterances 
(or sentences) can be explained within the theory of conversation set out by 
Grice. Since the concept and status of a pragmatic theory within an over-all 
theory of language is still quite unclear, the grea,ter part of what follows 
must be assumed to be in the nature of a tentative initial suggestion. 
Despite this caveat however, what I hope minimally to show is that Grice's 
framework can provide a natural explanation of the phenomena to which both 
linguists and logicians have given the label presupposition. If this 
explanation is at least in part correct, I shall take it that the restrict­
ion of semantics to a framework which is both truth-conditional and based 
on a two-valued logic receives double confirmation - (a) from internal 
arguments such as the prediction for any given sentence of its entailments 
and contradictions arising from those entailraents, and (b) from the 
demons tration that those phenomena which are not accounted for by this 
form of semantics appear to be naturally explicable within a more general 
theory of communication (pragmatics)*
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7*1 Grice’s Theory of Meaning
Grice’s theory has two parts? (i) a definition of speaker's
meaning (ii) the setting up of maxims of behaviour to explain the
2co-operative nature of communication* With respect to speaker’s 
meaning (* meaning^  *), Grice argues that (roughly speaking) in 
uttering 'x*, a speaker (S) is intending for indicative utterances
(а) that the hearer (H) should believe that S believes some
proposition jd and Cb) that by virtue of his belief that S believes
j>, H should also believe j), In more formal terms, Grice gives the
Jtj.
following definitions
For some specific occasion, a speaker S makes an utterance *xf 
to a hearer H indicating that p if he intends that:
(1) H should think x has f (where f is a feature)
(2) H should think that he S intends H to think x has f
(3) H should think f is correlated in way c with the state of
believing that p (where p is the prepositional content)
( k ) H should think that S intends that he (H) thinks f is correlated 
in way c with the state of believing th-,t p 
(5) H should think he S intends H (via 1 and 3) to think that S  
believes that p
(б) on the basis of (3), H should think that in fact S  does believe that p 
(?) H should think that S intends (6)
2* In all that follows, I shall give references wherever possible to tne 
published accounts of Grice's work. Where the only account is the 
mimeo version of Grice’s William James lectures 1967/3, I have had 
no option but to give references to this unpublished but widely 
circulated account* I have not given detailed page references in 
this case*
3* Cf, p*2(k)ff for a generalisation of Grice’s definition of meaning to 
include imperatives and questions, 
k »  This definition (given in the William James lectures) combines the
revisions to the 1957 account outlined in Grice 1969, with one omission 
which is not essential here (cf. in particular Grice 1969 p.165), with 
the change made in the 1968 account that H believe p only from his 
belief that S believes p, rather than directly from S's intentions 
(cf* Grice 1968**.p.230) •
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5
(8) on the basis of (6) H should believe that p.
That is to say, there is a general convention which all speakers
(and necessarily therefore all hearers) know (and moreover know that
they all know)  ^that in communicating some proposition jo, a speaker
is communicating his belief that p with the assumption that the
hearer, knowing that the speaker only says x if he believes that p,
7will also believe p#
The obscure part of Grice's definition of so-called 'meaning^' 
is the relation between 'x', 'f *, 'c' and *p'. The weaker one is 
that the relation between 'x*, *f•, 'c' and 'p' is that conventionally
g
provided by the rules of the language* This weaker thesis is 
straightforwardly compatible with the framework suggested in this 
book. The interpretation which Grice intends is however a stronger 
thesis? *x», 'f', 'c* and *p', as part of a definition of utterance- 
meaning, are intended to cover what on any occasion an utterer may 
mean by using a sentence. And - as Grice points out *» what a sentence 
means ('timeless meaning') is not necessarily the same as what an 
utterer might mean (speaker's meaning) in saying that sentence on a 
particular occasion. In saying for example 'He's a fine friend' of
5 * I have not adopted Schifferts revision of Grice's definition here 
(cf. Schiffer 1972), since this revision depends on the assumption 
that the regress involved in this definition is not harmless. Cf. 
section 7*2.2 of this thesis for an argument that this is not the case*
6. Hence the constant inclusion of a defining criterion 'S intends that H 
should think X' with a following criterion ' S intends that H should
think that S intends H to think X.
7. This definition of utterance-meaning depends on the assumption that 
w© all speak the truth, a problem to which I shall return on p*202
8* Cf. Apostel's (1971) paraphrase of Grice's conditions which includes
the condition that the perception of the event E* (caused by the speaker.A) 
by the tea®1 B 'causes the epistemio state in B about A because B believes 
that E* belongs to a set of events ‘{E*} whose structural description is
such that only systems behaving in accordance with certain rules R
(speaking a certain language) will produce elements of | E*j * Moreover 
B believes that these rules are such that only believing p and wishing 
others to know f(p) will produce E' '(p.l^ ).
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somebody who has just left you in the lurch, you do not mean to 
indicate the proposition _£ which is correlated by the rules of the 
language to the sentence you have uttered*
In its strongest form, Grice’s explanation of meaning is not 
compatible with a truth-based definition of semantics, but is rather 
in direct conflict with it* What Grice has aimed to show (with 
Strawson as his articulate second - cf, Strawson 1964a, 1964b, 1971b - 
and also Schiffer (1972)) is that (a) occasional (utterance meaning) 
can be defined as above in terms which do not presuppose the concept 
of linguistic meaning, and (b) linguistic meaning can then be defined 
in terms of occasional meaning. It follows from this that - if Grice,
Strawson and Schiffer are correct - linguistic meaning can and should 
be defined in terms of the speaker’s belief and intention in saying
9
sentences. The clarification of *x’, ’f1, *c* and ’p’ in Grice’s 
definition are therefore essential to an assessment of his claim.
While 1 am by no means certain that my interpretation of Grice 
is the correct one, I should like to consider some problems which 
appear to arise under the strong version of Grice’s definition. We 
have already seen that to incorporate into a linguistic theory what 
a speaker might mean in saying a sentence on some particular occasion 
is to face the consequence that the meaning of sentences is unpredictable 
(cf. ch.4 p.l23fi). Now, if sentence meaning is claimed to be derived 
from a definition of utterer’s meaning, and this definition allows 
’f*, 'c' and ’p’ to range over features, modes of correlation and 
propositions respectively which are not conventionally indicated by the 
utterance ’x', then it is by no means clear how the consequence of non^
9. Cf, Strawson 1971b, where he argues that the notion of truth condition - 
if it is not taken as primitive - can be defined in terms of communication- 
intention*
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predictability can be avoided* One possible way to avoid it would be
to restrict * f  , 'c' and *p* precisely so that they ranges, over
features, modes of correlation and propositions respectively in a way
which is co-extensive with a previously defined linguistic system.
But if this linguistic system is to be used as a necessary part of the
definition of what it means for a speaker to utter *x*, then sentence-
meaning can no longer be defined in terms of speaker-intentions since
such a step would make the hypothesis circular and no longer explanatorily
valid. Now it seems to me that the restrictions Grice places on his
occasion-meaning are implicitly of the type I have suggested. In
discussing how a speaker (U) might intend by a hand-wave (H-W) to
indicate *1 know the route’ Grice suggests that one condition of
this being successfully communicated is that *it is U's policy
(practice, habit) to utter H-W if U is making an utterance by which
10U means that U knows the route*• If this type of condition is 
applied to linguistic utterances, it seems that it can mean no more 
and no less than for an utterance x, to communicate one's belief as 
speaker (U) in a proposition £ it must be ’U's policy (practice, habit)1 
to utter *x* if U is making an utterance by which U means that p. But 
unless U is idiolectal, his policy will be decided by the linguistic 
conventions of the language he is speaking. Thus the correlation 
between *x* and *p* reduces to a linguistic convention. If this 
interpretation is correct, then the claim that sentence meaning can 
be explained in terms of speaker-meaning cannot be maintained. I shall 
therefore assume that the stronger claim - maintained by Grice, Strawson
10. Gf. Grice 1968&,p.232f. In fact this definition is there dismissed in
favour of the formulation *U has in his repertoire a certain procedure* 
but the difficulties with this latter phrasing seem to be no different.
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and Schiffer - is not correct; and that the characterisation of what 
a sentence means for particular speakers on particular occasions is 
dependent on a prior definition of linguistic meaning independent 
of the use of sentences in communication.
Once the strong form of the thesis is relinquished, Grice’s 
definition of meaning can be seen as a pragmatic characterisation of 
the way in which speakers and hearers use a previously specified 
linguistic system* However Grice's account goes much further than 
this, A basic condition for a pragmatic theory is that it explain 
not only how speakers use sentences of the language in a way which 
corresponds to their meaning, but also how they succeed in using those 
sentences to communicate information which is not specified by the 
meaning of the sentences in question (for some examples, cf. R.Lakoff's 
examples of common topic discussed in ch.4), and Grice provides a 
framework in which this is explained. Grice’s hypothesis rests on one 
basic principle - that most of our conversations are not random 
exchanges of disconnected remarks but that conversation involves - in 
general - a co-operative effort between speaker and hearer. That is, 
participants are expected to contribute to a conversation under 
conventions which Grice labels generally as the Co-operative Principle. 
This Co-operative Principle (henceforth CP) subsumes a number of 
maxims which specify the conventions which participants of a conversation 
should obey. These are as followss 
Quantity
(1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the 
current purposes of the exchange).
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11(2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required# 
Quality
(1) Do not say what you believe to be false,
(2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Delation
Be relevant.
Manner^
This maxim has an over-all instruction 'Be perspicuous1. Grice sub­
divides this general instruction into four further maximss
(1) Avoid obscurity,
(2) Avoid ambiguity.
(3) Be brief.
(^ ) Be orderly.
Each of these constitutes a convention that is normally obeyed.
In a conversational exchange, one generally expects for example that 
one's fellow conversationalists are telling the truth and one assumes 
that they will extend the same courtesy to oneself. Conversations 
would not follow the pattern they do if every statement made was 
assumed to be false.
One striking characteristic of these 'rules' is that - unlike 
linguistic rules in{pneral - they are often broken. There are many 
liars and there, are many conversations which change their subject 
abruptly as someone makes a statement quite irrelevant to what was 
said before. These are simple breakages of the maxims. There is
11, Cf. the equivalent 'platitudes' of Strawson - 'The Principle
of the Presumption of Ignorance* and 'The Principle of the 
Presumption of Knowledge',
12, The maxim of manner is of less importance than the others, and I 
shall not consider it in detail. However cf. ch.8 section 8,7#
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however a much more interesting way in which the maxims can be broken. 
They may be deliberately and flagrantly broken, in such a way that the 
speaker knows and intends that the hearer shall recognise that a 
maxim has been broken. The hearer then has two alternatives: one is to 
say 'You're a liar' or 'That's irrelevant* or whatever, in which case, 
the CP has broken down. But he may - and characteristically does - 
choose a second alternative* He assumes that the speaker is in 
general observing the CP and reasons in the following ways 'If he 
is d>serving the CP and if he is flouting a maxim in such a way that
1 shall notice the breakage, then he is doing so in order to convey
some extra information which is in accordance with the CP, and 
moreover he must know that I can work out that information* *
Let us take for example Grice's case of a man who is asked to give 
a reference for a past student i\rho is applying for a lectureship in 
Philosophy, The man writes: 'Dear Sir, Jones' command of English is 
excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours
faithfully,'. The writer of the letter is clearly and openly
violating the maxim of Quantity (if not that of Delation too): he 
is offering absurdly little information. The receiver of the letter, 
faced with this blatant violation, will not however throw the letter 
away: he will assume that its sender is trying to convey information 
other than what his letter strictly says - namely that Jones is no 
good at Philosophy. Since if the recipient makes this assumption 
the man's letter no longer violates the Co-operative Principle, 
and since the man clearly intends that the recipient of the letter 
will deduce precisely this information, this is therefore what his
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letter implies; or as Grice labels it, this is the implicature of 
what he has written. These 'conversational implicaturesf of an 
utterance are by definition assumptions over and above the meaning of 
the sentence used which the speaker knows and intends that the hearer 
will make in the face of an apparently open violation of the CP in 
order to interpret the speaker's sentence in accordance with the CP. 
Grice's own characterisation (from the William James lectures) is as 
follows;
'A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p 
has implicated that q, may be said to have conversationally implicated 
that q, provided that; (l) he is to be presumed to be observing the 
conversational maxims, or at least the co-operative principle,
(2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that q, is 
required in order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or 
doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption, and
(3) that the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think 
that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the 
hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition 
mentioned in (2) is required*.
Other examples are provided by (1), which flouts the maxim of relation
and (2), which flouts the maxim of quality;
(1) The police came in and everyone swallowed their cigarettes
(2) You're the cream in my coffee
Someone hearing an utterance of (1) and not knowing about the 
illegality of marijuana might think that swallowing cigarettes is a 
stupid pastime and what did it have to do with the police anyway? 
However, anyone saying that in 1973 would assume that the hearer 
was able to work out that the second sentence is relevant if one 
assumes that the people would only swallow their cigarettes when the
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police came in if those cigarettes were illegal* Since people 
smoking illegal cigarettes are generally smoking marijuana (not 
opium, cocaine or other drugs) one interprets the sentence as 
'implicating* that everyone was smoking marijuana. (2) is an example 
of categorial falsity, and metaphor, and Grice's implicatures provide 
a natural explanation of how metaphor is interpreted (and why it 
commonly involves non-linguistic assumptions about the world). In 
order to interpret an utterance of (2) as not breaking the maxim of 
quality, the hearer must assume that the speaker is trying to convey 
something other than the literal meaning of the sentence. Since 
cream is ®omething which is not only a natural accompaniment to 
coffee, but a perfect accompaniment, the speaker is perhaps saying 
that the hearer possesses similar attributes. He is therefore paying 
the hearer a great compliment.
Five characteristics of conversational implicature stand out;
(1) They are dependent on the recognition of the Co-operative Principle (CP) 
and its maxims
(2) They will not be part of the meaning of the lexical items in the 
sentence since their interpretation depends on a prior understanding 
of the conventional meaning of the sentence.
(3) The implicature of an utterance will characteristically not be
the sole possible interpretation of that utterance. There may well 
be more than one possible assumption which will reinstate the CP 
in the face of an apparent breakage. Since these assumptions are 
not explicit, they are often indeterminate (for example, the 
interpretation of (2) above),
(A) The v/orking out of an implicature will depend on assumptions about 
the world which the speaker and the hearer share (for example the 
Interpretation of (1) above)• They will therefore not in general 
be predictable.
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(5) They are cancellable. That is, an interpretation which is not 
part of the conventional meaning of the utterance can be explicitly 
denied without contradiction. Thus for example our referee might 
have written a letter such as 'Dear Sir, Jones.! command of English is 
excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Moreover 
his ability at and enthusiasm for Philosophy are quite adequate for 
the job. Yours faithfully'. Similarly I might say 'The police came 
in and everyone swallowed their cigarettes though they were doing 
nothing illegal* , or 'You're the cream in my coffee but since I 
don't like cream, that's a dubious complement'.
So far I have assumed that there is a dichotomy between what is 
part of the conventional meaning of an utterance and what is super­
imposed on that meaning on specific occasions. As Grice points out 
in his lectures it is not that simple. The total signification of an 
utterance can be divided in two different ways. Firstly, there is the 
distinction between what is part of the conventional meaning and what 
is not$ secondly there is the distinction between what is said or 
asserted and what is implicated. This cross-classification leads 
to three possibilities: what is said, what is conventionally 
implicated and what is nonconventionally and hence conversationally 
implicated. Grice in fact allows for a fourth possibility, generalised 
conversational implicature, which is dependent for its prediction on 
the CP and which fulfils the conditions stated above for conversational 
implicature, but which unlike the conversational implicatures 
considered already is not necessarily dependent on features of the 
context for its interpretation - it may be generally interpreted as 
part of the total signification of such an utterance. We thus have
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four distinctions; what is said, what is conventionally implicated,
what is generally but conversationally implicated, and what is
13conversationally (occasion-specific) implicated*
What is the justification for this classification - in particular 
for the distinction between conventional implicature and generalised 
conversational implicature? Grice argues that there is a range of 
examples which appear to contain implications that the speaker is 
committed to, without those implications being strictly what is part 
of the meaning. That is, they are determinable, non-contradictable 
and not dependent on the CP for their interpretation® His example is 
John is an Englishmans he is therefore brave. In saying this he 
suggests a speaker is certainly committed to there being a causal 
connection between the two statements but if it turned out that 
both statements were true but there was no connection, the speaker1s 
statement as a whole would still be true. Moreover the speaker 
cannot say (if he is to retain his credibility) 'John is an English- 
man| he is therefore brave - though 1 don't believe there's any
lit
connection between the two'. Conventional implicatures are thus 
those elements of meaning which are not truth-functional, but which 
are not contradictable. They are in effect an ad-hoc way of 
labelling within a pragmatic framework counter-examples to the 
semantic framework I have argued for. General conversational
13, These distinctions are introduced briefly in Grice 1961 (Section
XXI) but they are not referred to there by the term implicature, 
l*t, Cf, ch.9 for a discussion of the validity of this example (p,302ff) •
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implicatures on the other hand are common accompaniments to the 
meaning of a sentence but they can be contradicted. To make a 
statement of the form P or Q for example generally implicates that the 
speaker does not know which of P or 0 is true. Thus the statement
1309 nw
It's either in your bedroom or the attic said in response say to the 
question Where's my book? v/ill generally imply that the speaker 
does not know exactly where the book is. But this implication is 
not a necessary part of the meaning! It's either in your bedroom or 
the attic, and I'm not saying any more than that does not have this 
implication, yet is clearly not a contradiction. Moreover, this 
implicature has a natural explanation on the basis of the CP. Since 
the maxim of quantity militates that a speaker shall give as much 
information as is required, and the maxim of quality that he should 
have adequate evidence for what he claims, a speaker is or should be 
committed to making the strongest statement he can, A hearer of an 
utterance of the form P or Qf will know (and know that the speaker 
knows) (a) P or Q, is true just in case either of P or £ is true, and 
that the speaker is making the strongest statement he can. If 
then he is complying with the maxim of quantity, the speaker must be 
uttering fP or Q' on the basis that he only has evidence for P or Q 
and not sufficient evidence to claim just P or just £ (to claim P or Q 
if one knows that P is to break the quantity maxim). Hence the 
speaker is implicating that he does not know which of P or £ is 
true. Since the calculation of such implicatures depends on a prior 
specification of the meaning of the sentence, it follows that 
conversational implicatures - unlike conventional implicatures - are 
demonstrably not part of the representation of the meaning of sentences.
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7*2 On Criticisms of Grice
Before we can go further and consider the ways in which Grice's 
theory provides an account of the phenomena generally labelled 
presuppositions« there are two important factors to consider.
First this formulation of the basis of communication must be 
extended to all forms of utterance, i.e. to imperatives and questions* 
otherwise the framework will not be sufficiently general. Secondly, 
and more importantly, it is essential that we take into account the 
various criticisms of Grice's theory. The most important of these 
are those which attack the theory in principle, since it is only if 
these can be rebutted that the use of Gricean principles to be 
given here will retain any explanatory value. I shall consider two 
such criticisms*
II Grice's formulation of meaning involves an infinite regress of 
conditions. This being so, it is not stateable in a finite form.
IIs The conversational maxims are so vague and general that they allow 
the prediction of any implication whatever - specifically those which 
do not occur as well as those that do. The theory is therefore 
unfalsifiable, vacuous, and of no explanatory value.
7.2.1 Speaker's Meaning and Non-Indicative Utterances
Grice himself generalises the definition of meaning to include 
imperatives by defining meaning on an utterance 'x' signifying **yp' 
where is a dummy for a specific mood operator corresponding to the 
propositional attitude of y-ing (cf. Grice 1969 p.171). Thus the 
definition I gave on p.l97f should be reformulated ass 
For some specific occasion, a speaker S makes an utterance !x' to a 
hearer H indicating "Hup* if he intends that;
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(1) H should think x has f (where f is a feature)
(2) H should think that he S intends H to think x has f
(3) H should think f is correlated in way c with the state of y-ing 
that p (where p is the propositional content)
(4) H should think that S intends that he (H) thinks f is correlated 
in way c with the state of y-ing that p
(3) H should think he S intends H (via (1) and (3)) to think that
S y-s that p
(6) on the basis of (5), H should think that in fact S does y that p
(7) H should think that S intends (6)
(8) on the basis of (6) H should y  that p.
If we define assertion and imperative as follows -
'bp* is conventionally correlated with a belief that p
* Ip * is conventionally correlated with an intention (with respect
to some audience) that that audience make p true -
Grice's definition of pragmatic meaning then provides an account of 
the basis on which a speaker will successfully convey his belief or 
intention that p.
The definition has however to be modified somewhat for questions 
(both wh and yes-no ), since unlike imperative© or indicatives, the
jfmt . turn* " *  •
speaker is not indicating a positive attitude or intention with respect
to p, Yet it is clear that a similar explanation must apply to
questions. Suppose we characterise yes-no questions (*?p') as 
conventionally correlated with an intention (with respect to some 
audience) that that audience tell the speaker the truth value of 
(equivalently, tell him either 'p' or '-p')# Then just as in the 
imperative case, where the speaker succeeds in conveying his intentions
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by virtue of the hearer's recognition of those intentions, so in 
the case of '?p', S intends
(A) that H should think '?pr has a feature f which is correlated
in way c with intending with respect to some audience that that 
audience say either 'p1 or *-pr (the relation between f, c, and 
p, being given by the conventions of the language) (corresponding
to conditions (l)-(3) of the definition)
(B) that H should think that S intends H to think via their common 
knowledge of the correlation c that S intends that H say 'p* or '-p1 
(condition (5) of the definition)
(C) on the basis of this, that H should think that S does in fact 
intend that H say 'p* or '-p* (condition (6))
(D) on the basis of knowing that H intends (C), H should form the
intention to say either 'p' or *-p'*
In other words the communication of meaning in yes-no questions can
be described (as is intuitively correct) as no different in kind from
the communication of any other utterance. This type of analysis
extends naturally to wh-questions with slight modifications. In
saying '?p' where jd is made up of (X wh^p Y), where X and Y are
variables, S intends that H should think that ?(X wh~p Y) is
correlated in way c with intending with respect to some audience that
that audience say 'pC', where c L is a member of the set indicated by|2 .
The process of deduction then goes through in exactly the same way,
giving the conclusion that on the basis of S saying *?(X wh j^S Y)1
15H forms the intention to say 3}hat is to say, each type of
15* The characterisation of wh-questions has only been given informally 
here, since it is not a central concern of this thesis. It is 
arguable that a pragmatic characterisation of questions should give 
an account which applies equally to yes-no and wh questions. 1 shall 
leave this problem for another time.
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utterance is based on an intention on the part of the speaker which
is itself based on an anticipation of the hearer's strategy on
hearing that utterance (cf, the concept of 'co-ordination problem* 
outlined by Lewis, to be discussed on p. 2l6ff).
To what extent do the maxims apply equally to all types of 
utterance? Clearly just as statements have pragmatically to be 
uttered sincerely, so do imperatives and questions have to be uttered 
with a sincere intent to receive a response and the maxim of quality
has to be generalised to apply equally to the three types of
utterance. In addition, the maxim must apply to the implicatures of 
an utterance as well as what is stated. It is just as misleading to 
say 'I'm tired' if you ' intend your hearer to construe from
your utterance that you have a headache even though you do not have 
one as it is to say explicitly 'I've got a headache* in the same 
circumstances. Thus the maxim must require that one not only believe 
or sincerely request one's utterance but one must believe (and have 
adequate evidence for) any implicatures consequent upon that 
utterance. The maxims of quantity and relation apply equally to all 
types of utterance even as they stand. In the case of the quantity 
maxim for example, as we shall see in more detail in chapter 8 
section 8.2, it is just as important to give sufficient information 
in asking a question or giving" a command as it is in making a statement. 
Furthermore the maxim of quantity guarantees that questions be 
answered, and answered appropriately; at least one major interpretation 
of the first maxim is not that the speaker should merely give as much 
information as the situation requires, but more specifically that the
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speaker should give as much information as the hearer requires, should
16the hearer make a request for information. It is this more narrow 
interpretation of the quantity maxim which applies in the case I have 
already discussed where an utterance of P v Q v/ill normally implicate 
that the speaker does not know which of P or ^ holds. For example, 
suppose H asks 'Where is my book?' and S replies 'It's either in 
your bedroom or the attic' S knoi/s that he is bound by the pragmatic 
convention on wh-questions and by the corresponding quantity maxim 
to provide a specification of the place where the book is. However
he is also constrained to say only that for which he has adequate
evidence. If therefore he gives a disjunction of two possible places^  
he knows and knows that H will recognise that he is not fulfilling the 
exact requirement on the question posed by H. On the assumption that
he is in fact complying with the CP, he knows that H will deduce that
he does not have adequate evidence to choose between the two 
possibilities he has put forward. He knows therefore that his 
utterance will be construed as indicating that he has evidence only 
for the disjunction Either the book is in your bedroom or the attic  ^
and not for either disjunct.
In this section I have considered informally how Grice's account 
of meaning can be generalised to all forms of utterance, whether 
statement, imperative, yes-no question or wh-question. This has given 
us three (or possibly four) mood indicators ' t-', 'I' and '?' (plus 
an operator for wh-questions, though cf. p.21l)#
16. For a discussion of an apparent counter-example to this interpretation 
of the maxim, cf. p. 233 •
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V/.ith this generalisation, I take it that the limitation on Grice's 
account of pragmatics that it apply only to statements cannot be raised 
as a criticism of principle.
It might on the other hand be argued that this list of pragmatic 
mood operators is not long enough since it should contain at least a 
pragmatic operator of denial. If this were so, negative sentences 
which were not mere negative descriptions would be distinguished 
semantically from those that were, by prefixing to denials a 
pragmatic mood-operator characterising denial of a positive statement 
(whereas the negative descriptions would be preceded by the assertion 
operator). It might be argued further that if this solution were 
adopted, many of the arguments given in this thesis against the 
logical relation of presupposition fall to the ground since the marked 
cases of negation which have been brought up can only sensibly be 
uttered as denials of a foregoing positive statement, I have already 
argued (p.102) that there is no semantic justification for distinguishing 
two such types of negation. There are in any case severe problems 
involved in incorporating a pragmatic operator of denial within this 
framework* First notice that since pragmatic mood-operators are 
merely entered into the semantic formalism here as primitives, a denial 
that p (as opposed to the negative assertion ™p') will oe semantically 
identical to the assertion that ja except for the difference in mood- 
operator. The second problem created by the addition of a mood- 
operator characterising denial is that the pragmatic framework would 
have one mood-operator which was different in kind from all the other 
operators. We have already seen (p, 7^ ) that the mood-operators
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M- 1» '? * and 1 1 * are not illocutionary force indicators since each 
can be used with a wide range of illocutionary forces. Not so denial. 
If in the face of some positive statement a speaker denies jg, 
his illocutionary act constitutes only a denial* It is not simult­
aneously a threat, promise, request, warning et. Furthermore, and
17more seriously, positive statements can also be used as denials. 
Consider the following two conversations;
(3) As John has passed his exams 
B; He hasn't*
A; John hasn't passed his exams.
B; He has.
It is arguable that the illocutionary force of B's statement is the 
same in both conversations; he is denying (or contradicting) A's 
statement* But we would surely not wish to conclude that the semantic 
representation of the sentence used by B in conversation (A) 
corresponds even approximately to;
'Denial* (-John has passed his exams)
This v/ould have the unfortunate consequence that every positive 
statement is at least two ways ambiguous. These various problems 
suggest that the concept of denial does not have the status of a 
pragmatic mood-operator but is simply one of the uses (along with 
warnings, threats, promises, etc) to which sentences can be put.
I have therefore not increased the list of pragmatic mood-operators 
beyond three.
17. For further arguments against conflating negation and denial, 
cf. Gale 1970*
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7.2*2 The Infinite Regress Problem
Much more important than the problem that the theory has only
been articulated to apply to statements are the accusations against
it of infinite regress and vacuity. The first criticism has been
pointed out by Grice himself as well as others (Grice 1969 p,156ff,
l8Schiffer 1972, MacKay 1972), though he suggests that the regress,
if it exists, is not a serious one. I think he is correct in
thinking the regress not serious, but not for the reasons he appears
to hold. I take it however that the criticism of the harmfulness
of infinite regress would be seriously eroded if it could be shown
that this form of infinite regress was part of the very nature of
convention, and hence of any analysis of the conventions for use of
a linguistic system. This has been done by Lewis (1969), whose
analysis of convention depends on such regress.
Briefly, this analysis depends on the notion of 'co-ordination 
19problems', and their solution. These are exemplified in the 
following way (to take Lewis' initial example). Suppose you and I 
both want to meet. It doesn't matter where - we each merely want to 
choose to go v/here the other is most likely to go. Co-ordination is 
achieved if we succeed in meeting. In order to do this, each of us 
has to work out a strategy, and each of us knows that if one succeeds 
in his strategy then the other will also have done so, since we 
are both planning to the same end (namely to succeed in meeting).
This being so, I shall try to work out where to go on the basis of 
what you will do; and the way to work out v/here to go is therefore
18, MacKay*s claim of infinite regress alternating with a claim of ad- 
hocness of the conditions is based on a mistaken notion of justification 
and a misunderstanding of the central nature of the Gricean definition 
of meaning* 1 shall therefore not consider it in detail. In any case, 
the first of two conditions which he objects so strongfyto, does not 
appear in the 1967/68 lecture version 1 have adopted here*
19. The term is Lewis' own, but the problems are also developed by Schelling 
I960*
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to replicate your reasoning. Like me, you will work out v/here to go
on the basis of where you think 1 shall go. Since v/here I go is
determined by where I think you will go, it follows that you will be
trying to anticipate where you think I think you v/ill go. But since
where you go depends on where you think I shall go, it follows
that you will be trying to anticipate where you think I think you
think I shall go. etc, etc. This attempt to replicate the expectations
of the other member in a co-ordination problem automatically sets up
20an infinite chain of expectations. Given only this overly brief
exemplification of a co-ordination problem, one might wonder why
communication (or more specifically a Gricean theory of meaning^)
should have anything to do with co-ordination problems. The answer,
as Lewis suggests, is that all conventions involve the solution of
21co-ordination problems. More formally,
fa regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when 
they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and 
only if in any instance of S among members of P
1) everyone conforms to R
2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R
3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others 
do, since S is a coordination problem and uniform conformity 
to R is a coordination equilibrium in S (** the best strategy 
for successful coordination RMK) * (p.*f2)
Thus a convention is in effect a standard solution to a co-ordination
problem. Having sophisticated this definition of convention and given
a definition of a conventional signalling system on the basis of this
20. It is important to note that this is a chain of implications, not 
of steps in anyone's actual reasoning. Gf. p.218.
21. This is disputed by Schiffer (1972 p.151).
-218-
definition, Lewis then goes on to give a proof that Grice's definition
of meaning is a consequence of his own definition of conventional
signalling - i.e. is a solution to a co-ordination problem (the problem
in the case of statements being roughly the transmission of a certain
belief by uttering a certain signal - co-ordination is only successful
22if the hearer does in fact gain the belief in question). He does
this by showing that Grice's definition of what it is for a speaker to
meannn sorae^ 1:iinS by a symbol * can be derived by examining the
reasoning that justifies his saying '*'i this reasoning replicates
exactly the characteristic structure of an agent's justification
within a conventional signalling system (cf, Lewis p.1^6 ff)• Since
conventions of meaning are shown to constitute a conventionalnn
signalling system, it follows that any analysis of the basis of these 
conventions will by definition involve infinite regress in the way 
that all solutions to co-ordination problems do. Furthermore, this 
regress is not, as the original Gricean regress seemed to be, a 
serious one, since there is no claim that anyone's actual reasoning 
to a co-ordination equilibrium involves an infinite number of steps.
The infinite regress concerns rather a chain of implications which 
follow from any finite (and normally very limited) number of steps.
As Lewis points out, there is therefore nothing improper about its 
infinite length (p,53)# On the basis of Lewis' arguments (which 1 
have presented here regrettably in a highly impoverished form for 
reasons of exegesis), I shall therefore assume that any attempt to
22. The position is not in fact this simple. Cf. Lewis ibid p.l79f*
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explain what a speaker does in using his conventional (linguistic)
system is bound to set up a regress which is in principle infinite,
though in practice it never exceeds more than three or four steps.
The characteristic of infinite regress in Grice's theory of meaning
does not therefore raise objections in principle to the theory, but
23is part of the very essence of convention itself.
7.2.3 The Vacuity of The Maxims
That the maxims of the Co-operative Principle are too vague to 
be anything but vacuous has been argued by Kroch (1972), who provides 
two examples which purport to demonstrate that the maxims can in the 
on© case and must in the other generate contradictory implicatures.
On these grounds, he concludes that the theory is unfalsifiable.
His first and main consideration is with time adverbs. He points 
out that there are adverbials v/hich are sometimes interpreted as 
synonymous, sometimes not.
(5a) Before the arrival of the army, the government controlled the town 
(5b) Until the arrival of the army, the government controlled the town
(6a) During one period before the arrival of the army, the government
controlled the tov/n 
(6b) *During one period until the arrival of the army, the government
controlled the town
(7a) John died before dawn 
(7b) *John died until dawn
That until and before clauses cannot have the same semantic representation 
is demonstrated by the contradiction inherent in (6b) and (7b), though
23* The arguments of Lewis do however suggest the correctness of the 
position adopted here, that Grice's theory of meaning can only be 
a basis for a pragmatic theory and not for a linguistic theory of 
semantics - it is hardly the burden of the semantics of any conventional 
system to explain not only the interpretations given to the elements of 
the system, but also the nature of convention per se.
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they clearly are synonymous in (5)• On the basis of these examples, 
Kroch analyses until and before as?
until z  at all times prior to NP
before - at some time(s) prior to NP
(where NP is the object of the adverb phrase)
To these definitions, he adds a rule of interpretation (a putative 
general conversational implicature) that adverbs containing an 
existential quantifier will be interpreted universally when the 
action modified is durative, given th#t the context does not prohibit 
it. Hence the synonymy of (5a) and (5b). He points out however that
if there is an explicit existential quantifier in the time adverbial,
then there is no such implication,
(8) At some time before the arrival of the army, the government
controlled the town
Unlike (5a), (8) is not normally interpreted with some read as all.
On the contrary, there is an opposite implication that the government
did not control the town for the entire period before the arrival
of the army. Yet, Kroch argues, the only difference in the meaning
of (8) and (5a) is that there is an explicit quantifier in (8).
Since they have the same basic meaning, these sentences should have
the same conversational implicatures. These examples therefore
appear to constitute a case where either the theory must allow for
two contradictory implicatures, or we have to admit an implication which
is not predictable by implicature.
Notice however that Kroch's argument only goes through on the
assumption that (8) and (5a) have the same semantic representation.
If they do not, then the theory has a natural basis for predicting
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different implicatures. Kroch*s analysis of before I shall at the
moment accept as containing an existential quantifier, since parallel
to the interpretation of *3 1, it allows for the entire range from
one moment in the time specified (e.g. (,7a)) to every moment in the
time specified (e.g. (5a)). I suggested earlier however (following
Bierwisch - cf.pei74f) that the interpretation of noun phrases in
general should not be based on the existential and universal
quantifiers of predicate calculus, and it seems not unreasonable to
suggest along the lines put forward by Bierwisch 1971 that the some
of natural language should be described in terms of a subset of some
whole (where the notion of set is taken as primitive) rather than in
terms of a collection of one or more individuals (in the formalisation
24of predicate calculus). Thus, while (5a), containing before, 
correctly involves a paraphrase 'at least one time prior to NP*,
(8), containing some, does not. The distinction is I suggest analogous 
to the following pair?
(9a) They took some of the girls
(9b) They took at least some of the girls
Notice that (9b), with at least, allows the implicature that they
took more than some girls, namely all, whereas (9a) does not. More
generally, any sentence containing at least will carry an implicature
which we must somehow capture as 'one or more notches up the scale in 
25question*. Thus for example Her .jewels cost at least two thousand 
pounds implicates that they probably cost more. By contrast, sentences
24. For a more formal and much more detailed discussion of some other 
aspects of plural noun phrases, cf. Bierwisch 1971 pp.414 ff*
25. This implicature is straightforwardly deduceable on the basis of the 
maxims of quantity and quality.
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without at least, such as (9a) and (8), which are to be interpreted 
as involving a subset of the members of the whole set in question,
26implicate that that subset is not co-extensive with the whole set*
While I grant that these observations are informal, and I have no 
suggestions to make here as to their formalisation, they seem to 
provide a natural basis for the distinction between (5a) and (8), I 
take it then that there is some evidence to suggest that (5a) and
(8) should have semantic representations which differ at least in 
that (5u) will have a representation which relates it to other 
sentences containing at least explicitly*
Kroch*s other attack on the maxims is his claim that they have 
the power to predict on the same utterance both the implicature which 
does not exist and the one which does. Thus for John ate the apple, 
he gives two parallel arguments?
(A) 'Xf the speaker had meant that the whole apple was eaten, then he
would have said, "John ate all of the apple" in order not to 
violate the maxim of quantity *,* by giving too little information. 
Since he left out the word "all", he must have been obeying the 
maxim of quality ... and avoided saying more than he knew. There­
fore, all that the speaker was saying is that at least part of the 
apple was eaten**
(B) 'The speaker would have said "John ate at least some of the apple"
if that were all he knew (by the maxim.of quality - RMK)• Since 
he left out the qualifying phrase, he must have meant to convey 
that the whole apple was eaten. Otherwise he would have been 
giving too little information* *
26* Cf. p,22X fn.25*
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However only (B) exists as an implication of John ate the apple*
From this he concludes that the theory, in allowing both for the
Case which does and for the case which does not exist, is in
principle unfalsifiable and therefore vacuous.
Unfortunately his example is not a good one. If the
interpretation of John ate the apple corresponds roughly to
'There is some specific apple which John chewed and swallowed', it
is not obvious that John abe his apple but only some of it is not a 
27contradiction. Compare John has eaten his food but not all of it 
which seems a clear case of contradiction. This being so, the 
semantic interpretation of the sentence will predict that the inter­
pretation that Kroch aims to predict by (A) is not a possible 
interpretation of this sentence.
Nonetheless I grant that answers of the kind just given to attacks 
in principle are merely fending off the day when a better example will 
be thrown up (cf. p*248f for a discussion of further examples which 
appear to suggest the same conclusion). To disagree over data does 
not alter the force of the criticism. The do jection remains an 
important ones if Grice's Co-operative Principle is to provide a 
substantive explanation of the basis on which communication is 
conducted, we must restrict it in such a way that it constrain the 
nature of communication processes as narrowly as possible. Otherwise
2?* I assume that it is not a linguistic matter that in eating objects 
there is a convention that only certain edible parts are relevant* 
Thus the fact that James has eaten his cake though there are a lot 
of crumbs on the floor and John has eaten hie apple but he's left 
the core are not contradictions does not alter the point being 
made here.
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the apparent naturalness with which the framework appears to explain 
the varying phenomena is merely a consequence of the vacuity of the 
framework. Since, as I shall argue, the Gricean maxims seem to allow 
a natural explanation both of occasion-specific implications on 
utterances (such as Robin Lakoff's speaker-presuppositions) and also 
of more general implications (such as arise in the use of definite 
noun phrases and factiv© verbs), one of my chief concerns in the 
following chapter v/ill be to consider to what extent the maxims can 
be given a greater degree of content.
My main concern in this chapter has been the exposition of 
the two facets of Grice1s theory - his concepts of meaning^ and the 
Co-operative Principle, We have not yet considered how Grice*s 
theory can be used to explain the apparent anomalies which have 
arisen during the course of this thesis. Yet clearly its validity 
as part of an over-all linguistic theory depends on whether it can 
provide a natural explanation of these apparent anomalies. Since 
this explanation, as we shall see, rests on the concept of the 
Co-operative Principle, its maxims, and the consequent implicatures,
I shall restrict my attention in the remainder of this thesis to the 
maxims and shall not consider the details of meaning^ further.
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CHAPTER 3 s The Application of Grice's Theory
We saw in chapter 7 that Grice's theory of meaning and 
communication provided a potential basis for a theory of pragmatics.
In section 7*2 of that chapter, I defended Grice's theory against 
specific criticisms of infinite regress and vacuity. Our troubles 
would not be over however, even if it were certain that Grice's 
hypothesis could be presented in a testable way. The general problem 
that remains is to explain how Grice's framework can capture the 
insights which presupposition has been used by linguists in the past 
to capture• This can be broken down into six parts;
(i) We have to be able to explain the concept of a natural interpretation 
as opposed to an unnatural one - viz, why some interpretations of 
negative sentences are so much more likely than others. Connected 
with this problem is a second problem, which has so far not been 
discussed at all* In general, linguists arguing for presupposition 
have claimed that in negation and questions the presuppositions of 
a sentence will be preserved. Since the basis for presupposition 
was in terms of the truth-value assignment to statements, my 
discussion of linguists* use of the term was restricted to negative 
sentences. Yet questions share with negation the property that 
certain entailments of the corresponding positive statement are 
normally assumed to be true when that statement is questioned. Thus 
Does John regret going? implies in isolation that he went, and Is The 
King of Rumania coming to the coronation? implies that there is a 
King of Rumania, However, as in negation, this implication can b©
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cancelled without creating a contradictions in (l)-(7) there is no 
assumption either of the truth of the Active complement or of the 
existence of the referent corresponding to the particular definite 
noun phrase.
(1) Does John regret going or didn't he go in the end?
(2) Did PETE regret doing an MA ~ 1 didn't think he was accepted for
the course.
(3) Was the teacher annoyed that Sue was late or did she manage to
get there on time?
( k ) Was the teacher annoyed that SUE was late - I thought she got
there on time,
(5) Is the King of Rumania coming to the coronation, or doesn't
Rumania have a king?
(6) Did the Duke of PLAZITORO come to the opening ceremony - 1 didn't
think there was such a place as Plazitoro, 
let alone that it had a Duke,
(7) Is the King of Rumania coming to the exhibition - I thought
Rumania was a republic.
So it seems that in both negation and question, we have to be able to 
explain how an implication which normally appears to be part of the 
meaning of the sentence can be cancelled out without contradiction, a 
possibility which is by definition aot open to central core meaning of 
sentences. Since this problem arises only within an over-all theory 
which does not incorporate a logical concept of presupposition, I 
consider this one of the chief remaining tasks of the thesis,
(ii) We have a heterogeneous collection of lexical problems to explain 
viz. the non-truth-conditional idiosyncrasies of the (cf. p, l6lf), 
but (cf. p,117f), and (cf. p.ll6), and even (cf. p.128),
(iii) We have to be able to characterise presupposition in the sense
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of Chomsky (1971) and others - i.e. what is assumed in an utterance 
of a sentence, as opposed to what is asserted.
(iv) We should be able to predict why stress assignment and the 
interpretation of sentences are interdependent.
(v) There must be some explanation of Robin Lakoff's suggested constraint 
of common topic on co-ordination.
(vi) Finally there is a somewhat different problem which, like the 
problem of questions, 1 have not considered in detail so far - the 
status of Austin's concept of illocutionary force. Since I have 
argued (p.70 ff) that, semantically, performative statements are no 
different in kind from other statements, the burden of explanation of 
such concepts as illocutionary force must fall on a pragmatic theory,
8.1 The Concept of Relevance
Since it is evident that the validity of a Gricean pragmatics 
depends initially on giving the theory sufficient content to render 
it non-vacuous, the first hurdle to overcome is to see to what extent 
Kroch's criticism (cf. p. 2 2 2  ff)^ can be answered more generally.
Since it is the maxims of relation and quantity which are largely 
responsible for the Co-operative Principle's enormous power of 
application, it is these for which I shall attempt to give a more 
precise definition. I shall turn initially to Robin Lakoff's concept 
of common topic, which concerns the problem of relevance.
To recapitulate, she argued that no sentences could be conjoined 
unless they shared a common topic, and she pointed out that the harder 
the topic was to construe, the more various became the interpretations
1. Echoed by many colleagues informally,
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informants found. However I argued (clS.m k  p.119) that every conceivable 
sentence containing two conjunct® could be construed as having some 
common ground and that the constraint was therefore vacuous. More­
over it appeared that any sentence containing two conjuncts could be 
given more than one interpretation. Each of these characteristics 
is predicted if the interpretation of the specific common topic is 
analysed as a consequence of the conversational implicatures of an 
utterance. Thus for example our speaker (S) says *John owns a yacht 
and Bill has a house in Knightsbridge' and he knows that the hearer (H) 
will reason in the following ways fS has said both that John owns a 
yacht and that Bill has a house in Knightsbridge, and since he is 
biding by the Co-operative Principle (CP) he must be assuming that the 
second sentence is relevant to the first, despite the fact that it 
appears not to be. But S knows and knows that I know that yachts are 
very expensive and so is property in Knightsbridge, particularly 
houses, John and Bill must thereforenrich, and this - together with 
the two assumptions necessary to reach this conclusion - is what S 
is implicating.1 But this interpretation (depends on the assumption of 
shared knowledge made by S and H. If our speaker and hearer operate 
with a different set of assumptions, then the interpretation of the 
sentence will, as we saw in chapter *f, be different. Along similar 
lines, every conjoint sentence can both be construed as having some 
common point of relevance and as having more than one interpretation. 
And this is the result that our analysis should predicts implicatures 
by definition are open-ended, different assumptions providing different
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interpretations (cf. the third characteristic listed on p.215)» and 
hence the interpretation of common topic is unpredictable in isolation 
(cf. condition (4) on p.215), Prediction of the shared knowledge of 
speaker and hearer is not possible without knowing both participants. 
Furthermore these results follow only if such implicatures are 
analysed as quite separate from the lexically specified meaning of 
the sentence.
Now it is clear I think that Kobin Lakoff's concept of common
topic can be extended to discourse structure in general. From her
account I argued that given a sentence containing and S2, the
hearer must be able to deduce some form of (partial) identity if the
two conjuncts are to be seen as possessing a common relevance (cf,
Lakoff 1971 p.ll8f) - either by virtue of the semantic interpretation
of the two conjuncts, or if not, via some extra assumptions or
implicatures. Thus in our example above, the hearer deduced that the
speaker was implicating that yachts are very expensive, that Knightsbridge
is an expensive area, and hence that both John and Bill are rich.
A more general form of the constraint would be that in order for any
S± to be relevant in a given conversation, it must carry at least one
implicature or entailment that is implicated by To see that
2
this xs at least in part correct, consider a conversation between A and Bj:
A s John has a yacht
B s Bill has a house in Knightsbridge
A % Which do you think is the richer?
Parallel to the conjoint sentence, A implicates that John is rich.
On the basis of this implicature, B makes a statement which implicates
2. Cf. the parallel definition of relevance given by Apostel (1971 p.l8):
*p is relevant if the belief in p is held to be logically connected 
with some statement that occurred not too long before or that will 
not occur too much later1.
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that Bill is rich. This common topic Is then made explicit in A's 
question. Alternatively, to give a case where the second utterance 
entails the implicature of the first, consider the following 
discourses A says ‘John’s late* implicating that he’s rude, and B 
replies 'He takes great pleasure in being rude'. Thus as we would 
expect, the apparent constraint on co-ordination seems to be a 
property of discourse structure in general, and the maxim of 
relation can be reformulated with this in mind ass
'Only say any sentence made up of **y p', if p either 
entails or implicates some proposition q which is also 
implicated by
This characterisation of relevance in conversation is of course
only a first approximation, and is in any case absurdly limited.
In any detailed account of conversational relatedness, it is clear
that the interdependence between implicature and entailment must be
specified. Notice first for example that it is not a sufficient
condition of relevance that a sentence should share at least one
entailment with the preceding sentence in the discourse, since
both the sentences John went to London yesterday and John’s mother
has got cataract entail the sentence There is someone called John
yet the latter could only be seen as relevant to the former on the
basis of some further assumption, for example that John's mother lives
in London, Thus we do not want to say that any sentence which entails
3will also implicate S^ . However one might reasonably hypothesise 
that a relation of implicature does hold between two sentences and 
when is used to implicate a sentence which entails .
3* Of* ch.*f p.12^ , where examples such as these were seen to provide 
problems for Lakoff*s mechanism predicting sentence-presupposition 
pairs.
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This would predict that John doesn't regret running until he was sick
(S^) normally implicates that John went until he was sick (S^) since
normally implicates that John ran until he was sick (S^ ) (cf, section 
8,5 of this chapter), which in its turn entails that John went until
he was sick (S~),
But this is only the tip of the iceberg. There are undoubtedly 
many such relations which must be formalised in any pragmatic account 
which makes reference to both entailment and implibature. Moreover, 
this is particularly important in view of the tentatively proposed 
definition of relevance since the definition - if it is even 
approximately correct - now allows that any sentence will be 
relevant in a discourse if an entailment of any one of the 
propositions it may be used to implicate is also implicated by the 
preceding utterance of the discourse,
1 shall not go further into this area here, since my main purpose 
has been merely to consider a possible way of constraining the notion 
of relevance so that it become open to empirical investigation. We 
shall see in any case in section 8,6,1, that it is not obvious that the 
notion of relevance can be so constrained, if our pragmatic constructs 
are to account for the whole range of data (particularly problems of stress),
8:2 The Maxim of Quantity: Some Preliminaries
Having taken a few tentative steps towards making the maxim of 
relation more specific via a consideration of Robin Lakoffs data, 1 
shall now consider the maxim of quantity, for discussion of this maxim is 
a necessary preliminary for the pragmatic account I shall give of definite 
noun phrases, factive-verb complements, and the assertion-presupposition 
contrast. This maxim has in Grice1s formulation two subparts:
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(i) Give as much information as is required 
(jft) Do not give more information than is required 
Grice himself suggested (in his 1967/68 lectures) that the second 
part of the maxim is either unnecessary (since it is not a violation 
of the CP to say too much, merely a waste of time) or it is covered 
by the maxim of relation since if you give more information than is 
required, this additional information will of necessity be irrelevant. 
For these reasons I shall restrict my attention to the first part of the 
maxim.
There are several problems with the maxim ’Give as much information 
as is required*. Like the maxim of relation, its formulation allows 
for an extremely wide interpretation. First the agentless passive 
form of *as is required' allows for an interpretation so open that it 
is almost entirely without content, since it allows the requirement 
to be forced by either the semantic or pragmatic content of the 
previous discourse, or by the hearer, or by more general elements of 
the situation. Secondly, the constraint of ’being informative* 
seems to need two quite different statements (as we shall see), and as 
it stands, the maxim is simply neutral between these, allowing in 
fact the addition of any further interpretation xvhich may be required 
in the face of counter-examples.
While I am by no means certain that the following analysis is
li
anything more than an interim measure, I shall argue for the need of 
at least two separate sub-maxims of quantity to cover
(i) the requirement that one answer questions appropriately
(ii) the requirement of presenting sufficient information in questions ,
One would presumably wish ultimately to give a unified account of 
informativeness where this has two separate parts.
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and imperatives to enable one’s requests to be successfully carried out
(iii) the general requirement of not saying what is familiar*
Since in each case, the requirement of informativeness can be stated 
with at least a certain amount of precision, the specification of
further maxims would appear to go some way towards increasing the
content of the CP*
I have already suggested (p.212 f) that one interpretation of the 
maxim is that the speaker should ’give as much information as the 
hearer requires', and I argued that this was equivalent to an instruction 
that one answer a wh-question according as the semantic interpretation 
of the question (or a corresponding imperative) determines* One 
apparent counter-example to this is provided by comparing the two 
following conversations, which let us assume take place in Malet 
Streets
(8) As How long does it take by taxi to Russell Square?
Bs One minute.
(9) As Hov; long does it take by taxi to Russell Square?
Bs You don’t need a taxi - it’s only two minutes walk.
According to the above interpretation of the maxim, the conversation 
in (8) is well-formed (and informative) whereas that in (9) is not.
Yet clearly the conversation in (9) is the more informative ones in 
(8) B is being, under all normal circumstances, misleading or at 
least unhelpful. It thus might seem that one cannot constrain the 
concept of 'required information' to anything less general than elements 
of the situation. However this conclusion is not I think warranted.
In the situation created by A's utterance in Malet Street, B is faced 
with a conflict between the given maxim of quantity and the maxim of 
quality that one believe one's utterance and its implicatures.
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A's utterance implies that one goes by taxi to Russell Square. If 
therefore B answers the question in the way it strictly requires, 
he will also be implicating that one goes by taxi to Russell Square.
But he knows that this is false, and to answer thus would therefore 
violate the maxim of quality. Since this is the fundamental maxim 
on which all the others depend, the maintenance of the maxim of 
quality over-rides the maxim of quantity, thus predicting that the 
only communicatively helpful answer to a question in which the 
questioner makes a mistaken assumption is one which corrects the 
assumption. Examples such as these are therefore not counter-examples 
to this analysis, since they can be naturally explained in terms of a 
conflict between the proposed maxim and the maxim of quality.
However this is not the only counter-example. Assume that you 
are standing at a cross-roads in Salisbury and someone drives up in 
a car and asks you ’How long does it take to get to London?' Now 
clearly the answer you should give is one which incorporates information 
from the situation (viz. that the questioner is in a car) - something 
like 'Three hours' being an appropriate answer. Yet the maxim merely 
makes reference to the content of the question. So, according to the 
maxim, a perfectly straight answer would be *A week'* Moreover, it 
might be a true answer, on the basis that one was walking. Thus there 
appears to be no violation of either the maxim of quantity or the maxim 
of quality on the part of the hearer. What has gone wrong? Is 
this evidence that we cannot constrain the maxim of quantity so that 
it apply only in terms of responding to the request strictly made by 
the question? Again I think the answer is 'No*, though the reason is 
not the same as before. What I suggest is the basis of the difficulty
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here is that the questioner has provided too little information to
allow his question to be answered without making further assumptions*
That is, he knows (and knows that the hearer knows) that a wh~
question is a request for information with respect to a certain variable,
in this case of time. Moreover, he knows (and knows that the hearer
knows) that the time an action takes is dependent on the speed of the 
6action. Since his question makes no mention of how he is getting 
to London, he knows that the hearer will not have sufficient information 
offered him to make a proper answer. The hearer might thus construe 
that he the speaker is violating the maxim of quantity. However he 
knows that the hearer knows that he is in a car and will therefore be 
able to work out that since he is in a car he is likely to v/ish to 
drive to London. Since if H makes this assumption S's utterance no 
longer violates the maxim of quantity, S therefore assumes that if he 
utters the sentence ’How long does it take to get to London?', H 
will take him to be implicating th$t he will be going by car. This 
form of analysis suggests that the reliance on facts of situation is 
not part of the definition of the quantity maxim but an implicature 
which arises from apparent violation of the maxim. That this is 
correct is suggested by the fact that the utterance ’How long does it 
take to get to London?' allows for differently appropriate answers 
according as different assumptions are made. The variability of
5, Cf. p.211 for an informal discussion of wh-questions.
6. I assume that this fact should at least follow as a consequence of 
the semantic representation of duration adverbials. However the 
formal semantic representation of duration adverbials is quite 
unclear to me, and I shall not give further details.
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interpretation by virtue of changing assumptions is as we have 
seen (p.2£>5) a defining criterion of conversational implicature.
It therefore seems at least the analysis is on the right lines.
But what version of the quantity maxim has been invoked?
What is involved in being constrained to give sufficient information 
to enable your question to be answered? The problem is not restricted 
to questions? it also arises with imperatives. If A, a business man, 
asks B, his secretary, ’Please get Smith on the phone’ and at the 
end of the day she has still not done so, he will no doubt round on 
her and say ’Why haven’t you got Smith on the phone?’ But she is 
technically in the right if she says ’But you didn't tell me when to 
get him on the phone - 1 was going to do so tomorrow’. However, in 
fact A knows that she will recognise that he has given insufficient
information for her to know exactly in what way she should obey the 
command and on the basis that he is in fact obeying such a quantity 
maxim, she will make the further assumption that he wants it carried 
out at the time of utterance. Thus it is only on the basis of an 
implicature that the command be carried out now that A can be 
construed as obeying the quantity maxim that he give sufficient 
indication to enable his hearer to know exactly how to meet his 
request. So it seems that with both imperatives and questions v/e 
must be able to state what constrains speakers to give sufficient 
information for hearers to obey them. How is this constraint to be 
stated? Is it covered by ’Give as much information as the hearer 
requires1? In one sense it is: the hearer does require a certain 
minimum of information in order to be able to reply to a question or
respond to an imperative. The problem is that the maxim does not 
apply in the same way that it did in the case of answering questions.
In the earlier case, the maxim covered the fact that speakers must 
answer questions appropriately by supplying information with respect 
to the variable already indicated by the questioner. Now we have the 
converse, that questioners must give information which will enable 
their hearer in the one case to provide information solely on the 
variable in question, and in the other case to carry out the command 
precisely. The question then arises; are these two forms of 
explanation correctly collapsed into one maxim? If the maxim applies 
to both these cases, the problem of over-generality raises its ugly 
head again. Is the notion of 'what the hearer requires1 any less 
all-embracing than 'what the situation requires*? If it is not, then 
any explanation which depends on the maxim of quantity is in danger 
of being no more explanatory than the maxim itself. If however the 
concept of what the hearer requires can be explained in terms of the 
semantic and pragmatic content of either the speaker’s utterance 
or preceding utterances, then it would seem that hearer-requirements 
can be given a reliable degree of content. I think in the case of 
imperative and question, the requirement of informativeness can be 
traced to the interpretation given to commands and wh-questions.
In the former case, since propositions can only be true relative to a 
specific state of affairs at a specific point in time, it is arguable 
that a command to make some proposition true is pragmatically 
inadequate unless a specification of the time at which it should be made
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true is included. Wh-questions, on the other hand, as requests for
information with respect to a particular variable, are pragmatically
inadequate if they do not imply the truth of propositions which
must be believed in order to give a value to the variable in question.
Thus in the case of How long does it take to get to London?. the question
itself gives no implication of the manner of travel. Yet the semantics
of duration is such that the hearer must know the manner of travel
7if he is to provide a specification of duration. So the only way to 
construe the questioner as not breaking the maxim of quantity is to 
make some further assumption which would reinstate the maxim. Hence 
the implicature that the speaker is travelling to London by car.
It seems then that if we wish the maxim of quantity to foe maximally 
specific, we should add separate maxims of quantity guaranteeing that 
inadequacies of this type do not arise. Since all of this is extremely 
tentative I shall not give further specification to the maxim here.
What I hope however to have indicated is how jfr principle the concept 
of hearer's requirement of informativeness (whether as a questioner 
or questionee) can be defined in terms of the semantic or pragmatic 
content of the discourse.
8.3 The Maxim of Quantity and The Pragmatic Universe of Discourse 
Constraints on iuformativeness are not however fully covered by 
the maxim 'Give as much information as the hearer requires1. In 
addition, there is a more general constraint of informativeness which 
applies to a^l forms of utterance, I pointed out earlier (p.212)
7, Cf. p.233 fn.6.
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in a footnote that the maxims demanding that the speaker*s contribution 
be as informative as required but not more so corresponded to Strawson*s 
*Presumption of Ignorance* and 'Presumption of Knowledge* (Strawson 196^ -a 
p.97f)* These 'presumptions* capture on the one hand the assumptions on 
the part of the speaker that the hearer does not already know what the 
speaker is telling him and on the other hand the speaker's assumption that 
the hearer knows certain 'empirical facts relevant to the particular point 
to be imparted in the utterance* (p.97)* What this latter presumption 
suggests is that there is a certain body of facts which in any discourse 
a speaker will presume that his hearer knows* Now if we are to give any 
content to the maxim of quantity construed in a general sense and give 
an account of the oddity of uttering tautologies or statements which 
are generally recognised to be true, we must give an explicit 
characterisation of the concept of 'assumed knowledge*; since if a 
sentence is to be informative it must not merely tell the hearer what h© 
already knows nor what both the speaker and the hearer already know each 
other knows* And more importantly perhaps for the specific hypotheses
j
presented in this thesis, we shall that a formal definition of 'assumed 
knowledge* provides a natural basis for explaining the pragmatic behaviour 
of definite noun phrases and factive complements, which is one of our 
chief remaining concerns#
8*3.1 The Pragmatic Universe of Discourse: A Definition
What we have to capture is that in any conversation, there is a body 
of facts which both speaker and hearer believe they agree on and which 
is therefore not in dispute: this set of propositions constitute their 
shared knowledge - knowledge which they know they share* That is, for any
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individual S, there is a fund of knowledge which may be represented 
as a set of propositions K^ . When this arbitrary individual communicates 
to any other individual H, who also possesses a fund of knowledge K., 
there will generally be a subset of K. which is also a subset of K.,
More formally we can say that for every conversational exchange in 
which S is the speaker and H the hearer, the set of propositions 
which constitute the knowledge which two such speakers will believe 
they share must meet the following four conditions:
(1) S  believes P.i
(2) S  believes H knows
(3) S believes H knows S believes P^
( k ) S believes H knows S believes H knows P^
I shall call this set of propositions the Pragmatic Universe of
9
Discourse. For any proposition P^ , if it fulfils these conditions
it will constitute a proposition which both speaker and hearer will
(or will expect each other to) assume. Moreover, if a proposition
P. fulfils these conditions then the entailments of P. must also fulfil i x
these conditions. This follows from the general rule of 
doxastic logic (logic of belief statements) that for any 
speaker S, if he believes that p and jo entails c[, then he is
8. I have characterised these conditions in terms of belief or knowledge 
in the way that seemed the most satisfactory, though there is independent 
evidence that this formulation is correct (cf. p.2^7f)• A more precise 
formulation would depend on theorems of epistemic and doxastic (belief) 
logic. Cf, Hintikka 1962 where he defines a logic for statements of 
knowledge and a logic for statements of belief. Cf. also p. 2 $ L  fn.10.
9# This concept of a Pragmatic Universe of Discourse is close to the 
concept of *mutual knowledge1 defined independently by Schiffer 1972 
(p.30f): S and A mutually know* that p iff Kgp, K^ p, K^ K^ p, K^KgP,
KsW* kaW >  ¥ a W -  W a V ..
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committed to the belief that q."^
The Pragmatic Universe of Discourse (henceforth PUD) is not, as 
this formulation might suggest, a static one. On the contrary it changes 
(increases) its membership as a conversation progresses. This changing 
content of the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse is a necessary consequence 
of the information-bearing nature of making a statement. Once you have 
made a statement » which by the maxim of quality you know the hearer 
will assume you know to be true - you will assume (by virtue of the 
definition of speaker's meaning - cf, p,19?f) that the hearer now also 
believes (and all its entailments and implicatures). So if both 
you and your hearer are obeying the CP, will - after your utterance - 
be a statement you both share knowledge of. But our definition of the 
Pragmatic Universe of Discourse predicts exactly this process of 
enlargements according as the conversation progresses from S^ , ••••
n^* ^1 (an(* 3-^8 consequent commitments) will become a proposition 
which fulfils all four of the defining conditions. That is, the 
speaker believing (condition l) tells it to the hearer. On the assumption 
that his communication is successful, he then believes the hearer knows 
(condition 2) and moreover he believes (by the quality maxim) that the 
hearer knows he believes (condition 3 ) and similarly that the 
hearer knows that he believes the hearer knows (condition
It may seem that the definition of the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse 
(PUD) is unnecessarily unwieldy and that the two conditions (1) and (2) are 
sufficient to characterise what will constitute the assumptions made
10. Hintikka's doxastic and epistemic logics were set up to formulate
criteria of consistency for statements of belief and knowledge res­
pectively parallel to the criteria of consistency provided by standard 
logics. Thus to take the example provided here, it would be inconsistent 
(or in Hintikka's sense 'indefensible') for any speaker A who believes 
that p, where J3 entails to deny that he believes that q. In Hintikka's 
more general formulation: B^p 3  B^q v/henever p q. Notice that by 
this rule condition (1) of the PUD follows from condition (2): H knows P.
entails P. and hence if S believes H knows P., he is committed to x
believing P^ . x
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by two speakers at any one point in a conversation and will therefore 
not be part of their conversation at that point. But this is not always 
so. There are cases in which the CP is being maintained, and conditions
(1) and (2) hold, but the propositions in question are not part of 
what we want to say are the assumptions of that utterance. Take for 
example a situation in which an examiner says to a student 'What is 
a transformational rule?* Now the student may assume that the 
examiner knows that a transformational rule is a rule which states a 
relation between two phrase-markers, but he may still say 'A transformational 
rule is a rule which states a relation between two phrase-markers'.
This is not assumed in the PUD of that conversation. What the 
student does not believe is that the examiner knows he knows that 
a transformational rule is as described (i.e. condition (3) is not 
fulfilled). Likewise a persoiiell officer (PO) talking to a new man 
in the firm may believe that the new man knows that no information 
about the firm may be given to outsiders (condition 2) but he does 
not believe that the man knows that he the PO knows that the man knows 
this (condition 4) - the new man may therefore think he can break the 
rule. Thus the PO may say 'No information about the firm may be given 
to outsiders.' The failures of conditions (3) and (4) are clearly 
not the normal reasons why a proposition is not part of the PUD, but 
rather what is stated. The general condition on saying something is 
that you believe that the hearer does not know what you are telling 
him - that is, condition (2) is not met. And if condition (2) is 
not met, then it is not possible that condition (4) be fulfilled. If 
condition (1) is not met, then clearly the proposition in question 
cannot, trivially, be part of the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse since 
the speaker does not believe it.
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8.3*2 The Maxim of Quantity II
My initial aim in delimiting the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse 
was to incorporate into the maxim of quantity some general constraint 
on being informative. I suggest the following maxim as a first 
approximation :
11'Do not assert any proposition p which is a member of 
the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse' 
or, more generally:
'For any proposition p, and any mood operator •+vyt (i.e.
1 h *, ’I* or do not say '*yp' if p is a member of
the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse.'
But will only be a member of the PUD if sufficient conditions for 
the truth of jd are themselves members of the PUD. Equivalently, 
if j) is known to be true, the conditions which guarantee the truth of 
jo will also be known to be true. The maxim can thus be given the 
further specifications
'For any proposition p whose truth is minimally guaranteed by 
n conditions, and any mood operator '*ty*, only say '*yp» 
if ^ n-1 of those conditions are members of the PUD.*
As a first indication of how this maxim might operate, let us 
look first at positive assertions, imperatives and questions. The 
maxim was defined to exclude as conversationally inadequate saying 
what is mutual knowledge between speaker and hearer. It also excludes 
ordering one's audience to carry out some action which is already 
clearly true. Thus one should not tell someone to shut the door if
11* Of. section 8.6 of this chapter for a discussion of assertion.
■»2.44“
12it is already shut, nor to kill somebody if that person is already 
13dead* Along similar lines, one should not ask a question to which 
one knows the answer if moreover one knows that the hearer knows the 
answer. The position is further complicated here by the fact that *?p' 
indicates a request for either the utterance 'pf or the utterance ’ -p' * 
Unlike imperatives which indicate a simple intention, ’?p* expresses 
a complex intention (containing a disjunctive or) and it is 
therefore conversationally inadequate to say *?p* if either or 
-p are members of the PUD* How do negative statements obey this maxim? 
We have seen in previous chapters that the semantic representation 
of some statement -p is a disjunct of semantic features, say,
CA/M] v [A/N] v [A/P] etc.llf 
Any one of these disjuncts is a sufficient condition for the truth 
of but no one of them is a necessary condition. What the maxim 
claims is that if any one of these disjuncts is a member of the PUD, 
it will be otiose for any speaker to inform his hearer of the 
statement -p* And this is what we find. As an example, let us 
assume a very approximate schematic representation of John didn*t kill 
Mary^ to be
[A/J]X1 v [A/M]X2 v [CAUSE]X1( [A/DIE]X2> v [A/CAUSE]X^ [DIE]X2>
(a) (b) (c) (£)
If it is common knowledge between any speaker and hearer either that
12* I am ignoring the moral constraints that might operate in this 
latter case.
13* In fact the constraint is stronger than the maxim indicates, since 
a generalisation of the maxim of quality should forbid one to command 
something if it is already true (whether or not this is known by the 
hearer.
14* A/M is the antonymy operator for a member M. of a set M_ ,Mp,M-,..*.M 
such that A/M = v v v M. v M (cf. ch.I p^ 33). n
13. This representation is misleading in that all problems of quantification 
are ignored* These details do not however affect the point being made, so 
I have excluded them for the sake of clarity. For a fuller 
representation of negative sentences of this type, cf. ch.6 p.l88f*
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someone other than John killed Mary (cf. (a)) or that John killed 
someone other than Mary (cf. (b)) or that Mary died but John 
definitely was not the cause of it (cf* (d))$ o r  that John raped 
Mary but she didn’t die as a result (cf. (c))t then the maxim 
predicts that the utterance of this sentence will flaunt the Co-operative 
Principle and therefore be conversationally inadequate, in just the 
way that 'John killed Mary' is an inadequate utterance if the 
speaker and hearer both know that this is so*
8.3*3 Some Putative Counter-Arguments
It might seem that there are immediate and obvious counter-examples 
both to the maxim and to the general definition of the PUD. On the 
one hand, the newly defined maxim appears to exclude the possibility 
of repeating, recapitulating or summarising what one has said, since 
one is only conventionally allowed to say what is not part of the PUD 
and everything that is said in an exchange becomes in Its turn part 
of the expanding PUD. And on the other hand - along similar lines - 
one often tells children things which they already know, an activity 
which appears not to be allowed. More generally, it is not obvious - 
as the account of the PUD presumes - that communication is based on 
the assumption that as a result of some utterance P^ by a speaker, the 
hearer then himself believes P^ (which is then part of the PUD),
Rather the effect of the speaker's utterance might be only that the 
hearer believes that the speaker believes P^ , in which case the 
predicted expansion of the PUD as the conversation progressed does not 
take place since one member (the original hearer) does not believe P^ .
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None of these criticisms however seem to me to he justified.
Let me take first the case which I suggest is theoretically the least 
interesting - that of the child, for whom one may often repeat oneself. 
Now in all that has been said so far, it has been assumed that the 
pragmatic conventions, like the linguistic conventions, are part of 
our mastery of the use of our language. The child, by contrast to 
adults, may well not have mastery of its language and it seems that 
is precisely and only at the age when the child is learning 
the language that it most delights in being told what it knoxvs.
This suggests that it has not learnt the pragmatic maxim I suggested. 
This seems to be confirmed by the fact that it is at just this age 
when the child in the role of speaker will repeat itself over and 
over again. Thus in both its role as speaker and as hearer the child 
has not yet acquired the pragmatic convention in question. The 
evidence of repetition to and by children is thus irrelevant to the 
point in hand.
More interesting for my purposes is the problem of conversations 
in which the hearer is not convinced by the speaker's statement 
and is not led by this utterance to believe himself. Should such 
instances, which are surely common enough, be included within a 
theory of communication as one form or result of communication? I 
think the answer is 'No' for the following reason. If convincing 
one's hearer that one believed some proposition P were a sufficient 
end in itself for communication, one would anticipate that conversations
16. My step-son of five intensely dislikes being told what he knows,
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could proceed in an orderly fashion on this weaker assumption. But 
they cannot. Suppose the hearer of P only believes that the speaker 
of P believes that P without himself being committed to the truth 
of P. If he then makes a statement which depends on P, he is breaking 
the Co-operative Principle (viz. the maxim of quality). In order to 
develop the conversation on the basis of P, he must be committed to 
the stronger belief that P. So we can see that if a hearer assumes 
that mere belief that the speaker believes that P is a sufficient 
basis for communication, he immediately violates the CP on which 
communication is based. It follows that a belief in P on the part of 
the hearer of P is a necessary condition of successful communication.
With this in mind, we have a natural explanation of the third 
criticism that summarising, recapitulating and other repetitions appeared 
to be excluded by fiat by the newly specified maxim. Consider the 
function of a summary or a recapitulation. In each case they serve 
to ensure that the statement in question has been successfully 
communicated! they are generally made in the face of doubt on the 
part of the speaker as to whether his communication was successful 
in the first instance. That is to say, they are made to prevent the 
situation we have just discussed, where the hearer was not himself 
convinced that P, he merely believed that the speaker believed that P
•
In all cases, though the speaker has already indicated that P and 
hence he should believe that the hearer knows that P, in Set he 
doubts this and makes the weaker assumption, and believes only that
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the hearer believes that he the speaker believes P. This being the ease,
repetitions fail to meet the conditions specified by the Pragmatic
Universe of Discourse (in particular its condition (2)) and hence
they are not excluded by the maxim 'For any proposition p, and any mood
operator ' *y' do not say **V^ p' if p is a member of the PUD', They
17are therefore not counter-examples to this analysis,
8.3*4 Exclamations and The Requirement of Informativeness
In all the discussion of the maxims of the Co-operative Principle 
so far, I have restricted my attention to statements, questions and 
(briefly) imperatives. There remains however a further class of 
utterance - exclamations. Utterances such as Isn't she cleverI 
Isn't the view lovelyI Didn't she sing beautifully] appear to 
constitute much clearer counter-examples even than repetitions and 
summaries to the constraint that speakers should not say what is known 
and known to be known by the participants in a conversation. There 
is little doubt that two people can stand in front of the Mona 
Lisa and knowing both that it's a beautiful painting and that each 
other knows it is a beautiful painting they can still naturally turn 
to each other and say 'Isn't it a beautiful painting!'
These examples are interesting for a further, and potentially 
more damaging, reason. Unless the maxim of quantity is given greater 
content than is provided by Grice, examples of this type show up its 
vacuity since the maxim enables one to predict either that they should 
be deviant or that they are not. If the maxim 'Give as much information
17# For a much more, detailed refutation of apparent counter-examples of this 
type with a concept of 'activated belief, cf. Grice 1969 p.l69ff.
18. These examples were pointed out to me by R.A, Hudson.
as is required* insists, as it suggests, that all utterances must have 
some information content, where information is measured in terms of what 
is not agreed between speaker and hearer (corresponding to the definition, 
of the PUDs cf. p,2*K)) then since these utterances neither offer nor 
seek information, they are predicted to be conversationally deviant.
If however the maxim allows for a situation in which no information 
being required, no information need be given then the theory predicts 
that exclamations of this type do not violate the maxim. However if 
this interpretation of the maxim is allowed, it is not clear what 
conceivable situation it could exclude. It is therefore vacuous, 
and without content. This criticism does not however extend to the 
reformulation of the maxim I have given; but the examples instead 
become counter-examples.
There are at least two ways in which these counter-examples 
might be treated. The first is to claim that the prediction made is 
correct in excluding these from a theory of communication since they 
are essentially noncommunicative. On this view they are not counter­
examples, While this approach is tempting, I think it has to be 
discarded. It is tempting because there is a sense in which utterances 
such as *She IS lovely*, 'He DOES sing well* are not communicative 
utterances but involuntary expressions of belief which do not seek 
to further conversation. But even if such an explanation could be given 
any content, it does not seem to be applicable to exclamations in 
the form of a negative question. These genuinely seek a response of 
some sort, and are not the natural form of exclamation uttered in the
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absence of an audience. The second explanation of such exclamations
is that they are not mere statements of fact but are communications
of the strength of the speaker's commitment to the statement in question*
It has been pointed out by Quirk et al (1972? p.^fOO^that exclamatory
questions of this type are only possible if the question contains a
gradable term, the interpretation always being that the speaker is
committing himself to an assessment of the gradable term as at the
extreme end of the scale of gradation. Thus Isn't she lovely? Didn't
she sing badly? Didn't she sing a beautiful song? can all be exclamations,
whereas Isn't he coming tomorrow?. Wasn't she your secretary last year?
and Didn't he do the washing-up? can never be. Though the speaker may
know that the statement itself is known by the hearer to be agreed by
him and the speaker, what the speaker does not assume is that his
hearer knows the strength of his commitment. Hence part of the
information conveyed by such utterances is not mutually agreed by
the participants. The problem with this form of explanation is its
informality, an informality which seems unavoidable given the problems
involved in stating a predictable interpretation fbr negative
questions of this kind. They are unique in being sentence forms
which do not allow a cumulative interpretation of their constituent
parts. The interpretation of Isn't she lovelyI is not a questioning
20of the negative proposition She is not lovely. Thus it bears no relation
19* Cf, also Hudson 1973#
20. This is unlike true negative questions such as Isn't she coming? which 
can be analysed as querying She isn't coming. Indeed these are 
characteristically uttered in the face of their corresponding 
statement (or an implication of it).
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either to its sentence operator, the negative element, or to its 
pragmatic operator, the question element. It seems clear that until 
we have a non-ad-hoc way of giving an interpretation to such 
utterances, we have no means of testing the validity of explaining 
their message-content in terms of a considerable degree of commitment 
on the part of the speaker. With reservations of this sort, I shall 
accept this explanation pro tem.
In this section, we have seen how a formal characterisation of 
the notion of 'assumed knowledge’ (in terms of a Pragmatic Universe 
of Discourse) can be used to give greater specification to one of 
the central maxims, the maxim of quantity. This now contains two 
subpartsz (i) Give as much information as the hearer requires
(ii) Only say '*vyp» if p is not a member of the Pragmatic Universe 
of Discourse', Both the maxims of relation and quantity are no\tf at 
least partially defined in terms of the semantic and pragmatic content 
of the utterance and, in being restricted in this way, are less open 
to universal application. One large problem however remains! should 
they be restricted in this way2 As we shall see in section 8.6.1, 
there is evidence that at least the maxim of relation cannot be 
restricted merely to the content of the utterance since the interpretation 
of stress depends not merely on utterance content but on its form. 
Furthermore the problem is not restricted to merely predicting the 
available data. As I shall lake up in the final chapter, the question 
of how the maxims should be specified may depend on the theoretical 
status of pragmatics within an over-all theory of language. For the 
moment however I shall simply assume that the restriction of the maxims
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to the pragmatic and semantic content of utterances can only be 
beneficial in giving them greater content and thus greater explanatory 
value. We shall see in any case that the restrictions placed on the 
maxims and the setting up of a Pragmatic Universe of Discourse are 
not merely ad-hoc methods of saving the theoretical framework, but 
enable us to give a natural explanation of definite noun phrases, 
factive complements, and the postulated assertion-presupposition 
distinction.
8,^ Definite Noun Phrases and The Pragmatic Universe of Discourse
In chapter 5 1 argued that there are two implications in the use 
of definite noun phrases. These are for any object described with 
the use of the that there is such an object, and that the hearer 
knows of the existence of the object (in so far as he can uniquely 
identify it for the purposes of the particular discourse). I argued 
however that only the first of these implications was semantic, since 
to say 'the x* does not entail that the hearer be able to uniquely 
identify the object referred to by the x. though this is a normal 
implication of its us© (cf, p,l6lf). It is this latter implication 
that we have to characterise in pragmatic terms. This is not the 
only problem which definite noun phrases present. In addition we 
have to explain the natural interpretation of definite noun phrases in 
questions and negatives that they be protected from the scope of 
negation.
In chapter 7 I defined two categories of standard implicature, 
conventional implicature and generalised conversational implicature, 
and we are now in a position to assess the explanatory value of these
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categories, As a preliminary to doing so, let me briefly recall 
examples which demonstrate the central properties of general 
conversational implicature and conventional implicature. The first 
was exemplified by 'P or Q' which normally implicates in response 
to a wh~question that the speaker does not know which of P or £ holds, 
since by virtue of the maxim of the CP that one must give the 
information that the hearer requires (cf. p.253ff)« the hearer 
deduces that if the speaker knew that P was true he should be committed 
to stating that P; the speaker will therefore be taken to be implicating 
that he does not know which of P or £ is true. The reasons why this 
category is not a conventional implicature are (a) that the implicature 
is cancellable either explicitly or by virtue of the situation 
in which it is uttered and (b) it is deduceable from the maxims 
of the CP in conjunction with the linguistic specification of the 
sentence in question. Conventional implicature by contrast fails both 
these criteria - it is not cancellable and it is not deduceable from 
the CP, It is thus in effect not explicable by means of the pragmatic 
constructs. One of Grice9s standard examples of conventional implicature 
is the implication in but.xof a contrast between its two conjuncts 
(cf. Grice 1961) , which I demonstrated in chapter k  was unformalisable 
in semantic terms since it was not possible to predict any contrast 
(either semantic or syntactic) which was a necessary pre-requisite of 
but's occurrence. This implication of contrast carries all the hallmarks 
of conventional implicature! it is not strictly speaking part of the 
word’s meaning for reasons already given, but it seems in some sense 
always a consequence of the word’s use - to say *X but Y, but I don't
21mean to imply there*s any contrast between the two* is indefensible
in the same way as it is indefensible to say ’X but I don’t believe it':
22and it is not dependent on the CP for its interpretation* Since 
in the case of but, the semantic arguments against distinguishing 
but and and are undeniably strong, the ad-hocness of the pragmatic 
mechanism guaranteeing that but conveys a particular implication does 
not provide a serious flaw in the theoretical framework* However it 
seems clear that unless the use made of the concept 'conventional 
implicature* is extremely restricted, the over-all explanatory value 
of the pragmatic framework could be cast seriously in doubt* Thus though 
in principle we have two possible ways of explaining the pragmatic 
implications of definite noun phrases, it would be a reasonable 
criticism to suggest that if either implication had to be analysed 
as a conventional implicature, this would constitute a much more 
serious counter-example than but to the general position adopted 
in this thesis*
We have already seen that the relationship between I saw the Mayor 
of Bristol and a statement such as You know who I am referring to by 
the phrase ’the Mayor of Bristol* is not one of entailment, since 
I saw the Mayor of Bristol can be true whether or not the hearer knows 
of the existence of such a man. Is it a general conversational
implicature? If so, we should be able to derive it by means of our
21. Cf. however, ch,9 p. 305f.
22* One might try to interpret a speaker saying ’X but Y* as reasoning 
a) H knows I am obeying the CP and making the strongest statement 
possible (2) Since I am not saying *X and Y' I must be implicating 
something further (3) Therefore I am implicating that X is in 
contrast to Y. This is not however a valid argument (even using 
such weak forms of the maxims), since there is no justification 
for the jump from (2) to (3)• The only means of making this step is
to know that but indicates a contrast. But this means that in order
to predict the contrastiveness of but by means of the CP we have to 
assume that but is contrastive. This implicature is therefore not 
dependent on the CP,
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general principles of communication. Let us take the anaphoric use
of the definite noun phrase first. In saying the sentence I saw a
man today who was patting a dog despite the fact that the dog looked
remarkably vicious, a speaker might reason that the hearer (H) knows
and knows that S knows (a) the semantic convention that The dog
looked remarkably vicious entails There was a specific dog
(To) the syntactic convention that C+Def] is a feature which occurs
automatically on a noun phrase when it is in an environment which
contains a preceding coreferring noun phrase (cf. p,153ff) and
(c) the pragmatic convention that any proposition, or set of propositions,
once stated will, if the communication is successful, become part of
the agreed Pragmatic Universe of Discourse (PUD) (cf. p.2 0^f).
Since the statement I saw a man today who was patting a dog involves 
at least the proposition that there was a specific dog and a specific 
man such that I saw the man was patting the dog, the effect of an 
utterance of that statement will be to add to the PUD the proposition 
There was a specific dog that S saw a man pat. S therefore knows 
that if the first mention of the dog, as part of the utterance, 
successfully achieved an addition to the PUD, then H will recognise 
(by virtue of the linguistic and pragmatic conventions of the language 
just listed) that the second mention of the dog, with the formal 
reflex [**"Def] must be an acknowledgement of what is already within 
the PUD - simply by virtue of its being a second mention. But since 
the definition of the PUD is that all its members are propositions 
which the speaker believes the hearer knows (among other things), 
it follows that in using the definite noun phrase the dog in the
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utterance in question, the speaker - unless he is deliberately 
giving information which he does not believe - will be implicating 
that he believes that the hearer knows which dog he is referring to - 
namely the dog that S saw a man patting. As the hearer assumes that 
the quality maxim is being obeyed, the anaphoric definite noun phrase 
will therefore implicate that the hearer knows which object is 
being referred to.
From this deduction, we can predict that those environments 
where the definite article is not anaphoric will also bear the same 
interpretation. We have seen that C+Def] occurs obligatorily for 
formal syntactic reasons in an environment where, as a consequence of 
the pragmatic definition of meaning and the definition of the PUD, the 
object to which the noun phrase refers is automatically construed as 
corresponding to a member of the PUD. Moreover in chapter 6 (p*l66ff)
X. argued that definite noun phrases are syntactically and semantically 
identical at deep structure except that the syntactic feature C+DefT, 
which has no semantic interpretation, may be arbitrarily assigned by 
optional rule (cf. p.l82). Despite this semantic identity, we know 
that the speaker (S) must be intending to convey some extra information 
by the use of the feature [+Def] where it is optional. But [+Def] has 
no semantic representation. So S can only be interpreted as conveying 
extra information if he is deliberately seeking to convey that implication 
which is an automatic consequence of the obligatory use of the definite article.
Take for example the utterance *1 saw the mayor of Bristol'. In 
saying this, our speaker S might argue 'I know and I know that H (the 
hearer) knows that (a) I saw the mayor of Bristol entails There is a 
mayor of Bristol, (b) [+Def] occurs both optionally on noun phrases, and 
obligatorily just in case it is an environment which contains a 
preceding coreferring noun phrase and (c) information given and
-257-
received becomes progressively part of the PUD shared by me and H. 
Moreover I know that H knows that where C+Def] occurs obligatorily 
it always carries an implicature that the object to ivhich the noun 
phrase bearing &-Def] refers is known by both me and H (i.e. it 
corresponds to a proposition in the PUD S and H share). We both 
know this by virtue of the CP and the definition of pragmatic 
meaning, since if I tell him something I know then I can assume he 
knows it too. But I know that H will expect that I use the feature 
C+Def] where it is not obligatory only if X intend to convey some 
extra information. But both H and I know that the feature has no 
semantic interpretation, and that it can therefore only be construed 
as offering extra information if it is used to convey the same 
information as its obligatory use. I therefore know that H will 
take my utterance of I saw the mayor of Bristol as implicating that 
we both know there is a mayor of Bristol.*
There is one problem in this deduction - in what way do the maxims 
apply to demand that the speaker offer extra information in his use of
V
the definite article? If we invoke the maxim of quantity, then 
it appears to be applying in its most general form. Certainly nothing 
the hearer has said or will say affects the speaker's choice of the 
definite article, so the revised form of the maxim of quantity does 
not apply. And in the form adopted in section 8.1, the maxim of 
relation also concerns preceding utterances of the discourse and 
this is not relevant to the problem we have here. However I 
indicated there (p.231) that the maxim of relation would have to be 
extended to accommodate problems of stress. To anticipate what is
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argued for in detail in section 8.6.1, it appears that the maxim of 
relation needs a separate sub-maxim which applies to the relation 
between form and content for any utterance, viz? 'Make the form of 
your utterance relevant to its content*. Now if this maxim is 
justified - and I argue in section 8.6.1 (p.2?6ff) that it is the 
only way to accommodate stress phenomena without reducing the maxims 
to vacuity - it has a natural application in the case of definite 
noun phrases. If the speaker uses a noun phrase whose syntactic 
and semantic specification is Identical to that of an indefinite 
noun phrase except that it bears the feature &*f)»ef] arbitrarily 
assigned (by optional rule) at deep structure (cf* p.l82), he 
will be breaking this maxim of relation unless he intends the 
use of this feature C+Def] to be relevant to the content of his 
utterance. And the only way to construe it as having relevance is 
to deduce that the speaker must be deliberately invoking 
that implication v/hich is an automatic consequence of the obligatory 
use of the definite article. So it seems that where the use of the 
definite noun phrase is non-anaphoric, the deduction of its implicature 
depends on the pragmatic definition of meaning (Grice's meaning^), 
the quality maxim, the definition of the PUD, and a not yet justified 
extension of the maxim of relation.
This account of the pragmatic implication on definite noun phrases 
extends naturally both to other types of sentence and across utterance 
boundaries. In a conversation in which H says 'I saw a man yesterday' and 
S responds with the question 'Did the man speak to you?' S will argue 'I 
know that H knows the conventions (a), (b) and (c) (as before p.256f).
Moreover I know that on the basis of (b), (c) and the deductions already given 
that Ii will deduce that definite noun phrases in effect occur obligatorily
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when the noun phrase is interpreted as being a member of the PUD.
Since I am using the definite article, H will therefore deduce that I
am implicating that the man to which I refer is part of our PUD.
But if I were referring to some man other than the one H has just
23alluded to, I would be breaking the maxim of relation, since my 
question would have nothing to do with his utterance. Since to 
do so would therefore be to break the pragmatic maxims, and since 
H will assume that I am obeying these, H will take my question as 
referring to the same man as his utterance. So H will take my 
utterance of the man as implicating that it has a preceding co­
referent and is therefore part of our PUD by definition.1 As this 
example demonstrates, we now appear to be able to account for cases 
of coreference not only within and across sentence boundaries, 
and within different sentence types, but even between sentences with 
different speakers. The ability to predict this range of coreference 
potential arises directly from the delimitation of the PUD. Once 
any noun phrase corresponds to a proposition of the PUD by virtue of 
either speaker's assertion, then reference by the can be made to it 
irrespective of who was responsible for the information about the 
noun phrase. This prediction, which is an anomaly within any sentence
2 hor speaker based framework, arises naturally from the analysis given here.
More generally, X have shown how an implicature on definite noun 
phrases depends on a prior specification of the linguistic system 
(conditions (a) and (b)), and on quite general constraints on 
communication (condition (c)and the maxims of the Co-operative Principle).
23. This invocation of the maxim of relation refers to the maxim defined 
in section 8.1 'Give as much information as the hearer requires'.
2Xf. The same phenomenon arises with pronouns and can be explained along 
similar lines*
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These properties are the essence of conversational implicature. In 
addition, as an analysis in terms of conversational implicature would 
predict, this implicature is cancellable, either explicitly or by 
virtue of the context in which it is uttered. Thus one can say:
(10) The King of Ruritania came to my exhibition, though I don't
suppose you knew I was having one, let alone 
that there was a King of Ruritania - did you?
Contextual cancellation of the implicature is provided by the
examples which are central to this thesis:
(11) The King of Ruritania didn't visit the exhibition, because there's
no such man
That is to say, if there is no King of Ruritania - as the speaker of
(11) asserts and hence must believe - then the situation is such that 
the speaker cannot believe in using a definite noun phrase that the 
hearer knows of his existence. More formally, we have already seen 
(p,2'*i0f, and fn.10) that The speaker believes that the hearer knows 
P doxasticaily implies that the speaker believes that P. If therefore 
it is not the case that the speaker believes that P it follows (as 
with entailment) that it must also not be the case that the speaker 
believes that the hearer knows that P. If we consider the converse, 
we can see exactly why both examples (10) and (11) eases ' - . 
where the implication on definite noun phrases of assumed knowledge 
is cancelled. Since The speaker believes that the hearer knows that P 
doxasticaily implies that the speaker believes that P, it follows that 
-(The speaker believes that the hearer knows that P) is (like 
entailment) consistent with either The speaker believes that P 
or -(The speaker believes that P). In the case of (10) we have the 
former possibility while in (11) we have the latter. In both cases
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the pragmatic implication on the definite noun phrase that the
speaker believes the hearer knows that there is a specific King of
Ruritania is cancelled outs i.e. we have (schematically)
-(S believes that H knows that P). In (10) the pragmatic implication
that the speaker believes that there is a specific King of Ruritania,
25is maintained (schematically, S  believes that P); while in (11) 
it is not (schematically -(S believes that P)). In the light of this 
over-all explanation of definite noun phrases, we can conclude 
that the implication on definite noun phrases that the speaker believes 
that the hearer knows of the existence of the referent to which the 
noun phrase refers possesses the following characteristics:
(i) it depends for its deduction on (a) general principles of 
communication and (b) a separately specified linguistic system;
(ii) it is a normal non-situation-specific accompaniment to the 
relevant utterances; and (iii) it is explicitly cancellable.
And these characteristics are the defining characteristics of a general 
conversational implicature* It thus seems that the implication of 
definite noun phrases that the speaker believes that the hearer knows 
the referent in question is not an inherent property of the definite 
noun phrase, but is a generalised conversational implicature.
The significance of this conclusion does not however stop here.
The status of generalised conversational implicatures as normal 
accompaniments to the interpretation of sentences which possess them 
provides an automatic explanation of the marked nature of negative 
sentences containing definite noun phrases where the implication of
25. On the assumption that an utterance of P pragmatically implies 
that the speaker believes that P.
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a specific referent of the noun phrase in question is included 
within the scope of negation# It is because definite noun phrases 
generally implicate the hearer's knowledge of the existence of 
the specific referent that interpretations of such negative sentences 
will normally maintain the implication of the existence of that 
referent. It is only if this implicature of the hearer's knowledge 
does not hold, the marked case, that the existence of the referent 
in question can be consistently denied* On this basis, one would 
predict that the utterance of The King of France did not visit the 
exhibition would normally implicate that there was an exhibition, 
that there was a King of France, and moreover that the speaker 
believed that the hearer knew both that there was an exhibition 
and that there was a King of France# But since these implicatures 
are 'generalised conversational' implicatures and not 'conventional' 
ones, they can be cancelled, these constituting the marked case.
And one way of cancelling such an implicature is to deny a statement 
on which the implicature depends. Hence to include the existence 
of the specified referent within the scope of negation necessitates c l  
cancelling of the speaker's belief in the existence of the referent 
(if the speaker is being honest), which in its turn necessitates 
a cancelling of the speaker's belief in the hearer's knowledge of 
the referent in question. So with the statement The King of France 
did not visit the exhibition, if there is no King of France, and the 
speaker believes that there is no such man, then it cannot be true 
that the speaker believes that the heai’er knows that there is such 
a man. So the marked cases of negation we considered in chapter 5 
are examples where a second general implicature is cancelled out.
And with general conversational implicature defined as it is, the 
theory predicts that such cases constitute the marked cases.
Since moreover the implicature of assumed mutual knowledge is 
directly dependent on the syntactic property of the definite noun 
phrase as a coreference marker, it follows that the markedness of 
the particular interpretations of negative sentences which have 
been central to this thesis can be traced not to the semantic 
properties of definite noun phrases (as one might at first expect) 
but to the pragmatic interpretation given to the syntactic feature P"Def]» 
An exactly parallel explanation can be given to questions, where 
again both the existence of the referent and the hearer's knowledge of 
the existence of the referent are normally assumed. The implication 
that the definite noun phrase corresponds to a proposition in the PUD 
(and is thus part of the knowledge agreedand assumed by both speaker 
and hearej) is cancelled out just in case the proposition itself is 
doubted or questioned by the speaker.
(5) Is the King of Rumania coming to the coronation, or doesn't
Rumania have a king?
(6) Did the Duke of PLA2IT0R0 come to the opening ceremony - I didn't
think there such a place as Plazitoro, let 
alone that it had a Duke.
(7) Is the King of Rumania coming to the exhibition - I thought
Rumania was a republic.
Examples (5)-(7) (repeated here for convenience) do not imply that 
there is a specific referent corresponding to the definite noun phrase 
in question and therefore they cannot be taken to imply that such a 
referent is a member of the PUD which speaker and hearer share.
In general terms, what this section has - hopefully - demonstrated, 
is that an independently motivated pragmatic framework appears to 
provide a natural explanation of one property of definite noun 
phrases, which we have already seen from semantic evidence is different 
in kind from other semantic properties of such noun phrases. Since 
in addition this pragmatic explanation of definite noun phrases 
automatically predicts (a) the possibility of negative and interrogative 
sentences in which the existence of the referent of a noun phrase is 
denied or questioned respectively, and (b) that such interpretations 
are extremely marked, I think we can reasonably conclude (as long of 
course as the explanation is correct) that it provides reassuring 
confirmation of the semantic and pragmatic frameworks adopted here.
8.5 The Pragmatic Interpretation of Factive Complements
We saw in chapter 6 that there was semantic evidence for an 
interpretation of factive sentential complements in a way that 
corresponds to specific noun phrases, and that there was syntactic 
evidence that the underlying syntactic structure of such factive 
complements should contain an explicit definite noun head such 
that the sentences The King regretted the fact that the Queen was sick 
and The King regretted that the Queen was sick possessed the same deep 
structure. Two consequences follow from this analysis which are 
relevant to the problem we face here of explaining the marked status 
of negative sentences and questions incorporating the complement of 
factive verbs within the scope of negation or question. First, in
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giving factive verb complements a specification at deep structure 
which contains the feature C+Def] (cf, ch,6 p.L9>3) , one is committing 
oneself to a specific prediction about the pragmatic behaviour of 
these complements - since the pragmatic behaviour of definite noun 
phrases is triggered by the syntactic feature C+Def]? factive complements 
should have the same pragmatic properties as definite noun phrases.
This first prediction leads to the second. There are verbs which entail 
the truth of their complement but which do not share many of the 
syntactic characteristics of factives. Take for example prove*
This cannot take the full range of gerunds, and it allows both the
26for-to construction and the accusative plus infinitive construction.
If we distinguish between Jones referetted that Einstein was right 
and Jones proved that Einstein was right by assigning only to the 
former a deep structure definite noun head, our formal mechanism 
will automatically lead to a prediction that the pragmatic behaviour 
of regret and prove should be different, since it is the feature C+Def] 
on the head noun of the complement sentence which causes the pragmatic 
interpretation of factives. Both these predictions are matched by the 
evidence.
We have already seen in part that the first prediction is fulfilled. 
Both factives and definite noun phrases have occupied a central part 
in my arguments here because they share the property of having certain 
logically possible but highly marked interpretations in negative 
environments. Moreover this shared property carries over to questions 
(cf. examples (l)'-(4) p.226). Secondly there is an implication in
26. These are among the criteria specified by the Kiparskys (1970).
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the use of factives which I have not yet drawn attention to. (12) 
and (13) characteristically imply that the speaker assumes that the 
complement is true, (hence the common use of presupposition) - 
in other words the speaker believes the hearer knows that the 
complement is true*
(12) John regretted that Mary was sick
(13) Edward realised that his mother was dying
But this implication on factives parallels the implication on definite
noun phrases that the speaker believes the hearer knows the referent
to which the noun phrase refers. Now the implication on definite
noun phrases was, I argued, a general conversational implicature
since, among other things, it was cancellable - either explicitly
or by virtue of negating the entailment on which the implicature
depended. The implication on factive complements behaves in
exactly the same way: it can be cancelled, either explicitly as in ( l b )
or - in the case of negative and interrogative sentences such as (13)
and (16) - just in case the truth of the complement is also denied
or doubted. Corresponding to examples (10) and (11) (p,260) we have
(1^ ) I regretted/ didn't regret going to see your mother, though you
never knew until now that I ever went to see 
her, did you?
(13) John didn't regret that Mary was sick because she was not sick
(16) Does Felicity regret taking a BBC audition - I thought she'd
always refused to take one.
Thus both pragmatic properties of definite noun phrases - that in
negative sentences and questions the implication of existence of the
noun phrase will not be included within the scope of the operator,
and that in all sentences there is a general implicature that the
speaker believes the hearer knows the referent in question ~ appear
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to stand in a one-to-one correspondence with the pragmatic properties 
of the complements of factive verbs.
Our second prediction was that by virtue of the different syntactic 
analyses of prove and regret . the pragmatic behaviour of these verbs 
would be correspondingly different. And so it is. As we would expect, 
two properties distinguish verbs such as prove from the factive set. 
Unlike factives, the complement of prove is normally interpreted as 
falling within the scope of negation if the verb itself is. Though 
the natural interpretation of John didn't regret that Mary was sick 
is not that given in (13) but is that Mary was sick, there is no 
such parallel -in (17) s
(17) Jones didn't prove that Einstein was wrong
Here there is no indication of whether or not Einstein was wrong. 
Similarly the natural interpretation of questions containing prove 
is that the complement of prove is being questioned. Thus in (18) 
there is certainly no assumption that Generative Semantics is vacuous - 
rather this is just what is being questioned.
(18) Has Chomsky proved that Generative Semantics is vacuous ?
Secondly, the complements of prove carry no implication of assumption 
of their truth on the part of the hearer. That is, a sentence such 
as John proved that Einstein was wrong does not carry an implication 
that the speaker believes the hearer already knows that Einstein was 
wrong. All these predictions are exactly consonant v/ith the analysis 
given and they provide independent (Confirmation not only of the semantic 
and pragmatic account offered here but also of the syntactic analysis 
accorded to factives by the Kiparskys.
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It thus appears that in collapsing the pragmatic account of 
factive verbs with that of definite noun phrases, we have to hand 
a natural means of explaining marked and unmarked interpretations for 
a large range of negative and interrogative sentences - the marked 
interpretations arise just in case a separate general implicature 
is cancelled out0 And in a more general perspective, this joint 
account of factive complements and definite noun phrases together 
with the pragmatic constructs independently defined by Grice provides 
an aitomatic explanation of the apparent discrepancy between the 
semantics of negation and its use,
8,6 The Assertion-Presupposition Contrast
So far in this chapter, I have been pursuing my two chief aims: 
firstly to reformulate Grice's maxims so that they can reasonably 
be said to have explanatory value; second to use these maxims to 
explain why it is that some interpretations of negative sentences 
are 'natural' and unmarked while others are highly 'unnatural' 
and marked, I wish to turn now to the notion of assertion, since 
in predicting the relationship between what a speaker assumes 
(presupposes) and what he asserts, queries, etc, where this correlates 
with stress assignment, we shall see that there is evidence to 
suggest that the maxims cannot be restricted solely to message- 
content, We shall therefore be forced to reconsider the problem 
of the extreme power of the maxims.
Up to this point in the thesis, the term assertion has been 
used in two different ways. First I introduced (cf, ch.2 p. 78) 
a pragmatic assertion mood operator, which conventionally indicates
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a belief in the truth of the proposition it attaches to. But then 
in chapter 3, I argued that there were two uses of presupposition, 
oh® associated with statements and one associated with the speaker 
of an utterance, of which the latter stood in contrast to assertion 
in the sense of what the speaker is actually asserting. The first 
use of the term assertion, as a mood operator, applies to a sentence 
as a whole, the second, in contrast to presupposition, applies to 
some subpart of an utterance. In chapter 3t I argued that it was a 
confusion between these two separate senses of assertion that underlay 
the disagreement between Strawson and Russell. It might therefore 
seem that these two constructs should be distinguished not only 
theoretically but terminologically, as say entailment and implicature are. 
There is however a parallel problem with imperatives and questions, 
as Searle has pointed out (19&9 P*l62). In ordering someone to visit 
the King of France, you are not ordering him to cause the existence 
of the King of France, and in asking whether the King of France is 
married you are not (normally) querying the King of France's existence.
In both cases, the command and the query respectively are restricted 
to a subset of the conditions necessary for the truth of the 
proposition in question. In the one case, the scope of the imperative 
is restricted to the relation between your audience and the King of 
France, viz, that your audience visit the King of France; in the other, 
the scope of the question is restricted to whether the man in question 
has the property of being married. If then we proliferate terminology 
for the two senses of assertion, we shall have also to do so for 
command and for question. But in this way, we shall not be providing 
any explanation of the homogeneous behaviour of the three utterance
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types. If we are to give any general account of this phenomenon,
we must provide a uniform explanation of the varying scope interpretations
associated with the three mood operators.
The explanation can be found in the concept of the Pragmatic 
Universe of Discourse (PUD) and the associated maxim of quantity.
In section 8,3 I argued firstly that the PUD was defined as a set 
of propositions which the speaker believed the hearer knew the speaker 
believed the hearer knew (the other three conditions being derivable 
from this) and that secondly, the maxim of quantity should be given 
greater content by adding a further maxim:
•Only say ' *yp* if, of n conditions minimally guaranteeing the 
truth of p, 4 n-1 conditions are members of the PUD.'
The relation between the mood operators as applied to the proposition
as a whole and the part of the utterance which is in fact being
asserted/queried/coramanded is deduceable from this maxim. The speaker
believes the hearer knows (and knows that the speaker knows) a
certain body of propositions (i.e. there is a PUD) and in making a
certain utterance '*v^ p' he believes that the hearer, knowing the
conventions of the language and hence the conditions for the truth of
the proposition in question, vail recognise a subset of those conditions
as being part of the PUD and hence neither assertible, deniable or
queriable (without violating the quantity maxim), and a second mutually
exclusive subset of the conditions as being outside the PUD. This
latter set, he will interpret as being asserted, denied,'commanded or queried.
Thus what the speaker asserts in making some statement ' p1 will be
precisely those conditions of £ which he believes are not in the PUD
since the hearer does not know (or does not know that he knows) them.
What he commands in saying 'Jpf will be those conditions of jd that
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he believes are not currently true, and hence by definition are not 
part of the PUD. What he questions in saying *?p' will be those 
conditions which he believes are not members of the PUD, in this case 
not because the hearer doesn't know their truth value, but because 
he, the speaker, doesn't. In each case, because the body of 
propositions which makes up the PUD varies from context to context, 
the assertion-presupposition (or question-presupposition or command- 
presupposition) distribution for any sentence will vary according as 
the context varies (given the limits imposed by the semantic structure 
of the sentence in question). What now becomes self-evident is why 
the entailments on factive verbs and definite noun phrases (for 
example) were mistakenly construed as being necessarily part of 
what the speaker assumes (presupposes) as opposed to what he asserts.
Since, as we have seen, both factive verbs and definite noun phrases 
generally implicate respectively that the proposition expressed by 
complement and the proposition claiming existence of a specific 
referent are members of the PUD, it follows by definition that in 
any assertion (whether negative or positive), question, or command, 
these propositions would generally be assumed to be true. The 
mistake of presupposition supporters lay in setting down a requirement 
that such an assumption necessarily hold. As we have seen in earlier 
chapters, this implication is context-dependent, and as such is not a 
semantic property of the sentence in question. On the contrary, the 
fluctuating nature of the assertion-presupposition, question-presupposition 
distribution in different utterances of the same sentence is a 
characteristic of pragmatic generalisations and is predicted naturally 
under this analysis.
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8.6.1 Speaker-Presupposition, Stress Assignment and The Maxim 
of Relation
To have given a working definition of the utterance phenomena 
of assertion-presupposition, question-presupposition etc is not 
however the end of the story. As many writers have pointed out, 
there is a conventional correlation between stress assignment and 
the interpretation of the assertion-presupposition (positive or negative) 
and question-presupposition distribution. The.stressed item is (roughly) 
interpreted as the sole item falling within the scope of the mood 
operator, everything else being assumed to be true. The problem 
as we have seen earlier (ch.3 p*86) is that this phenomenon cannot 
be truth-conditional since it has no effect on the truth value of a 
statement in the positive case. It therefore lies outside the 
domain of what I have argued is semantics. Yet Chomsky (1971) has 
argued that focus (or scope) of the question or negation is entirely 
predictable given the stress assignment, both in the case of normal 
and contrastive stress assignment. Two questions then arise: is 
this claim correct, and if so what is the nature of the rule which 
encapsulates it?
The claim Chomsky makes is that the presuppositions of the
sentence can be read off by replacing the focussed item (where the
focus is any phrase containing the intonation centre) by a variable.
Thus for example the presuppositions of the assertion John didn't meet
Mary in the garden (with normal stress assignment on garden) are
either that John me| Mary somewhere (in the garden being the focus of
negation)* or that John met someone somewhere (Mary in the garden being
26.Actually this is a simplification, since in all opaque contexts, stress can 
lead to a change in the truth value of a statement (cf. Dretske 1972). I 
assume however that interpretations of opaque environments are like 
negation and contain a disjunct set of conditions (cf. ch.l p.36ff), and 
that stress does not alter meaning in these cases, but rather provides a 
pragmatic means of drawing attention to those conditions which are 
construed as falling within the scope of the operator in question, Cf.p. 
276ff.
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focus) , or that John did something (the entire veii) phrase being the 
focus), I have already argued (ch.l p.^ 6f) that this claim is 
inadequate if stress is normally assigned on the grounds that the 
full range of scope possibilities is available with normal stress 
assignment and this range cannot be predicted by considering the 
phrase containing the intonation centre. However, if stress is 
contrastive (i.e. not placed on the final lexical item in a sentence), 
then the interpretation of the scope of negation or question is not 
in general left open, but is restricted to the lexical item (or 
phrase containing the lexical item) iirhich is stressed. Since this 
phrase is often not the end-placed item, contrastive stress assignment 
will not therefore allow an interpretation in which every part of 
the sentence is interpreted as falling within the scope of negation, 
question etc. Thus Chomsky's formulation of focus-presupposition 
correctly predicts that The man in the GREEN coat didn't ask a question 
has the following possible interpretations: either that A man in
some sort of coat asked a question is presupposed (focus - Adjective), 
or that Some man asked a question is presupposed (focus - Prepositional 
Phrase) or that Someone asked a question is presupposed (focus - Subject). 
But these possibilities represent only a subset of the scope possibilities 
for this sentence, and do not include for example verb or verb phrase 
scope (where respectively the presuppositions would be The man in the 
green coat did something with a question, e.g. answer one, or The man 
in the green coat did something, but not ask a question)• Presupposition 
in this sense is, as we have seen (p.270 ), that part of the semantic 
interpretation of a sentence which corresponds to propositions which 
are in the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse (PUD).
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Now Chomsky's generalisation oould be incorporated directly into 
the pragmatic framework elaborated here in the form of a pragmatic 
instruction;
'For any utterance '*yp', only assign stress within that syntactic
construct which corresponds to conditions for the truth of p which
are not in the PUD*'
Thus in the case of a question such as 'Did JOHN kill Mary?', if
stress is assigned to John, the rule predicts that John will be the
only constituent corresponding to conditions not in the PUD, the
remainder (viz, that kill Mary is true of someone) thus being construed
as within it and hence assumed to be true. The same phenomenon
applies, though more weakly, for imperatives, 'Play with the ball in
the GARDEN' implies, as the rule predicts, that the fact that the
hearer plays with the ball somewhere is assumed and not in question,
but what is commanded is the place in which the audience is to play.
Finally, negation. Take by way of example the utterance 'JOHN didn't
kill Mary* with an approximate schematic semantic representations
[A/J]X1 v [A/M]X2 v [A/CAUSE]Xx( [DIE]X2) v [CAUSE]X-j^ C [A/DIE]X£)27 
(a) (b.) (c) (d)
The rule says only assign stress to a condition (in the case of this
utterance (a)) which does not correspond to a member of the PUD, One
might thus assume that the other conditions in the representation
(viz. (b)-(d)) are members of the PUD, a result which would be counter
to. the actual interpretation of the sentence. However, we already
have a maxim 'Only say '*typ* if L~ n-1 of n sufficient conditions for
the truth of jo are members of the PUD', And if any one of the
27. Of. p.l88f for a more detailed representation of negative sentences 
containing kill. Cf. also p,2.Mf fn.15.
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conditions (b)M(d) are members of the PUD then this maxim is violated 
(since each is a sufficient condition for the truth of the utterance).
On the assumption that the speaker is not violating this maxim, it 
thus follows that in obeying our new rule, a speaker would by saying 
'JOHN didn't kill Mary' be implying that all other sufficient conditions 
for its truth (viz. (b)”(d)) are not met and that therefore someone 
killed Mary,
As it stands, this rule is ad-hoc; it does not fit in any natural 
way into the theory. It clearly is not a maxim of behaviour. So 
if such a rule is to be explained naturally within this pragmatic 
framework, either it should be deduceable from the maxims and as 
such be a generalised conversational implicature, or it has to be 
listed as a conventional implicature. As we have already seen in the 
case of negation, compliance with this rule depends on complying 
with the maxims, and this suggests that the rule itself is derivable 
from the maxims. Notice moreover that contrastive stress has a 
second characteristic which is a criterion of conversational (as 
opposed to conventional) implicature. The implicatures consequent 
upon contrastive stress are cancellable. There is no contradiction 
in the following utterances, where the standard implicatures are 
contextually cancelled out;
(19) Though I don't wish to imply that Mary was necessarily hurt, what 
is absolutely certain is that JOHN didn't hurt Mary
(20) Though we do not as yet know whether the mayor was murdered, what 
is absolutely certain is that his WIFE didn't kill him
(21) Though we cannot be sure Smith was even in the hospital that night, 
the question we need the answer to is 'Was he at any time in the 
OPERATING theatre?'
(22) Though we cannot be sure that anyone was cheating, what we have to 
check is whether any LAW students had books with them in the exam room.
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The evidence of these examples suggests that the implication derived 
from contrastive stress cannot be considered to be an inherent one in 
any case, since it is not a necessary part of the interpretation of 
sentences with contrastive stress assigned. On the contrary however, 
such variability is a defining characteristic of a general conversational 
implicature.
How then could an implicature consequent upon stress assignment 
be derived from the maxims? There are two ways in which this could 
be done; either via a combination of the maxims of relation and quantity, 
or by setting up a new maxim. The problem with the first alternative is 
that in the reformulation I have given to the maxim, the notion of 
relevance relates solely to the pragmatic and semantic content of the 
utterance (and that of the preceding discourse). But stress is not 
part of the semantic or pragmatic content of the utterance and moreover 
its relevance relates only to the utterance itself and not (or not 
necessarily) to the preceding discourse. Yet if we loosen the 
restrictions imposed on the maxims and resurrect the old maxims, we 
face yet again the problem that they have very little content and 
therefore correspondingly little explanatory value. Suppose that we 
seek to demonstrate the conversational nature of implications 
consequent upon stress assignment by deducing them from an assumption 
of the maintenance of the old maxim of relation and the maxim of 
quantity. This could be done in the following way if we merely assume 
that stress is a conventional means of emphasis. Thus if a speaker S 
says 'A MAN hit Mary1, he knows the hearer II will deduce that since 
stress is a conventional means of emphasising and since he S is 
committed to asserting the utterance 'A MAN hit Mary* only if at
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least one of its conditions is not in the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse, 
his emphasis will only be relevant to his utterance of 'A MAN hit 
Mary1 if he is seeking to draw H's attention to one of these 
conditions. Since H assumes that S is obeying the maxim of relation, 
he therefore assumes that man corresponds to conditions (a set of 
conditions), one of which is not in the PUD, Moreover, since S has 
not drawn his attention to any other part of the utterance, H will 
further deduce that S must be implying that that is the only part 
of the utterance which is not in the PUD, H will therefore deduce 
that S is implicating that the remainder of the utterance does 
correspond to propositions in the PUD, S will therefore be taken 
to be implicating that H knows that someone hit Mary, and that H 
knows that S knows that someone hit Mary.
The problem with this form of deduction is that the umbrella 
maxim 'Be relevant' in its most general interpretation does not 
strictly speaking apply to the concept of relevance here. 'Be relevant' 
is normally construed as the relation between utterance and event, 
or between utterance and utterance; but the notion of relevance used 
here is an intra-utterance notion, relating utterance form to 
utterance content. Thus if we are to claim an explanation of stress 
assignment in terms of the maxim of relation, not only do we have to 
return to the highly general original form, but we have to construe it 
as applying more generally still, I take ifc that in view of what I have 
argued earlier (p,223f)» this analysis is not therefore a possible one,
28, Contrastive stress is not merely uniquely assignable within one sentence. 
Consider BILL didn't KISS Mary which implies (a) that someone kissed 
Mary and TbJ that Bill did something to Mary. Since it seems that in 
principle, any item could be contrastively stressed, the fact that an 
item is not stressed in an environment containing contrastive stress is 
adequate evidence for the hearer to deduce that anything which is not 
stressed corresponds to a proposition which is in the PUD.
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However, if we admit that the choice of the form of utterance may 
be relevant to an interpretation of that utterance (given that the
29
choices range only over those options which do not alter the meaning) 
then a plausible alternative is to maintain the maxim of relation in 
its strict form, viz, ’Only say a sentence if it either entails or 
implicates some sentence which is also implicated by ' (cf. p*23b), 
and to add a further maxim of relation ’Make the form of your utterance 
relevant to its content1. With this second maxim of relation, the 
deduction of the implicature goes through exactly as before, but we 
have not reduced the predictive content of the other maxim of relation.
A similar explanation will apply in the case of negation and question.
Thus if S asks ’Did a MAN hit Mary?’ he knows that H knows that by 
the maxim of quantity he must be assuming that at least one of the 
propositions entailed by A man hit Mary is not in the PUD and is 
the focus of S’s query. Moreover, his emphasis on man will only be 
relevant to the content of his question if it corresponds to a condition 
which is being questioned. Since moreover, it is the only stressed 
item, S knows that H will deduce that it is the only item in question 
and that hit and Mary correspond to conditions which are part of the 
PUD and hence not in question. H therefore takes it that by his 
utterance of ’Did a MAN hit Mary^S is implicating that H knows both 
that someone hit Mary and that S knows he knows this. On the basis 
of this form of explanation, I shall assume the existence of an 
additional Relation maxim, ’Make the form of your utterance relevant to 
its content*.
To see how this form of explanation has a natural general application, 
let us look at the sentences which Lakoff (1971&) posed as problem 
sentences for anyone not incorporating a notion of pragmatic presupposition
29. Cf, its application in the case of the syntactic feature C+Def],
p.258.
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into the grammar John called Mary a lexicalist and then SHE 
insulted HIM, As Lakoff points out, these are normally interpreted 
as implying that to call someone a lexicalist is to insult them, 
and within the framework here we would expect that such an implication 
be derivable as a conversational implicature. We saw in connection 
with the earlier utterances that on the basis of the maxims of quantity 
and relation, items which were not assigned contrastive stress iU an 
utterance were implicated as corresponding to conditions which were 
members of the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse, In the type of case 
posed by Lakoff, the hearer is presented with an apparent dilemma*
Mary's insulting John is not a member of the PUD (if it were 1h© speaker 
would be flaunting the quantity maxim by uttering it) and yet the 
speaker's stress assignment assumes that the insulting does correspond 
to a proposition in the PUD, since it has not been assigned contrastive 
stress, though other items in the utterance have, Thus what appears 
to be being assumed in the speaker's sentence is that someone insulted 
someone. If the speaker is not intending this to be an assumption 
then he is flaunting the newly-defined second maxim of relation. If 
however the hearer makes a further assumption, namely that to call 
someone a lexicalist is to insult them, the stress assignment, and 
the consequent implicatui’e that Someone insulted someone is a member 
of the PUD are predictable in the following way. On stating John 
called Mary a lexicalist, the speaker assumes by definition (cf* p.2#0f) 
that both his utterance and its entailments, specifically Someone called
JO. Cf, ch.*!- p.122 of this thesis
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someone a lexicalist, become members of the PUD, The further 
assumption, that to call someone a lexicalist is to insult them, 
implies an equivalence between Someone called someone a lexicalist 
and Someone insulted someone, or at least a relation of implication. 
With this assumption, it would follow automatically that if Someone 
called someone a lexicalist is a member of the PUD, Someone insulted 
someone would also be a member of the PUD, Since on this assumption 
the maxim of relation is being observed and the speaker's stress 
assignment on She insulted him is predictable, the speaker must 
therefore be implicating that to call someone a lexicalist is to 
insult them.
We have now seen that stress assignment and the consequent 
interpretation of questions, negative and positive assertions 
can be predicted within a Gricean framework, with the addition of 
one maxim. Since the addition of this maxim preserves the content 
of the other maxim of relation, I assume that taking this step 
strengthens the explanatory power of the theory. This is presumably 
preferable to allowing a generalisation of the single maxim of 
relation, which v/ould guarantee a reduction in the explanatory 
adequacy of the concept of the Go-operative Principle on which all 
my explanations have depended.
8.7 And and the Maxim of Manner
I have so far restricted my attention to problems arising with 
the maxims of relation and quantity. In explaining the pragmatic 
behaviour of and however, I shall have to refer to the maxim of manner 
which has an over-all instruction 'Be perspicuous' (cf. ch.7 p.202),
In chapter I argued (against Hobin Lakoff) that the sequence of time
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implied in such sentences as The police came in and we swallowed our
cigarettes was not a presuppositional implication and indeed not an
inherent property of and at all since sentences not joined by and
carried the same implication (cf* p,lljf). What explanation would
such an implication have within a Gricean framework? It clearly
cannot be a conventional implicature since this construct characterises
inherent non-truth-functional properties of linguistic items, and we
31have already seen that this is not merely a property of and*
But it cannot be a conversational implicature either since in order
to be so, it must be deduceable from the maxims, and there is no
obvious way in which this could be done. What solution is there?
One possible solution is to suggest that the implication of time
sequence is analogous to the implication on every statement that
the speaker believes the proposition it expresses. Grice explicitly
claims (in the 1967/68 lectures) that this implication is not itself
an implicature since it is not an assumption needed to preserve the
Co-operative Principle but rather arises as a direct consequence of
preserving the maxims straightforwardly. In the case of time sequence,
32the maxim one might invoke is the sub-maxim of manner 'Be orderly* 
with the interpretation 'Unless you explicitly mark the time relation, 
make your narration of events reflect their sequence1. If such an 
interpretation of the maxim is justified, then the implication of 
sentences is automatically predicted. Moreover since sentences joined
31* Cohen argues (1971 p.5^ ff) that this implication is not merely an 
inherent property of and but a truth-conditional one. His examples 
however conflate causality and time sequence, making the case appear 
stronger than it is,
32. Cf. Cohen's report of the 1967/68 lectures by Grice (Cohen ibid p.35).
joined by or or if....then do not constitute the 'narration of events' 
they v/ill, predictably, not carry the implication in question.
Is this solution entirely ad-hoc? The answer seems to be that in 
some respects it is, but others not. First, let us look at its 
disadvantages. The chief of these is that unlike the other maxims, 
it is not clear that a flagrant violation of this maxim would lead 
to a re—interpretation of the sentence uttered. Take as an example (23)j
(23) Rob Roy rode away and jumped on his horse.
An utterance of this sentence could not I think be re—interpreted in 
such a way as to give the utterance a plausible interpretation (in the 
way that You're the cream in my coffee can). If this criticism is 
right, we thus have a maxim which does not take part in the interpretation 
of implicatures (at least by flagrant violation of the maxims). To 
this extent it is ad-hoc. On the bonus side however, such a maxim 
provides an automatic explanation of the oddity of both (23) and (2**).
(2*0 Hob Roy rode away. He jumped on his horse.
In both cases, S1 entails that at time Q (such that Rob Roy was riding 
away) Rob Roy was on some animal (or at least some moving object).
2^ en^ a -^ls that at time P immediately prior to the time when he 
jumped on his horse, Rob Roy was not on his horse. If the maxim of 
manner ensures that utterances with no explicit time dependence betv/een 
them will be interpreted as reflecting the sequence of events, then it 
ensures that (23) and (2*0 will be interpreted as contradictions.
This is because S ^  entails that at a time P before the event at time 
Q that it describes, Rob Roy v/as not on his horse. But which by 
the maxim depicts the event at time describes Rob Roy as on some 
animal at that time. Thus at time P, Rob Roy is implied to be both 
on his horse and not on his horse. Hence the contradiction.
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Like all the other maxims we have considered, this interpretation 
of 'Be orderly* raises yet again the two problems of (i) the power 
of the maxims (ii) whether the maxims should in principle be so 
stated as to apply solely to the linguistic instances of communication 
(cf. p.2jlf). At every point, we seem to have found that it is 
possible to stretch the maxims so that they apply to anything, and yet 
with each extension of their predictive power, we reduce the chances 
of their possessing any explanatory power* In this particular case 
I have resisted this temptation, and have on the contrary interpreted 
a maxim so narrowly that it apply to a specific problem. But in 
doing so.., I have given it a linguistically specified interpretation 
which it could be argued is too narrow. I shall return to these 
problems inlhe final chapter. For the moment I assume that the 
implication of time sequence on certain utterances can be predicted 
without any difficulty by a particular specification of the maxim 
of manner.
8.8 Even Remains
There is just one more problem left if the general Gricean 
framework is to provide some sort of explanation for all the non­
truth-conditional 'presuppositional' phenomena which have emerged 
during this thesis - the problem of even. Let me briefly recapitulate 
the problem it creates. As Fraser points out in his discussion of 
even (Fraser 1971), a sentence such as Even Max tried on the pants 
has two implications specifically due to the presence of even;
(i) Other people tried on the pants
(ii) One would not expect Max to try on the pants
Neither of these is logically related to Even Max tried on the pants 
since if the sentence were uttered on an occasion in which neither 
(i) nor (ii) were true, it might still be true (even though odd) to 
say 'Even Max tried on the pants’. But if this is so, then it 
appears that the conditions for the truth of Even Max tried on the 
pants and Max tried on the 
are identical. Thus the theory of semantics outlined in previous 
chapters predicts that these three sentences are synonymous, and 
that even is a meaningless particle (since it does not affect the 
truth conditions of sentences it occurs i^). Intuitively this seems 
unfortunate.
In one sense hov/ever, this prediction is correct. It is correct
in so far as it predicts that whatever contribution even makes to
the sentences in which it occurs, this contribution is different in
kind from the contribution most wonLs make to sentence meaning. This
is certainly so. In fact the properties of even are so odd that they
do not naturally fit into the Gricean pragmatic framework either.
One might expect that implications such as (i) and (ii) would constitute
conventional implicatures - they certainly are not derivable in any
natural way via the maxims. But these implications have a further
characteristic which seems to militate against such an analysis -
they are to some extent cancellable. Consider the following utterance:
(25) All the kids tried on something. Mary tried on a pair of 
trousers, Sue a long shawl. Even Max tried on a fancy tie.
But then it's not really surprising. Now that his mother has 
married again, he joins in with things much more.
What does even contribute to this utterance of Even Max tried on a fancy
tie? It is not at all clear. The utterance certainly does not imply
that the speaker assumes that other people tried on a fancy tie.
pants (and too Max even tried on the pants)
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But nor is the speaker assuming that one would expect him not to try-
on a fancy tie. He is rather making the weaker assumption that
some people (including the hearer?) might expect him not to try on 
a fancy tie. This type of problem can arise with every case of 
even. (26) presents a similar case,
(26) Each member of the group did one thing towards getting publicity: 
May wrote to her bank manager, Bill to his local newspaper.
Adrian even wrote to the Prime Minister. But then I suppose it’s 
not surprising when one considers how adventurous he is.
Here too, the speaker is clearly not intending to imply that Adrian
did a number of things including writing to the Prime Minister. Nor
is he implying that it is surprising that he did so. All he is
implying is that his audience might expect Adrian’s action to be
surprising. Yet this implication is not itself a necessary property
of even. There is nothing odd in saying (27).
(27) I know you won’t find this surprising since you know John 
better than anyone but he’s even read Aristophanes of Byzantium
In this case, what seems to remain is the implication that John has
read other things. Thus what we appear to be faced with is a
disjunction of properties: even either implies that the constituent to
which it is prefixed should be construed as one of a group‘d  or that
there is some element of surprise involved (either on the part of the
speaker or on the part of hearer). Other than an ad-hoc formulation
of these properties, we have no means of stating these characteristics
35* For aldiscussion of scope phenomena and even, cf. Fraser 1971, 
Anderson 1972, and also ch.2 p,*iO fn.35 of this thesis.
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either within the semantic or the pragmatic framework. It therefore 
remains an anomaly. Since however its behaviour is so idiosyncratic,
I think one is justified in assuming on the basis of the evidence 
considered elsev/here in the thesis that the over-all framework set 
up here is not seriously disturbed by the counter-example which 
even presents.
8.9 Illocutionary Force: Its Status Within Pragmatics
Finally there is one general problem which I have more or less 
ignored throughout this thesis - that of illocutionary force ,
My earlier suggestion (p.?4f) that illocutionary force and the 
analysis of speech acts did not form part of semantics 
was on the grounds that they provide all the problems of indeterminacy 
which render semantics non-predictable. But if concepts such 
as illocutionary force are to form part of a pragmatic theory, then 
we must be able to demonstrate that they are compatible with the 
pragmatic framework given here. Otherwise they will be problems 
which have merely been sv/ept under the pragmatic carpet, and left 
there.
While 1 do not intend to give a detailed characterisation of 
this very large area, it can be quite straightforwardly shown that 
an analysis- of illocutionary force is dependent upon a knowledge of 
what the speaker is (nonconventionally) implicating and therefore 
must be part of pragmatics. We have already seen that a sentence such 
as There are three bulls in that field may be used to convey either 
a warning, a boast or a mere statement of fact (cf. ch.4 p.95). For
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a further example, consider I’ve got a headache. This sentence can 
be used at least as a warning, a request (for advice or sympathy) 
or an apology. In order for an utterance of this sentence to 
constitute a warning for example, the speaker must reason that 
the hearer will work out the relevance of the utterance on the basis 
that both speaker and hearer know, say, that when the speaker has 
a headache, he is normally very disagreeable and on the basis of 
this common assumption, the hearer will work out that the speaker 
is implicating that his company may be unpleasant and is thus 
giving the hearer prior warning. While this analysis is informal, 
it demonstrates nonetheless that the calculation of whether the 
statement is a warning is dependent on the implicatures of the 
utterance. This must be so since the illocutionary force relates 
directly not to the semantic content of the sentence used, but 
to the content of the message which the speaker is seeking to convey.
At the very least then, it seems certain that the prediction of 
illocutionary force for any utterance can only be part of a pragmatic 
theory.
There is however a stronger claim possible which naturally accounts 
for the dependence of illocutionary force on the Go-operative Principle, 
as we shall see immediately. Both Cohen (1969) and Searle (1968) have 
pointed out that all possible illocutionary forces can always be made 
explicit with the appropriate use of a performative verb. Thus 
’I’ve got a headache' construed as a warning corresponds to the explicit 
performative statement 'I warn you that I've got a headache'. On the 
basis of this, both argue that the distinction between illocutionary
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force and meaning is not well-founded and should be given up.
In the light of the deduction of warning that I gave on an utterance
of I’ve got a headache, we can see why this distinction is so tenuous.
Compare the first formulation with the following. S reasons in uttering
'I’ve got a headache' that since both he and H know that when he has
a headache he is very disagreeable, H will deduce that S is wishing
to convey to H that his company is likely to be unpleasant and he
is therefore implicating the statement 'I warn you that I am likely
to be unpleasant’. The only difference between the two formulations;
is that in the first, the warning is not itself said to be an implicature,
whereas in the latter the speaker is said to be implicating the
performative statement 'I warn you that....*. Is the difference
between the two substantive? I think not, for reasons which are
stated in detail by Cohen and Searle. Briefly, there is little
justification for claiming that I warn you that I’ve got a headache
is a specification of the illocutionary force of the utterance
'I’ve got a headache' rather than a specification of its (pragmatic)
meaning, particularly since in the full performative, the specification
given is unquestionably part of its meaning. If this is so, and the
intended deduction of illocutionary force of the speaker's utterance
35is merely one type of implicature, then it follows automatically
3^f. The solutions they offer are not however compatible.
35* An argument against this conclusion is given by Schiffer (1972 p*89)
who claims that in order to know the illocutionary force of an utterance 
, it is not enough to know what was meant by the sentence uttered, one
must also know what is' was meant as. If however I am right in saying
that for every case where an utterance is construed 'as a warning' there
is an equivalent analysis in which a performative statement (of .warning) 
is construed as part of what is meant, then Schiffer’s distinction 
falls to the ground.
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that an account of the illocutionary force of utterances is part and 
parcel of an account of the pragmatic properties of a language.
This is not to suggest that the concept of illocutionary force 
is necessarily redundant, and few would be foolish enough to suggest 
that re-analysing illocutionary force in terms of implicature did more 
than re-label the problem. In any case such an account raises extra 
problems for the Gricean framework. It is not obvious that the 
implication of warning (or request, apology etc) is dependent on the 
Co-operative Principle in the sense that its deduction depends on an
36apparent violation of the maxims. However it seems reasonably clear 
that implicatures in general arise even when maxims are not violated. 
There seems no reason to doubt for example that the implicature of the 
speaker's likely unpleasantness in the utterance of I've got a headache. 
is just as plausible in answer to the question 'How are you?* (when 
it would certainly be relevant and there need be little reason to 
suppose it untrue) as if it were uttered with flagrant disregard for 
relevance (for example in response to the greeting 'Hello'). Thus 
the relation between the concept of implicature and the conversational 
maxims is not a problem specific to the incorporation of illocutionary 
force as one type of implicature but applies to the entire model.
Whatever problems this re-analysis of illocutionary force gives 
to the general concept of the Co-operative Principle, the general tenor 
of the argument remains unaltered. Both the arguments given by Searle 
and Cohen and the close affinity between the deduction of illocutionary 
force and the deduction of implicatures suggest that illocutionary force 
on utterances is but one of the aspects of implicated meaning of 
utterances and is not different from it in kind.
36. Cf. ch.7 p.20^ - for Grice's own characterisation of implicature*
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8 * 1 0  S u m m a r y
In the course of chapters 7 and 8, I have concentrated on two 
main problems: (a) whether Grice's Co-operative Principle can be given 
sufficient constraints to constitute a non-vacuous theory of 
communication; (b) whether the framework so specified can account 
for the wide range of phenomena which have been given by various 
people at various times the label of presupposition*
What I hope that chapter 8 has unequivocally shown is that the 
phenomena often incorporated into semantics under an umbrella label of 
presupposition can naturally be explained within a framework which 
depends on a logically prior system of linguistic conventions and that 
these phenomena are thus not themselves part of the semantics of that 
system. The more tentative part of these chapters concerns the 
constraints on that pragmatic framework. It seems clear that there 
must be such constraints and what I have put forward can be seen as a 
first attempt to provide them.
There are in any case serious problems for a Gricean theory of
pragmatics, even in its most general form. One of these I have touched
on: can the concept of implicature be defined as an assumption
necessary to preserve the assumption of compliance with the pragmatic
maxims? If the examples I considered dn the preceding section (p«;289)
are correct, then it seems that implicatures need not be restricted to
apparent violations of the maxims. There is also the problem of how
the subject of any conversation can legitimately be changed. If a
Gricean theory is to be accepted as the only serious contender for a
pragmatic theory, then problems such as these will have to be solved.
I have not gone into them here simply because there have been more 
immediate and pressing problems.
More important perhaps than all these points of detail is the 
question of what status a pragmatic theory has within an over-all 
theory of language. It this question that I shall take up in the 
final chapter.
CHAPTER. 9 Pragmatics and The Competence~Perf ormance Distinction
The main tasks of this thesis are now all complete. These were 
to set out as a preliminary a linguistic framework to provide a 
perspective within which all consequent arguments would be considered, 
and then to argue: (i) that semantics of natural language involves a 
statement of the conditions for the truth of all the sentences of that 
language (by a recursive finite procedure) (ii) that concepts pertaining 
to speakers' beliefs in uttering sentences are correctly excluded 
from that semantics by virtue of very general requirements on semantic 
theory (iii) that the logic required within such a truth-conditional 
semantics is two-valued (containing the values true and false) and is 
not a presuppositional three-valued logic (iv) that apparent counter­
examples to these three hypotheses are naturally explained at a 
separate theoretical level, that of pragmatics, and thus do not in 
fact constitute counter-examples.
There would however be no justification whatever for assuming that 
there are now few remaining problems, even if my arguments are correct. 
Many, quite fundamentalf problems remain at every stage. Within the 
semantic framework for example, it is not obvious that in formulating 
semantic interpretations along the lines of Bierwisch as I have done, 
one is doing anything more than translating into yet another syntax 
which demands an interpretation in its turn. Thus the argument raised 
by Lewis (1972) against Katz that his formalism merely constitutes an
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1ad-hoc language, !,Markeresen, could perhaps also be Raised against 
the formalism adopted in this thesis. And within the pragmatic framework 
outlined by Grice, ' we have already seen that large problems 
remain. In any case, not all the data haars been taken into account »
I have not given a pragmatic explanation for some of the examples 
raised by Keenan, Since I could not pretend to solve all these 
problems within the bounds of a single thesis, I have concentrated 
my attention on those which seemed of primary importance. The others 
remain in need of a solution.
There is however one further problem which must be taken up.
Though I have considered in some detail the nature of a theory of 
pragmatics, I have not yet broached the question of what status such 
a theory should have within an over-all linguistic theory. In order 
now to be able to discuss this, let us first recapitulate the whole 
range of phenomena for which an explanation is demanded, First there 
is the central (*referential' or 1cognitive1) meaning of sentences 
and words, which can, I have argued, be stated - with very few 
exceptions - in terms of truth conditions on sentences (or in the case 
of words, the contribution they make to such sets of truth conditions). 
The few exceptions are words like but, even, and possibly therefore 
(but cf, p. 302 ff) , whose contribution to sentence-meaning does not 
appear to affect the truth conditions of sentences. Then there are 
the very general implications on sentences which I have argued cannot 
be seen as an inherent or necessary part of sentence-meaning in the 
same way as truth-conditional properties, since these implications
1. Cf, Lewis 1971 p.l69f*
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can be cancelled out without resulting in a contradiction. Finally 
there are the occasion-specific implications which depend on assumptions 
shared by particular speakers and hearers, and which may run counter 
to the standard message conveyed by utterances of that same sentence.
It seems to me that this range of data could be incorporated into 
a formal linguistic model in one of six possible ways,
I (equivalent to the Lakoffs' position) The distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics could be disputed and the entire theory of 
sentence interpretation based on a number of different procedures within 
the semantic component of the competence model. Implicit in this 
formulation would be the claim that the disparity of the evidence just 
listed should be reflected directly in a non-homogeneous account of 
natural language semantics,
II (equivalent to the Kiparskys' and Fillmore's positions) Occasion- 
specific implicatures would be explained as performance phenomenal but 
all general implicatures, whether contradictable or not, would be 
predicted within the semantic component. This could be done in two ways 
(a) by recognising the non-homogeneity of semantics (similar to the view 
I above), and predicting strict entailments and general implications
by two separate procedures (cf. the Kiparskys' distinction between 
assertion and presupposition, 1970)| (b) by generalising the concept 
of implication so that it apply regardless of whether the implication 
is cancellable or not (cf. Fillmore's use of presupposition, 1971)*
The distinction between semantics and pragmatics as I have drawn it is 
still disputed on both these positions; under position (b) semantic 
relations, though defined univocally, are not defined in terms of truth
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dependencies, and under position (a) the concept of natural language 
meaning is not defined univocally. As a consequence, in both cases, 
many implications which I have explained pragmatically fall under 
the domain of semantics,
III (equivalent to K a t z 1 197 3 . position - cf. p,420ff) The distinction 
between semantics and pragmatics is maintained as X have defined it 
and a pragmatic component (in the form of a model of Grice's theory) 
is incorporated into the competence model (with inputs from all three 
components, syntactic, semantic, and phonological).
IV Semantics and pragmatics, as I have defined them, are formulated 
respectively within a competence and within a performance model - 
but with one important exception. Conventional implicatures, such 
as on but and even, which are non-contradictable though not truth- 
conditional, are listed in the lexicon (which otherwise specifies truth 
conditions for lexical items) with an ad-hoc device indicating that 
they are not themselves truth-conditional.
V Pragmatics, along Gricean lines, is altogether formalised as a sub­
part of a theory of performance and the sole function of the semantic 
component of the competence model is to predict truth conditions on 
sentences and consequent entailments between sentences.
Now it must be evident from the tenor of my arguments in all 
preceding chapters that I am tempted, if not committed, to embrace 
the strongest possibility, alternative V. Before considering the 
rashness of this move, let me take up each of the preceding alternatives. 
Since I discussed the consequences of adopting alternative I in some 
detail in chapter 4, I shall not consider this position further other 
than to reiterate what I said there that since such a theory has no 
predictive power, it cannot provide an acceptable solution.
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What of the two alternatives listed under II? Alternative 
11(a) is similar to alternative I in so far as the non-homogeneity of 
the data is reflected in the semantic statement. Rather than disagree 
with this argument directly, let us consider how such non-homogeneity 
could be written into the theory. The performance model would 
presumably incorporate the Gricean maxims to explain occasion-specific 
implicatures, and these would therefore play no part in the competence 
model. The problem would thus concern phenomena such as the interpretation 
of but, even^  the (as distinct from the indefinite article), factive 
verbs (in positive and negative environments) and stress assignment.
In a Gricean framework, the first two of these have conventional 
(non-contradictable implicatures^ the last three general but 
contradictable implicatures. One possibility is to specify such implications 
as part of the lexical entry. Thus but might have an entry indicating 
that it always conveys some form of contrast between the two elements 
it conjoins. However there has to be some explicit indication that 
entries such as this are different in kind from other semantic components 
since setting up this form of semantic component must not make any 
predictions about the behaviour of the item in question. Thus for 
example (as was pointed out in ch.4 p.H7f), no contradiction arises 
if but conjoins two sentences which are entirely non-contrastive 
(a combination which would be contradictory if the component in question 
were truth-conditional). Furthermore in the case of the or the factive 
verbs involving implications which a?e cancellable, there will have to be 
some ad-hoc statement that these implications are normal but not necessary 
implications.
2. Though cf. p.284f und the additional problems connected with even.
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One way (and arguably the only plausible way) round these problems 
is to postulate a distinction for cases such as these between their 
meaning and conditions for their use. Thus but could have two sub­
sections to the semantic specification of its lexical entry; a statement 
of its meaning and a statement for conditions on its use - via. that 
the speaker imply that there be some form of contrast between the two 
conjuncts. But this formulation not only meets exactly the same 
difficulties that face a separate theory of pragmatics, but appears 
to be no more than a terminological variant of it. Notice that 
within this partially truth-conditional framework, even has no meaning, 
just as in the exclusively truth-conditional framework; it merely 
has conditions for its use. Both formulations therefore predict that 
John was there and Even John w a s  there do not differ in meaning. It 
thus seems that none of the problems for pragmatics are avoided. In 
any case, to give an ad-hoc label to certain components - say, 
"non-truth-conditional" or "a condition of use" - is surely equivalent 
to saying that this aspect of these words is of a quite different 
status from the central core notion of meaning - in other words that 
these particular aspects of words (or sentences) have to be described 
at a different level. But this is exactly what setting up a theory of 
pragmatics aims to capture. Moreover, there is no explanation whatever 
within this putative partially truth-conditional semantics for the fact 
that some of these non-truth-conditional properties (such as those on 
the) are cancellable while others are not. And it is not obvious how
3* In the case of general implicatures, the label preferred by Kartunnen 
(1971b) and Geiss and Zwicky (1971) is "invited inference". But this 
label merely describes the phenomena. It does not provide an 
explanation of them.
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this could be captured. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude 
that the non-homogeneity of sentence interpretations is captured by 
setting up the distinction betvjeen semantics and pragmatics and it is 
therefore redundant to introduce such non-homogeneity into the semantic 
formalisation itself.
Alternative 11(b) constitutes a more radical criticism of the 
views I have put forward. On this view, the central importance of 
entailment is doubted and a weaker relation (to cover entailments 
and sentenee-pairs such as I didn't regret going I went. Even John hit 
Mary Other people hit Mary, etc) is defined in its place. A supporter 
of this view might argue that in certain crucial cases I have 
distorted the evidence so that the issue appears more clear-cut than 
it in fact is* For example, in chapter 4 I pointed out that sentences 
containing pretend such as John pretended that he was sick did not 
entail John was not sick despite a very general implication that this 
was so. Since the argument in chapters 4 and 5 did not depend on 
the nature of this implication, 1 did not pursue the matter further 
there. But it might be argued that this is one of many implications 
which linguistic semantics should wish to predict and if this relation 
is not reducible to a truth dependence, so much the worse for truth- 
dependent semantics. Verbs such as criticise and accuse provide 
further examples, and it no coincidence that Fillmore chose this 
group of examples in seeking to attack a componential approach to 
semantics. I argued in chapter 4 (p. 9££ ) for example that John 
criticised Mary for taking his books did not presuppose that she took 
them, but rather entailed the weaker statement John was assuming that
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Mary took his books, whether or not she in fact did, and whether he 
believed it or not (cf, egs (18) and (21)). Now such a claim might be 
countered by the criticism that the inclusion of assumptions (as a primitive?) 
in the formal statement of criticise is merely an ad-hoc device to avoid 
recognising the need for a weaker implication between sentence pairs such 
as John criticised Mary for taking his books and Mary took his books. On 
this view, to formalise this relation as an entailment between John 
criticised Mary for taking his books and John was assuming that Mary took 
his books is a confusion of a metalinguistic statement and a statement of 
the object language. Confirmation of this general view might be sought 
by pointing out that even provides no anomaly in a system based on a 
weak (undefined?) form of implication. Even only provides a problem 
if entailments are to be predicted, since it is preciesly the set of 
entailments of a sentence to which it is attached that even appears 
not to affect*
This form of criticism is not however I think justified. Notice 
that by seeking to confirm or refute hypotheses of meaning by the 
evidence of contradictions, we successively refine our analyses of 
meaning so that they make exactly the predictions required. So for 
example the observation that John pretended that Mary was sick does 
not entail that Mary was sick merely indicates that the analysis of 
pretend is more complicated than the initial hypothesis suggested. A 
similar procedure applied in the case of criticise and accuse (cf* ch. 4 
p,98ff). In contrast to this, a theory of meaning based on some 
loosely defined umbrella term of implication would either not be able 
to make predictions of any sort since it would not distinguish between 
necessary and possible implications, or it would be of such general 
application (cf. the various uses of the term presupposition in ch.4  
p.92) that its explanatory power would be nil. Furthermore, and more
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seriously, to base analyses on general implications rather than on 
necessary implications leads inevitably to shoddy results since as 
in the case of accuse* and criticise (and indeed pretend)* general 
implications lead to approximate and untestable analyses (verifiable 
only by speakers' hazy intuitions as to what constitutes part of a 
sentence's meaning) rather than exact and testable ones* Thus the 
existence of implications on utterances which do not extend to all 
uses of that sentence does not seem to me to provide any evidence for 
the need to incorporate some looser form of implication into semantics, 
either in the form of alternative II(a) or the stronger alternative 11(b) - 
particularly since, as we have already seen, the general implications 
on negative factive sentences, on definite noun phrases, etc, can be 
given an explanation by reference to pragmatic constructs such as 
the Co-operative Principle and its maxims which are, by definition, 
logically posterior to a linguistic system*
There remain alternatives III, IV and V, each preserving much 
more closely the dichotomy that I have assumed in previous chapters 
of this thesis* Alternative III must, I think, be dismissed for the 
following reason. If a competence model was envisaged as containing 
a pragmatic component (dependent on information from the other three 
components of the grammar) then it would automatically become a matter 
of one% linguistic knowledge that people generally speak the truth 
and stick to the point. In other words, 'Do not say what you believe 
to be false* and 'Be relevant1 would become rules of one's competence.
But the content of these rules and the way in which they apply are quite 
unlike any rules of either the syntactic, semantic or phonological 
component. In the first place, they can be broken. Not speaking the
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truth for example does not lead one to utter an ungrammatical sentence , 
though breaking a syntactic, semantic, or phonological rule does. In 
addition, the interpretations the maxims provide may have an indeterminacy 
which is quite unlike the outputs of the three existing components of the 
model. On.the■contrary,the model is committed to providing a fully 
determinate syntactic, semantic, and phonological specification to 
the sentences it generates. In.. fact . , all the problems which
necessitated the delimitation of semantics to exclude speaker-belief 
constructs - the most important being the loss of predictive power - 
immediately return if pragmatics is incorporated into the model of 
competence. These reasons suggest that the pragmatic maxims are not 
part of the central competence model but must rather be part of a 
theory of performance.
One rejoinder might be made to this conclusion. In chapter 7-8 
I went to considerable lengths to constrain the notions of informativeness 
and relevance so that the Gricean maxims might acquire at least some 
predictive power. It might however be argued that in doing so I have 
committed myself to incorporating some Gricean concept of pragmatics 
into a linguistic competence model, since the revised maxims make 
reference largely to the specific semantic and pragmatic content of 
messages and not to more general concepts (cf. in particular the 
postulation of a second maxim of Relation on p.278 to account for 
stress phenomena and the interpretation of the maxim of Manner in connection 
with and on p.281f)« Thus the maxims only apply to linguistic behaviour 
and no' longer constitute conventions on social behaviour in general as
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Grice appears to have intended them to. This rejoinder is not I think 
valid. Remember - the point of the increased specificity of the 
maxims was to increasatheir content so that they became less vacuous.
If the rejoinder suggested here were correct, it would seem that a 
necessary condition on performance theories is that they be so general 
as to guarantee vacuity. In any case there is no a priori reason why 
performance constructs should not refer to linguistic constructs.
On the contrary, there is evidence that they must. If as Bever suggests 
(Bever 1970) there are perceptual strategies associated with the 
understanding of constructions, and if his formulation of such strategies 
is even partially correct, then it seems certain that whatever form 
an over-all theory of performance might take, it must make reference 
to specific linguistic constructs. The assumption behind such a 
criticism of the revised maxims thus seems to be false#
In suggesting that the maxims must be part of a theory of 
performance rather than the exclusively linguistic model, I have still 
not closed the door on alternative IV, though it may seem so at first 
glance. What is at issue here is not the general but contradictable 
implications on definite noun phrases or factives discussed in 
chapter 8. Both alternatives IV and V are agreed that anything which 
can be explained by virtue of the maxims must be part of the domain 
of performance, since the maxims do not constitute linguistic rules.
What is at issue are those implications which are apparently inherent 
properties of the word in question but which are not truth-conditional.
We have already seen (ch.7 p*207) that not only are these counter­
examples to a truth-conditional semantics but they are also, in effect,
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counter-examples to a Gricean pragmatics since they neither fall 
within the domain of his meaning^ nor are they explicable by reference 
to the maxims of the Co-operative Principle. These then are the 
examples which do not fit satisfactorily into the semantics- 
pragmatics dichotomy and which in addition cause pragmatics (if they 
be part of pragmatics) to apply across the competence-performance 
distinction.
Xn assessing these examples, perhaps the first questions to ask 
are 'How big is the list?* and 'How important are the items it contains?' 
Of the problems which have arisen in this thesis, just three appear 
to constitute conventional implicatures - the implications of but, 
even, and therefore. The last, therefore, was used by Grice as a 
standard example of this form of implication and I bowed to this 
judgment in using it in chapter 7 (p,207 )« However the validity 
of this analysis is questionable. Consider what a statement of the 
meaning of therefore would have to indicate. To give the meaning of 
P and therefore Q. one would have to give the set of conditions 
guaranteeing the truth of P and Q together with a condition specifying, 
r oughly, that £ follows from P. If this last condition is not 
truth-conditional, it should not affect the truth value of two sentences 
it conjoins. But consider the followings
(1) If Bill hit Mary and therefore she was covered with bruises,
she will have won her suit for damages.
Presumably we are agreed that this statement will be true if both
antecedent and consequent have the same truth value, whether true
or false, and false if the antecedent is true and the consequent false.
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Now suppose we envisage a situation such that (i) Bill did hit Mary,
(ii) Mary was covered in bruises but none of them caused by his 
hitting her - she got them from falling off her bicycle in the rush 
hour, (iii) she did not win her suit for damages. That is to say, 
each of the separate claims made by the antecedent is true except for 
the condition expressed by means of therefore. Now if therefore 
does not contribute to the truth conditions of the sentences in which 
it occurs we would expect (1) to be false in the situation specified.
But if on the contrary it does affect the truth-value assignment, 
then since the causal connection asserted is not fulfilled in the 
particular state of affairs, we would expect (1) to be true. And 
so, I think, it is. Consider also (2)
(2) If it's not true that Bill hit Mary and therefore she’s covered
in bruises, then she will have given up her 
suit for damages
in conjunction with a situation in which (i) and (ii) hold as before - 
Bill hit Mary but the bruises she has have nothing to do with his 
hitting her - and this time, she sues him. That is, the claim made 
by the conjuncts in the antecedent are both true though they are not 
causally connected. Thus if therefore has mo contribution to make to 
a truth-conditional statement, the antecedent is false, since the 
conjunction is preceded by negation. If however therefore makes a 
contribution to the statement's set of truth conditions, then the 
conjunction of P and therefore Q will in this case be false, and so 
the whole antecedent true. The consequent is false. If the implication
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on therefore is truth-conditional, we would predict that in this state 
of affairs, (2) will be false. If therefore only provides a conventional 
implicature on the other hand, we would predict that (2) will be 
true (both antecedent and consequent being false). Though one's 
intuitions have to work hard at this level of logical complexity, it 
seems certain that given the state of affairs outlined, (2) is false.
This example is interesting for a different reason. (2) provides 
an example in which the implication induced by therefore falls within 
the scope of negation. If this property is truth-conditional as 
statements (1) and (2) suggest, this is just as one would expect, since 
the rule interpreting negatives is a semantic rule. If however, the 
implication were pragmatic, then one might expect that such a property 
should not be subject to a semantic rule such as negation. Even and but 
are strikingly different from therefore in this respect. No statement 
of the form -(P but Q) can mean "P and Q, but there is no contrast 
between them". It is perhaps more unexpected that even behaves in a 
similar way. John didn't even whip Mary is not interpreted as "It is 
not the case that John even whipped Mary" but as "It is even the case that 
John did not whip Mary". That is to say, however the interpretation of 
even is formalised, the rule must operate on the output of the rule of 
negation. Moreover in cases parallel to examples (1) and (2) 
containing even we do not get changes in truth value, as we did with 
therefore. Consider (3)
(3) If John even hit Mary then Bill will have reported him to the police 
in conjunction with circumstances such that (a) John hit Mary, (b) John
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did nothing else at all (c) Bill did not report John. In this case
(3) seems to me to be false, with the consequent false, even though
the condition suggested by even that John did something else is not
fulfilled. Similarly (4).
(4) If it's not the case that John even hit Mary, then Bill will have
withdrawn his threat to report him to the police
Here, imagine that as before John hit Mary, nothing else, and Bill 
does not withdraw his threat. Thus the constituent sentence inside 
the negation is true, except that John didn't do anything else, so 
the entire antecedent is false and with a false consequent this 
guarantees the truth of the claim. Thus even, as a pragmatic account 
would predict, seems to have no effect on the truth value of 
utterances. However therefore «* on the evidence put forward here
and contrary to my initial assumption *» seems to be explicable
straightforwardly in terms of truth conditions.
So our list of exceptions is reduced to two - even and but. Are
these sufficient to constitute an issue? I think not. Notice that in
both cases, their interpretation is extremely difficult to pin down, 
either semantically or pragmatically. In the case of even (cf. ch. 8 
section 8.9), we saw that each of its implications \ m s  separately 
cancellable, though the basis for these cancellations did not appear 
to have any basis on the Co-operative Principle and its maxims. And 
in the case of but, not only does no contradiction arise if but, 
despite the requirement of contrast, occurs in an environment where 
there is no contrast between the sentences it conjoins, but unlike 
any other word it is impossible to challenge a person's use of the 
word but on the basis of its meaning. That is, if somebody says
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" John's sick", you oan challenge him by saying "Why do you say he's 
sick?" and he cannot reasonably reply "But I didn't imply that he was".
By contrast, if somebody says "You may be sick, but so am I" and you 
challenge him (on the basis of some c£ Hobin Lakoff's definitions of 
but - cf. R.Lakoff 1971 section 3) saying "Why do you think there's 
anything unexpected about your being sick?" or "Why do you think there's 
anything odd about your being sick?" or "Why do you assume there's 
anything contrasting your being sick and mine?" he may well, and 
reasonably, reply to all three questions "I didn't imply there was".
So we have two possibilities to choose between. Either we enter even 
and but as out-and-out exceptions to the general format of the semantic 
component within the lexicon of that component, or we give them no 
interpretation in the semantic component other than, in the case of but, 
the truth table for and. It is not obvious that the two alternatives 
are in this form more than terminologically distinct. What evidence 
could lead to a choice between them? The former conveys by ad-hoc 
listing that there are a few exceptions to a truth-conditional statement 
without any further explanation; the latter defines the exceptions 
within a theory of performance whioh automatioally predicts that their 
interpretation will be different in kind from words such as run and boy. 
Moreover if we are to give any substance to the statement that using but 
commits the speaker to some form of contrast, we can go at least some way 
to specifying this contrast if - and only if - we indicate the way in 
which implicatures of contrast can be deduced by assumptions made by 
specific speakers on specific occasions (cf. R.Lakoff ibid pp,132ff).
But to do so involves reference to the Co-operative Principle and its 
maxims and both alternatives XV and V agree, against alternative III, 
that the nature of the maxims is such as to exclude them from a 
competence model. It thus seems as though alternative V provides the 
most explanatory solution.
It does however have one extremely counter-intuitive consequence. 
Performance conventions and constraints are in general not arbitrary in 
the way that linguistic conventions ares it is not the case that in some 
societies people generally tell lies as a basis for communication, and it 
would indeed be surprising to find a society which found centre-embedded 
constructions easier to understand tha<\, co-ordinated constructions. Yet 
clearly the conventions for the use of but and even are arbitrary in just 
the same \ m y  as any other linguistic signs it is hardly a function either 
of the structure of the English brain or of our society that even and but
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have the interpretations they do. If then we are to include the 
interpretation of even and but within the umbrella of performance, 
it seems as though we shall have to distinguish this type of implication 
from all other performance conventions. We thus seem to have an impasse.
On the one hand even and but disturb the univocality of semantics, and 
on the other hand they disturb the apparent univocality of performance, 
There is however one further piece of evidence - that of style. 
Stylistic differences between synonyms provide an anologous problem.
They are normally excluded from semantics on the grounds that their 
difference is so much less important than their similarity. But if a 
stylistic account is excluded from competence on the basis that stylistic 
differences are merely a factor of use, then we seem to be invoking a 
concept of use extremely close to that characterised by the Go-operative 
Principle and its maxims. One might therefore expect such differences to 
be accounted for within a theory of performance. Yet some stylistio 
conventions are just as arbitrary as conventions for the use of even and 
huiu We have here a very similar problem to that presented by but and even 
and their relation to pragmatics. Many stylistic conventions are non- 
arbitrary in the required sense. Complex noun phrases as subjects with 
simple predicates, such as The problem described above in which 'even' and 
'but* provide anomalies to eaoh logical possibility remains, may well be 
more unacceptable in conversation than in a written text by virtue of more 
rigorous memory constraints in the former case. But conventions which mark 
fiddle as informal (in contrast to violin which is unmarked stylistically) 
are entirely arbitrary; and yet - along with all other stylistic problems - 
such stylistic differences are not generally considered within a 
competence model. The explanation of their distribution therefore forms 
part of performance, despite the arbitrary nature of the convention in
-308-
certain cases. But if an explanation of such stylistic distinctions 
falls within the domain of performance, non-arbitrariness cannot be 
a necessary condition of a performance factor. Since the univocality 
of the non-arbitrary nature of performance conventions seems in any 
case to be disturbed by the incorporation of stylistic conventions,
I shall conclude that the interpretation of but and even forms part 
of a theory of use as a subpart of a theory of performance.
Thus somewhat hesitatingly, I wish to embrace alternative Vi 
accordingly I suggest that Grice's explanation of communication, as 
extended and modified here, provides at least a first formulation 
of some data that a theory of performance will have to account for, and 
at most the first steps towards a theory of pragmatics as part of a 
theory of performance, (in any case, if the strongest position, stated 
as alternative V, has to be relinquished for alternative IV the 
essential parts of Grice's theory remain as part of a theory of 
performance, since as we have seen (p.301f), conventional implicatures 
such as carried by but and even are in effect exceptions to Grice's 
account as well.) It remains to be seen what formal representation 
can be provided to give serious content to the theory of pragmatics 
I have been pressing for here. In particular for example, I have said 
nothing about the initial translation from a truth-conditional semantic 
statement into a Gricean pragmatic statement (of meaning^) (°£« ch.7 
pp.l97ff). But problems such as this I must leave for another time.
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